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What Could You Do With a Bogus Root Name Server?
Posted by
Soulskill
on Sun Jun 01, 2008 12:11 PM
from the root-root-root-for-the-home-team dept.
from the root-root-root-for-the-home-team dept.
Barlaam notes a post from the Renesys Blog which follows up on news they discussed a couple weeks ago about the 'identity theft' of a root name server. To emphasize the issue of safeguarding such a system, they've now posted an explanation of exactly how the situation could be exploited.
"It shouldn't be too hard to see that you could end up answering every DNS query from an organization that came to you for an updated list of root name servers. Every one. And you might end up doing this for a very long time, especially if your answers were largely correct. An attack like this would have no resemblance to the YouTube hijack, where the entire planet gets a blank page and it's immediately apparent that something isn't right. Obvious events like this will continue to occur, and we'll continue to resolve them relatively quickly. But as this incident demonstrates, DNS hijacks are far less obvious and potentially far more harmful."
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IT: Identity Theft Hits the Root Name Servers 131 comments
aos101 writes "The Renesys blog has an interesting story about networks advertising the old address space of the L root name server after ICANN changed the IP address last November. These networks were also running root name servers on the old IP address of the L root name server up until last week, so any DNS servers still using the old IP address might have been getting their answers from these bogus name servers. A very cursory examination by Renesys of one of these bogus servers found that it appeared to be providing correct responses, which might be why no one noticed the problem. As Renesys points out, the volume of traffic to a root server is staggering, so the people running these bogus root servers must have had a reason. What did they get out of it?"
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Its simple... (Score:5, Funny)
(Seriously, Imagine borrowing every bank's front page in North America
Re:Its simple... (Score:5, Funny)
Parent
Hmmm... (Score:2, Informative)
... so, you answer nearly all of them correctly.
Except for the precious few, which, say, redirect you to almost exact copies of pages which take your credit card data.
Or did I get it wrong?
Re:Hmmm... (Score:5, Funny)
Parent
easy (Score:5, Funny)
yeah how funny is it now that the joke is on the other foot biatches!
I've heard of this new technology... (Score:3, Interesting)
Re:I've heard of this new technology... (Score:5, Interesting)
DNSSEC [dnssec.net] has gone through three (3) mutually incompatible specifications. The DNSSEC people are claiming that the last revision really really works, honest, gov, and that all that remains to be done is deploying it.
But they don't appear to be deploying it on their own servers [isc.org].
Parent
Re:I've heard of this new technology... (Score:5, Informative)
But they don't appear to be deploying it on their own servers [isc.org].
I've just checked -- and the ISC do sign their zone. Sorry for the mis-information.
Parent
Re: (Score:3, Informative)
The entire security of DNS as provided by DNSSEC is predicated on the ability to trace a secure delegation. The general theory of operation is that you'd preconfigure your resolver with cryptographic hashes of the root's public DNSKEY records. Then every time you wanted to do a secure lookup, you'd be
Re:I've heard of this new technology... (Score:5, Informative)
Parent
Re:I've heard of this new technology... (Score:4, Insightful)
You don't need to sign the requests, you need to sign the replies. And you only need to compute the signing once, and store the signed value.
Parent
Simple recipe (Score:5, Insightful)
If you have lost DNS, game is over, you lose. A recipe if your system hits a compromised root server.
Better yet, people often use similar IDs and passwords into other systems. Evil hackers can often use the email to figure out which banks, credit, stock brokers and on line e-tailers you use. Maybe change the home address of your Amazon account and order stuff, if the e-tailor isn't right on top of it.
Root servers need to be secure, end of story.
I should note the above method would also work with SSL, be creative, it only has to be a legitimate cert with a root chain.
Re:Simple recipe (Score:4, Insightful)
Parent
Re: (Score:2)
Re:Simple recipe (Score:5, Insightful)
Think about it.
Parent
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Re:Simple recipe (Score:5, Informative)
If you have lost DNS, game is over, you lose. A recipe if your system hits a compromised root server.
Unless you happen to have SSL enabled pop or imap.
A (revised) recipe for an SSL enabled mail host:
* You open up email to read todays email. You PC looks up pop3.yourisp.com.
* DNS returns the IP of evil PC to your PC which will connect to it.
* Evil PC returns a forged SSL certfificate claiming to be pop3.yourisp.com
* Your email client brings up an error message saying there's something wrong with this certificate (self signed, etc)
* You hopefully get suspicious, (this never having happened before), and don't click through.
* Attack fails.
If you don't get suspicious, and just click OK, you're right. But the situation isn't quite as dire as you make it out to be. I'd never connect to a non-secure host for something like email.
Parent
Re: (Score:3, Informative)
Mail.app and Thunderbird, for two.
Mail's error message actually characterises a self-signed cert with language to the effect of, "Couldn't connect to the server because of an untrustworthy certificate." When this was reported to me by a non-technical user, they repeated only the first two words: Couldn't connect.
That's how things should be.
I'm hoping that Firefox's improved handling of self-signed certificates ge
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Re:Simple recipe (Score:5, Informative)
Parent
Re: (Score:3, Funny)
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Re: (Score:2, Insightful)
Instead of a MitM attack, would it be possible to do a "proxy-in-the-middle" attack?
* User opens up to read email/connect to their bank account/something secure.
* DNS returns IP of evil impersonator (EI) instead of Real Computer (RC).
* User requests connection from EI. EI transparently proxies that connection to RC, while listening for the password that authenticates the key exchange.
* Profit! Or would it be?
I can't imagine this kind of hole not already being covered, but it seems like it would be fe
Re: (Score:3, Informative)
See SPEKE [wikipedia.org], for instance, which is pretty much a Diffie-Hellman key exchange with the (fixed) generator constant replaced by a hash of the password. Snoo
break everything (Score:4, Insightful)
Seriously, in the last decade the premise that the Net is always there has become a silent assumption underlying a lot of critical systems. No I'm not talking about nuclear power stations being online, I'm talking about basic logistics chain outages that mean there's no-one there to run the power station, because they've no fuel for their car, because the petrol tanker driver is off scavaging food for his kids. There are a number of scenarios that could knock out the net (or at least cause widespread depeering, so you'd be stuck on your provider's network and unable to get traffic to/from anywhere else); it would be... well, a bit too interesting for my liking to see how things would go with, say, a seven day outage. Actually a 7 day outage might be just enough to wake people up to the importance of patching your infrastructure, having a heterogenous mix of code for all critical functions, oh and and enforcing BGP security.
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Maybe the geeks should go on strike.
No patches; no tech support; no maintenance -- until things are organized properly.
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That would be sweet...
*GO BACK TO THE BASEMENT, JOHNNY*
*OK MOM! - Oh God, can't even dream in peace anymore...*
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Re:break everything (Score:5, Interesting)
Parent
Re:break everything (Score:5, Interesting)
Exactly. If you think the problem is bad now, wait until we've fixed it. (Arthur Kasspe). This should be the motto engraved on every Government departmental seal.
Parent
flat files (Score:2, Funny)
Re: (Score:3, Informative)
http://www.livinginternet.com/i/iw_dns_history.htm [livinginternet.com]
they tried that (Score:3, Funny)
Re:they tried that (Score:5, Funny)
Hey, I oughta' write up an RFC on this
Parent
Wrote about this in Feb 2006 (Score:5, Informative)
http://www.cavebear.com/cbblog-archives/000232.html
My conclusions were that one could make money and cause trouble.
One of the more interesting aspects was (and still is) that one could operate root servers and, using the Google model, pay ISPs and users to send their queries to your roots so that you could generate data mining revenues.
That quality of data that is minded form root traffic would not be as good as that as from a top level domain server - and who has some large top level domains and also has root servers? Verisign.
And ICANN's contract with Verisign explicitly permits data mining of query traffic.
DNSSEC (Score:2)
The heck with DNS (Score:3, Funny)
It's a JOKE! Alright?
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Only after we switch to IPv6.
Target evil sites (Score:2)
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Look up an anarchist/comedy/anti-establishment group called "The Yes Men". They pulled a magnificent prank on the World Trade Organization by putting up a web site that people who didn't read carefully would assume was theirs.
The slagging they gave the WTO was presented in such a fashion that those would would seek such a site out would be well into it before they realized they were being had.
Being able to redirect by controlling DNS servers could raise the bar quite a bit, and you can bet that the o
hosts file (Score:3, Informative)
208.65.153.253 www.youtube.com
208.65.153.238 www.youtube.com
208.65.153.251 www.youtube.com
69.63.184.15 www.facebook.com
81.110.242.129 www.s5h.net
66.102.9.99 www.google.com
66.102.9.104 www.google.com
66.102.9.147 www.google.com
Use google page cache for anything else
Re: (Score:3, Funny)
use strict; use warnings; use Net::DNS; my %hosts; sub lookup { my $res = Net::DNS::Resolver->new;my $query = $res->search( shift );if ($query) {foreach my $rr ($query->answer) {next unless( $rr->type eq "A" );return( $rr->address );}}else {warn "query failed: ", $res->errorstring, "\n";}}while( my $l = ) {if( $l =~ m!(http://.+?)\s! ) {print( "$1\n" );if( $1 =~ m!http://(.*?)/! ) {my $ip = loo
That's easy (Score:5, Informative)
Take it... (Score:2, Insightful)
Obvious first move (Score:5, Funny)
Make some fast cash. (Score:2)
i'm sure that would be worth something to someone.. Perhaps even enough to afford that shiny new powerbook pro