Richard Feynman, the Challenger, and Engineering 217
An anonymous reader writes "When Richard Feynman investigated the Challenger disaster as a member of the Rogers Commission, he issued a scathing report containing brilliant, insightful commentary on the nature of engineering. This short essay relates Feynman's commentary to modern software development."
External Pressures Ruin Engineering (Score:5, Insightful)
The problem with the shuttle disaster (both of them, really) is external pressures that are not in anyway at all scientific. The pressure from your manager at Morton Thiokol to perform better, faster and cheaper. The pressure from the government to beat those damned ruskies into space at all costs.
So this is really a case of engineering ethics, when do you push back? As a software developer, I never push back. Me: "There's a bug that happens once every 1,000 uses of this web survey but it would take me a week to pin it down and fix it." My Boss: "Screw it--the user will blame that on the intarweb, just keep moving forward." But could I consciously say the same thing about a shuttle with people's lives at stake? No, I could not.
So when an engineer at Morton Thiokol said that they hadn't tested the O-Ring at that weather temperature that fateful day and that information was either not relayed or lost all the way up to the people at NASA who were about to launch--it wasn't a failure of engineering, it was a failure of ethics. External forces had mutated engineering into a liability, not an asset.
And there's a whole slough of them [wikipedia.org] I studied in college:
* Space Shuttle Challenger disaster (1986)
* Chernobyl disaster (1986)
* Bhopal disaster (1984)
* Kansas City Hyatt Regency walkway collapse (1981)
* Love Canal (1980), Lois Gibbs
* Three Mile Island accident (1979)
* Citigroup Center (1978), William LeMessurier
* Ford Pinto safety problems (1970s)
* Minamata disease (1908-1973)
* Chevrolet Corvair safety problems (1960s), Ralph Nader, and Unsafe at Any Speed
* Boston molasses disaster (1919)
* Quebec Bridge collapse (1907), Theodore Cooper
* Johnstown Flood (1889), South Fork Fishing and Hunting Club
* Tay Bridge Disaster (1879), Thomas Bouch, William Henry Barlow, and William Yolland
* Ashtabula River Railroad Disaster (1876), Amasa Stone
Faster, Better, Cheaper (Score:5, Insightful)
Re:External Pressures Ruin Engineering (Score:5, Insightful)
Maybe, but remember what your own example shows -> What is the cost/benefit of fixing/preventing an error? Is a week of debug time worth missing your target ship date? Maybe, maybe not - depends on the error.
A blanket indictment of capitalism is quite unfair. You would still have the same cost/benefit analysis regardless of economic system you toiled under.
Is is not possible to engineer against all eventualities; trying to do so will usually keep you from ever getting off the ground.
Hm. (Score:5, Insightful)
Re:Hm. (Score:3, Insightful)
Re:External Pressures Ruin Engineering (Score:5, Insightful)
But I do agree that tradeoffs occur under any system. Those tradeoffs just let us make better decisions under capitalism whereas we can't allow the information from those tradeoffs to inform us economically in a socialist system.
Re:External Pressures Ruin Engineering (Score:1, Insightful)
Absolutely.
Progress requires risk. The astronauts are aware of their risk, it's not a big deal.
Yes, it would be nice to take 500 years to flawlessly engineer a tool, but in reality, you don't have that long. Engineering is sometimes about making educated guesses in order to build something in a reasonable period of time, and you learn something from your errors. Obviously more commercial tools require more margin than more complicated ones - you expect more risk going to the moon than going to 7-11. (Oddly, there's probably more risk per mile going to 7-11, so the space engineers are doing a pretty decent job.)
The problem with the shuttles wasn't poor engineering - it was that when someone spotted an issue, that it was squelched. This is a social/management problem, not an engineering problem.
Chartered engineer status (Score:5, Insightful)
To qualify as a Professional Engineer we should place good practice above short term gains. Professional Engineers should be truthful and objective and have no tolerance for deception or corruption. Professional Engineers only work in areas were they are competant. Professional Engineers build their reputation on merit and their skills through continual learning and the skills of their charges through ongoing mentoring.
We wouldn't have to put up with the shoddy work of cowboys, because they wouldn't be allowed to practice. We wouldn't have to put up with orders that counteract professional ethics or good practice, because legal responsibility trumps commercial pressures. The professional wouldn't be undermined by fast to market but poor quality work. We could place trust in third party tools, software & services and we would not have to put up with EULA that diavowed responsibility for damage.
Re:External Pressures Ruin Engineering (Score:3, Insightful)
Comment removed (Score:3, Insightful)
Re:External Pressures Ruin Engineering (Score:1, Insightful)
Re:External Pressures Ruin Engineering (Score:3, Insightful)
Blaming the shuttle disaster on capitalism is erroneous. I do not necessarily disagree with your assessment in general, but capitalism was not at fault in that particular instance. What was at fault was bureaucrats trying to look good to their superiors and present a positive public image at the cost of real engineering.
I would say that in general is the meta-problem, not capitalism. In its current form in the US capitalism has caused the existence of many large entities that use hierarchical systems of command and control. These hierarchical systems frequently make sub-optimal decisions because individual actors within the system act for their own benefit but against the benefit of the larger system they are a part of. Particularly egregious examples of this can be found, and they tend to be highlighted as aberrations, but they aren't. They are merely extrema of a problem that is widespread.
Bureaucracy in general serves to insulate actors from responsibility for the results of their actions. As I recall we didn't see any of the middle management of NASA held accountable for the disaster they caused by attempting to look good for their superiors and the public. And this failure of accountability is endemic to the kinds of hierarchical systems you see in most bureaucracies.