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Spyware Disguises Itself as Firefox Extension

Posted by timothy on Thu Jul 27, 2006 12:42 PM
from the not-yet-linux-compatible dept.
Juha-Matti Laurio writes "The antivirus specialists at McAfee have warned of a Trojan that disguises itself as a Firefox extension. The trojan installs itself as a Firefox extension, presenting itself as a legitimate existing extension called numberedlinks. It then begins intercepting passwords and credit card numbers entered into the browser, which it then sends to an external server. The most dangerous part of the issue is that it records itself directly into the Firefox configuration data, avoiding the regular installation and confirmation process."
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  • Not a vulnerability. (Score:5, Informative)

    by Short Circuit (52384) * <mikemol@gmail.com> on Thursday July 27 2006, @12:46PM (#15792636) Homepage Journal
    Note that this isn't a Firefox vulnerability.

    The trojan is opened as a Windows executable from email attachments, and writes itself into the Firefox profile's configuration directory.
    • by kfg (145172) on Thursday July 27 2006, @12:51PM (#15792709)
      I refuse to use this trojan until it's ported to Linux.

      We have to send a message to developers that we want our apps native.

      KFG
      • by 140Mandak262Jamuna (970587) on Thursday July 27 2006, @01:23PM (#15793038) Journal
        Come on, You dont even have to be a script kiddie to write malware for Linux.

        This is how it works:

        First create an executable that will do bad things. It could even be a csh script. Then send emails to all and sundry like this and attach that file"

        Dear Linuxuser,

        This is a virus/trojan/worm/malware for Linux. It works on the honor system. Please forward the attachment to all addresses in your .mailrc first and then save it to disk, chmod +x and sudo it. Thank you.

        Attachment: malware

      • by zo1dberg (939135) on Thursday July 27 2006, @01:28PM (#15793081)
        This is the one thing that keeps people from running Linux on their desktops! We normal users don't want to fiddle around with the commandline and stuff like that, we need a point-and-click-interface to compromise the security of our computers! Trust me, until this is fixed, Linux has no hope of ever becoming a serious competitor to Windows.
        • by Not The Real Me (538784) on Thursday July 27 2006, @01:39PM (#15793199)
          Good point.

          A friend of mine has certifications as an MCSE and a CNE. When I tell him to run "ipconfig /all" and "route print" (on his WinXP machine), the look of consternation and confusion on his face is priceless.

          • by soft_guy (534437) on Thursday July 27 2006, @02:33PM (#15793757)
            A friend of mine has certifications as an MCSE and a CNE

            With friends like that, who needs users?
          • by cyber-vandal (148830) on Thursday July 27 2006, @03:15PM (#15794169) Homepage
            Not as priceless as the look on my face on reading that and noting that that clueless muppet gets paid a lot more than I do. Maybe I should get off my arse and get one of them MCSE thingies.
            • by Anonymous Coward
              Look, I got my MCSE in 1999, and I had to know how to use ipconfig and route as part of the course -- now, did that get covered in the test? I don't know. But it was part of the work we had to do in the TCP/IP module. It's depressing to me because I think MCSE used to mean something, but I also have encountered dolts who have a raft of acronyms after their email signature, and it's almost a sure-fire way of identifying useless chumps in the organization. I don't advertise my MCSE in my signature, and I
    • Emphasis on that. (Score:5, Informative)

      by khasim (1285) <brandioch.conner@gmail.com> on Thursday July 27 2006, @12:54PM (#15792745)
      This is an Outlook/IE "virus" who's payload is a keylogger and crap that hooks into Firefox.

      This does not exploit any vulnerability in Firefox.

      If your OS is not secure, no app running on it can be secured.
      • by dedazo (737510) on Thursday July 27 2006, @01:39PM (#15793192) Journal
        This is an Outlook/IE "virus" who's payload is a keylogger and crap that hooks into Firefox.

        This is an user-executed email attachment with a trojan. It will happily be executed from Outlook Express, IE, Eudora and Thunderbird. McAfee mentions they've seen one version trying to exploit a three year old IE vulnerability. If you haven't patched that, well then you deserve to get nailed.

        This does not exploit any vulnerability in Firefox

        It is a vulnerability in that FF will happily load and execute any plugins dropped into its profile directory. The only time you are warned about installing someone is at download time. FF will never check for a signature or otherwise go "oh, a new plugin I've never seen. Hmmm, maybe I should ask the user about it?". Vulnerability.

        If your OS is not secure, no app running on it can be secured.

        If your OS is being operated by a user that executes attachments from "WalMart" that read "helo, teh attcachements for yuo pleasures" then your OS is not secure.

        BTW, this progression is interesting. When FF came out just installing it would make the world safe, because it was invulnerable and impervious. Now I also have to switch operating systems? And when someone finds another exploit in SSH

        • by mrchaotica (681592) * on Thursday July 27 2006, @03:36PM (#15794383)
          It is a vulnerability in that FF will happily load and execute any plugins dropped into its profile directory. The only time you are warned about installing someone is at download time. FF will never check for a signature or otherwise go "oh, a new plugin I've never seen. Hmmm, maybe I should ask the user about it?". Vulnerability.

          Okay, and then the next trojan will simply add itself to the file that Firefox checks to see if the extension is new, and you're back to square one.

          Firefox isn't the problem. The fact that the thing can write to the application's directory means the computer is already compromised.

          • Extensions can be happily installed inside a user's profile directory. It doesn't require write permissions to the Firefox application's directory to install an extension.

            There is nothing about "vulnerability" that would stop the same thing happening on a Linux box. The only saving grace for Linux at this point in time is that your average Linux user is smart enough to not execute random executable files they receive from people they don't know in an email message.

        • Re:Emphasis on that. (Score:5, Informative)

          by _Sprocket_ (42527) on Thursday July 27 2006, @01:36PM (#15793162)
          That's the legitimate extension. This trojan is not it.
        • by KURAAKU Deibiddo (740939) on Thursday July 27 2006, @01:36PM (#15793166) Homepage

          Actually, if you read the article more closely (and similar articles that have appeared in no shortage of other places), the malware pretends to be the numberdlinks extension. Your post implies that the actual extension is malware, and this is untrue.

          Additionally, if you read the Slashdot blurb, it's explained pretty clearly there.

          Basically, if you click on e-mail attachments without knowing what they are, it's your own fault if your computer becomes infested with viruses and spyware.

          • Ok, I stand corrected. Anyway, it is still a valid concern that any Firefox extension could actually be a Trojan horse.
            • by PhoenixPath (895891) on Thursday July 27 2006, @02:25PM (#15793672)
              No. It's not.

              Any extension downloaded from addons.mozilla.org has been tested, is widely used, and subject to an enormous amount of user feedback.

              Now, if you download an extension from kickme.to/malware, you get what you deserve.
    • Well yes it is. Firefox extensions are an easy way to trojan a system. Anyone can write an extension and put it up on the addons site and there isn't even the requirement that it be signed. There is no enforcement of trust at all except for a primitive domain whitelist system. I think it would be fairly trivial to produce a malicious extension. Worse, you could even craft one that works on Linux, OS X and Windows in one fell swoop, since you have unfettered access to all of the XPCOM objects running in Fire
      • Any piece of software capable of running executable code is vulnerable to trojans. Anyone can write an executable program to do nasty stuff, and there's no reasonable way for an application to tell the difference. Firefox can't figure out on its own that an extension which deletes files or sends email is malicious, because such functionality can conceivably be useful. The only real solution is to educate people about running untrusted executable code, and Firefox already takes every reasonable precaution
      • by sterno (16320) on Thursday July 27 2006, @01:52PM (#15793327) Homepage
        You are talking about a situation where an executable has been run with your priveleges. It can do anything it wants to, especially in Windows where most people run as Administrators. It can disguise itself as a firefox extension, sure. But it could also modify the firefox binary, or simply install a sniffer running as a service, or format your drive, or any number of nasty things.

        The only place a singature would matter in this case is when the trojan executable was run. If you are executing attached executables from an e-mail, then no amount of signature verification is going to protect you. The reality is that no technical process can exist that will prevent this kind of attack so long as users can install their own software.
        • Well the should. In fact, I read just the other day that Debian will be signing packages at long last. It's not brain surgery to do either - Red Hat has been doing it for a very long time.
          • It would be TRIVIAL to insert a trojan onto that site.

            I still don't see how that differs from a trojan on, say, SourceForge--that's just how trojans are.

            The funny thing is IE was panned for ActiveX control issues and yet Firefox contains something just as serious in extensions.

            IMHO problem with ActiveX are the seemingly endless vulnerabilities that enable drive by installations, I don't see this with Firefox.

            It is true that extensions must be voluntarily fetched by a user so the user base as a whole h

    • by dschuetz (10924) <slashNO@SPAMdavid.dasnet.org> on Thursday July 27 2006, @01:03PM (#15792856) Homepage
      Note that this isn't a Firefox vulnerability. The trojan is opened as a Windows executable from email attachments, and writes itself into the Firefox profile's configuration directory.

      While true, perhaps a related problem that actually is a vulnerability is the fact that Firefox (apparently) only checks for a valid signature on the plugin at download/install time. Maybe the Firefox configuration file, or at the very least the binaries for each extension, should be cryptographically verified at runtime.

      Of course, this presupposes that Firefox hackers can manage to get their extensions signed, and if that's possible, then the malware authors could do the same. Unless...FF gets distributed with a mozilla.org CA cert, and extensions accepted and published on the mozilla site(s) get signed with that cert, then every "legitimate" extension from the mozilla sites will be verifiable at runtime. The user could opt out of that with an "allow execution [not installation] of unsigned extensions" preference setting, but the majority of users would be protected, so long as the malware doesn't also set that preference for the user. :)

      (though even that last bit could be guarded against by creating a personal key to sign the config with, and every time you make a "security relevant configuration change" to the browser's settings, you have to re-sign the file.)

      • by KiloByte (825081) on Thursday July 27 2006, @01:13PM (#15792941)
        ... or until the trojan makes a trivial change in FireFox's binary.

        Once you're pwned, you're pwned. If you give someone free reign on your box, he can do anything to any file writeable by you.
      • by greed (112493) on Thursday July 27 2006, @01:14PM (#15792955)
        While true, perhaps a related problem that actually is a vulnerability is the fact that Firefox (apparently) only checks for a valid signature on the plugin at download/install time. Maybe the Firefox configuration file, or at the very least the binaries for each extension, should be cryptographically verified at runtime.

        Once someone's system is compromised, they can replace or alter the FireFox binary which verifies the signatures, replace libnssckbi.so, libsoftokn3.so, whatever.

        You can't win at that point. If you're storing your operating system and executables on writable media, it can never be trusted to that level. The hardware would have to cryptographically verify the boot loader on disk, which would verify the kernel, which would then be able to verify everything it executes--FireFox alone can't do it.

        (Say, what was that hardware-based Trusted Computing stuff supposed to do? In addition to ramming DRM down everyone's PCI bus, wasn't there system verification too?)

      • The headline makes it seem like Firefox is bad because there's a new piece of spyware that takes advantage of it.

        Darn, I knew this was going to happen sooner or later. Time to switch to IE. oh, wait a minute...

      • In general, if the next lower layer can't be trusted, the security of whatever you're evaluating is screwed.

        By way of example, at my previous job I used a linux boot floppy to change the local administrator password on a Windows NT4 system, thus owning the machine at the next boot. By an extension of your standard, this represented a Windows vulnerability, because whatever measures Windows may have taken to prevent such a thing (like NTFS) were ineffective.

        I think that's a clear mis-assessment of the true v
  • MozillaZine Has More (Score:5, Informative)

    by Anonymous Coward on Thursday July 27 2006, @12:46PM (#15792642)
    This MozillaZine article [mozillazine.org] has lots more on the trogan horse, including instructions for spotting if you have it.
  • Personally... (Score:4, Informative)

    by celardore (844933) <celardore@gmail.com> on Thursday July 27 2006, @12:47PM (#15792657) Homepage
    Personally I only download FF extensions from the official site.
    https://addons.mozilla.org/extensions.php?app=fire fox [mozilla.org]
  • Hmmmm (Score:4, Interesting)

    by robpoe (578975) on Thursday July 27 2006, @12:50PM (#15792686)
    Basically, what you're saying, is I must open an EXE from a non Walmart "Walmart" email, or I have to use IE?

    Nothing to see here, move along..
  • by Anonymous Coward on Thursday July 27 2006, @12:53PM (#15792729)
    In next version of Firefox, the extension will be broken anyways. Mozilla breaks extension every new release. :D
  • by Anonymous Coward on Thursday July 27 2006, @12:53PM (#15792732)
    Which makes me invulnerable to snooping for credit card numbers as all my accounts are empty and my credit rating is ruined.
  • by Anonymous Coward on Thursday July 27 2006, @01:08PM (#15792904)
    I've had it. That's it, I'm switching to Internet Explorer. You can play with your crappy browser but I'm done with it.
  • by krell (896769) on Thursday July 27 2006, @01:11PM (#15792927) Journal
    It could have been worse, like spyware disguised as a Microsoft Internet Explorer extension. That's sort of like Nixon wearing a Nixon mask.
  • RTFA (Score:5, Informative)

    by sensei85 (989372) on Thursday July 27 2006, @01:16PM (#15792981)
    Again with people jumping to conclusions. The trojan is loaded when you open an .exe attached to an e-mail from "Wal-mart". Lesson to be learned: never open random .exe attachments. Ever. Problem solved.

    For those of you screaming that "numberedlinks" should be removed from the mozilla site, that wouldn't fix the problem. The original extension is perfectly safe and NOT a trojan. This one is just spoofing it by installing itself with the same name.

    A little more careful reading and some common sense go a long way
  • On a machine which I maintain for my SO and children, M$ XP Pro is installed. The default browser is FireFox, which I have managed to convince my SO and children to use.

    My daughter (with a limited user account, no less) viewed a malicious advertising banner while logged into MySpace.com. I'm quite sure she clicked "yes" to running a WMF exploit.

    She has a limited account. End of story, you say? Nope, read on . . .

    My wife logged in a couple days later. A popup baloon warned her that the machine was infested and she should "click here to fix the problem". Well, she installed AntiVirusGolden v3.3 (from her not-so-limited user account). Who can blame her? I wouldn't have fallen for it (I already had CA's EZ-Antivirus installed and more or less trusted it), but it looked like a valid course of action to her, so the next thing I knew there were nearly a dozen payloads whanging around the rusty innards of my SO's computer - some acquired on the spot, others dropped there during the following week, I'm sure.

    That machine now runs Linux (like the rest of my home network). I'd like to thank the wonderful malware authors at AntivirusGolden for giving me the leverage I needed to convince my SO to give up on Windows and use a somewhat more securable OS.

    Oh, but I'll continue to use Firefox, now that I've closed that horrible WMF exploit that it has! You'd think the Firefox development team would know better than to trust end-users with the option to execute WMF's. Hmmph!

    *(The above is intentionally sardonic; but the basic facts are true)*

  • by Aeomer (990057) on Thursday July 27 2006, @02:18PM (#15793579)
    Forget the debate on FF vs IE and WinXX vs *nix - otherwise known as the 'My dad is bigger than your dad!' department. The issue is that an exploit, however it arrived on the machine, is targeting Firefox. All those smug 'it can't happen to me because I use xxxx version of yyyy product/os' should see this as the beginning of an onslaught on all *nix and open source projects in general. Yes, I realise this exploit was specifically on Windows but you are missing the big picture. That being an open source project went from a minor player to a major competitor and so became a big target. You may feel safe in your (insert *nix here) OS but the end of that house of cards is in sight. 'But I know what is secure and what is not, and my system is harded against such stuff!', I hear you cry. Well, if you realise that more and more people are running *nix based desktops and most of those new users have and need only basic 'Clue' on how to run their browser and wordprocessor then we are looking at an ever expanding problem. How long will it be before everyday users are downloading distros with Spyware built right into the kernel? 'But, I know how check a distro is genuine!!!', I hear you cry again. And again I say what about your average user - do they know instinctively how to check hashes on everything they download? No they do not! Mark this date in your calender - the end of OS smugness is in site.
    • The article is not clear. If not, get it off the Moz site. If so, sux to be them.

      It is: "presenting itself as a legitimate existing extension called numberedlinks".

      The McAfee characteristics page [nai.com] (2nd tab - stupid that that isn't directly linkable) also says:

      The original component installs the following files:
      * %MozillaUserProfile%\(ARBITRARY_CLASS_ID)\chrome\n umberedlinks.jar

      FormSpy installs these additional files:
      * %MozillaUserProfile%\(ARBITRARY_CLASS_ID)\chrome\n umberedlinks.jar (modified -

        • by radish (98371) on Thursday July 27 2006, @01:12PM (#15792929) Homepage
          Hate to break it to you but ALL software is potentially bad. You have to decide how much you trust it based on who wrote it, whether that's verifiable, your own inspection of the source, whatever. In the case of F/OSS you do at least have to option of inspecting the source. You have no such luxury with non-free software, in which case you simply have to decide how much you trust the publisher.
        • Re:FUD (Score:4, Insightful)

          by LurkerXXX (667952) on Thursday July 27 2006, @01:15PM (#15792970)
          What you don't seem to realize is that IE isn't embedded in 3rd party email clients like Thunderbird and Eudora, but the attachment will still hammer Firefix when you run it, just as it will in Outlook.
          • Re:FUD (Score:3, Insightful)

            As with anything else, this requires you to be enough of a moron to run an attachment received in a spam message (which theoretically requires you to be enough of a moron to actually read your spam). It's much more of a PEBKAC problem than a vulnerability of any piece of software. I don't know about Eudora, but I've found Thunderbird's spam filtering to be excellent, something not even offered the last time I used a MS-made client, which hypothetically reduces the risk of you running the thing, though tha