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Unauditable Voting Machines 343

CustomDesigned writes "AP news has a story on how the new proprietary voting machines for Palm County, FL are working (or not). It seems that voters are complaining that their votes weren't taken. The company claims that the machines are "self auditing", but won't say how they are "audited". The loser of a mayoral race is suing for a review of now the machines work. But doing so voids the warranty, so the election supervisor won't allow it. So, nobody knows how the machines work, but as long as we don't try to find out, the company "guarantees" that they do - whether they seem to or not. I don't expect are problems this fall, do you?" After the debacle, there was lot of noise about electronic voting systems, even ones which use open-source software and were thus completely auditable. Absolutely none of that talk has made it into practice.
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Unauditable Voting Machines

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  • Brazil (Score:2, Informative)

    by lay ( 519543 ) on Saturday July 20, 2002 @08:40AM (#3921960) Homepage

    That's where they should take a lesson from.

    They have had electronic voting systems for ages, and I've never heard bad stuff about it. Maybe they have something to teach here, in terms of audits, standard procedures and transparency.

    Brazilian people will know what I'm talking about when I say that everyone takes corruption and influence traffic as something that does exist there, so one would have to be at least a bit carefull when implementing a system that doesn't give you phisical voting cards that you can actualy grab with your hands and show them. People will rightfully be wary of electronic voting systems if things are not transparent.

    It basicaly gets down to a matter of convenience. In large countries like China, Canada, USA or Brazil, you'll take a substantial amount of time to know the results of an election in traditional voting systems. Electronic voting solves that. Brazilians know who their next president is going to be a couple of hours after the ballots have closed.

    OTOH, it introduces the problem of easy tampering. With voting cards, there needs to be a guy (or a gang of them) that steals the votes while nobody's watching and replaces the same number of votes with the result he wishes, and besides being risky, it does not guarantee a result that he wants. With electronic voting, you can add a couple of zeros here and truncate a couple of zeros there.

    How can such a system can be implemented without spartan audits, is beyond me...

  • Re:Well (Score:2, Informative)

    by p3d0 ( 42270 ) on Saturday July 20, 2002 @08:47AM (#3921973)
    What amazes me is that this is not totally obvious to everyone.
  • by Tim Colgate ( 519024 ) on Saturday July 20, 2002 @09:18AM (#3922030) Homepage
    The home page for Sequoia Voting Systems, who make these machines is here [sequoiavote.com]

    You can have a go with an interactive demo here [sequoiademo.com] and view an automatic demo (with a picture of the machine) here [sequoiademo.com]. These may not be the actual machines used in Florida, but are likely similar.

    As you can see it is a simple text-based touch-screen menu system (although elsewhere on the site they talk about showing pictures of candidates). A patent is (or at least should be) only applicable when there is something novel. They might have novel auditing stuff on the back-end, but there doesn't seem to be anything new here.

  • by Elias Israel ( 182882 ) <eli@promanage-inc.com> on Saturday July 20, 2002 @09:18AM (#3922031)

    The bottom line: all voting systems have the potential for inaccuracy and abuse, and nearly all of them experience inaccuracy and abuse every time they are used. We have faith in the outcomes mostly because the overall result usually does not differ very much from our shared sense of who really "won."

    As the Massachusetts state chair of the Libertarian Party, and a two-time candidate for public office, I have had an exposure to the voting process and the people who conduct it that many other voters have not had. Here's what I can tell you:

    At every Libertarian primary, we collect stories of votes not counted, votes incorrectly counted, and voters confused or abused by the system.

    In one case, some of our voters reported that they were actually asked to sign their ballots!

    In others cases, five people in a precinct will swear they've voted in the primary, but only three votes will show in the official tally.

    Then there's the actual abuse.

    A fellow who used to work with another party once explained to me how unscrupulous operatives routinely abuse the system by taking advantage of the fact that Massachusetts law does not require voters to present identification when they vote.

    I don't wish to give unnecessary detail, but suffice it to say that I do believe that some small level of vote fraud is present in most elections, even here in the United States.

    It is interesting to note, however, that when one Massachusetts town tried to mitigate the problem by requiring voters to show ID, the Democrats successfully fought the practice in federal court by alleging that requiring identification is an unfair burden on the indigent.

    For the most part, these issues arise not because people are malicious (although some inevitably are), but primarily because poll workers are well-meaning, underpaid, undertrained, and perfectly normal, fallible human beings.

    These problems are usually too small to notice against the bulk of legitimately cast and properly counted votes, except when the total number of votes cast is small (like in a small precinct) or when the overall result is very close (as in Florida in 2000).

    In general, it is not possible to get a "perfect" result from any voting system. The best that we can do is accept our imperfect knowledge and stand behind the result that most reasonably appears to be true.

    That's not always easy. But if you want to make sure the result means something, the best thing to do about it is help to ensure that the result is not small or close by going out and casting your ballot for the candidates you like best.

  • by FleaPlus ( 6935 ) on Saturday July 20, 2002 @09:33AM (#3922078) Journal
    I'm not sure how apparent it was in the parent post, but the description is (I'm fairly certain) from a fictional novel by Dave Barry. From the Amazon.com review of "Big Trouble" [amazon.com]:


    Dave Barry, the only newsman to win a Pulitzer for exemplary use of words like booger, will please humor and crime-fiction fans alike with this racy debut novel. The scene is Miami. In ritzy Coconut Grove, the teen son of Eliot, a newsman turned adman, sneaks up to spritz a cute girl with a Squirtmaster 9000 to win a high school game called Killer. Meanwhile, two hit men sneak up to kill the girl's abusive stepdad, Arthur. Arthur cheated his bosses at corrupt Penultimate, Inc., which equipped a Florida jail with automatic garage-opener gates that accidentally freed prisoners in a lightning storm.
  • A paper trail (Score:5, Informative)

    by steveha ( 103154 ) on Saturday July 20, 2002 @09:54AM (#3922149) Homepage
    For voting, it is very important to have a way to re-count the votes. I think a literal paper trail is best.

    I cannot imagine a better scheme than what Washington state is using now:

    When you go to vote, you get a piece of heavy paper (or maybe it's light cardstock) pre-printed with the ballot. Next to each item you can vote for is a bubble. They loan you a fine-point permanent marker (a Sharpie) and to vote you just fill in the bubble.

    When you are done, you take the ballot over to the counting machine. You feed the ballot into the slot. (If this is too technically advanced for you, the nice person watching the machine helps you.)

    The counting machine makes sure you didn't make any conflicting votes: for example, voting for both Bush and Gore for President. If there are any conflicting votes, it refuses the ballot and spits it back out the slot. Then you get a fresh ballot and start over.

    Assuming all is well, it counts up all the votes, and then drops the ballot into a bag. The bags are locked up and stored, so the actual paper ballots are available for a recount if necessary.

    At the end of the day, the counting machine is plugged into a phone jack. It calls in to a computer and reports the votes it had counted all day. The votes can then be quickly summed and you find out how the election went quickly.

    You only need one counting machine per voting location, and the voting booths are simple desks with privacy screens; the Florida voting machines cost $3500 each and you need one per voting booth.

    The system now used in Washington state is easy to use, not expensive or difficult to implement, gives results quickly, and allows for recounts.

    steveha
  • Re:Holy moly! (Score:5, Informative)

    by JamieF ( 16832 ) on Saturday July 20, 2002 @12:08PM (#3922692) Homepage
    >I'd really like to know why private business has so much
    >sway over government in these sorts of things.

    See, there's this thing called "bribery". It'a a major factor in this other thing called "corruption". Since you're apparently not aware of either, you should look into these new concepts right away. It'll give you a better understanding of why this "campaign finance reform" thing keeps coming up.

    P.S. it's spelled "Holy Moley" in the Captain Marvel comics where (as far as I know) that phrase originated.
  • by aebrain ( 184502 ) <aebrain@gmail.com> on Sunday July 21, 2002 @08:08PM (#3927548) Homepage Journal

    A Fully Tested Open Source E-Voting GPL'd system is available on the web.

    It was developed within 27 weeks [softimp.com.au] for about $100,000 US. Multi-language, using standard COTS hardware and OS. (The compiler and OS had to be open-source too of course - Debian and gcc). It has been used in a state election in the Australian Capital Territory [act.gov.au], the equivalent of the District of Columbia. There's an Executive Summary [act.gov.au] of how well it did, warts and all. A PDF of the full report [act.gov.au] is also available.

    /. readers will be most interested in the technical description. [act.gov.au] Oh yes, the code's available as a Zip file here [act.gov.au].

    The whole point about e-voting software is that it has to be open-source. The hardware has to be available for inspection at any time too, along with the OS source and the compiler source as well. The situation as described in the original article has a strong piscine aroma.

    Disclaimer I work for the mob that did the Aussie system - though I was busy making spaceflight avionics software rather than election software at the time, it was another team. They Did Good.

Understanding is always the understanding of a smaller problem in relation to a bigger problem. -- P.D. Ouspensky

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