Richard Feynman, the Challenger, and Engineering 217
An anonymous reader writes "When Richard Feynman investigated the Challenger disaster as a member of the Rogers Commission, he issued a scathing report containing brilliant, insightful commentary on the nature of engineering. This short essay relates Feynman's commentary to modern software development."
Re:External Pressures Ruin Engineering (Score:0, Interesting)
Yeah, I went to college at Wikipedia too. Remember when they upset Flickr in the Website Bowl?
Anyway, given that your list of "engineering failures" from the last century and a half, most of which weren't obviously predictable without hindsight, is shorter than the bug list in even a simple piece of typical software, I'm having trouble seeing where you get "Cut corners, often" from.
Tag on to a famous essay... (Score:5, Interesting)
It doesn't work 99.994% of the time, generally because very few people are as insightful as the original brilliant person.
sPh
Re:External Pressures Ruin Engineering (Score:3, Interesting)
Loss of the USS Thresher during initial sea trials.
Steam Line Rupture on the USS Iwo Jima.
Both of those were caused by engineering (the first) or procurement faults.
The thresher was lost with all hands due to (among other things) a failure in modeling the high pressure air system and inappropriate welds on seawater systems.
The Iwo Jima suffered a steam line rupture that killed a few guys because the wrong material was used on a high pres/temp steam line.
Neither of these were for profit ventures. Both were preventable.
Re:Tag on to a famous essay... (Score:3, Interesting)
Surely You're Joking (Score:3, Interesting)
Re:External Pressures Ruin Engineering (Score:5, Interesting)
Although this swaying is not normally mentioned in the articles about the construction of the Hyatt, it went a long way towards weakening and stressing the connectors supporting the floors.
Two of my friends were dancing on the floor when the walkways gave way and both were killed.
Re:External Pressures Ruin Engineering (Score:3, Interesting)
As a software quality professional... (Score:5, Interesting)
I think that this is a very key point to software development. I have seen companies who spent entirely too much time and money trying to eliminate all defects from their software when it wasn't the critical part of their business. Yes, we should always strive to eliminate defects, but you can't get them all. You have to know when to pick your battles, and when to accept the risks. If we're talking about life-or-death software, or security, or other very critical things - you need to focus on those.
There's a grid I have seen used that is a great tool when doing projects.
Schedule, Cost, Quality, Scope.
1 can be optimized, 1 is a constraint, and the other 2 you have to accept. Period. It is a more useful version of the "fast, good, cheap - pick two"
Re:Yeah, BUT... (Score:3, Interesting)
I had never heard of Dresden Codak before this post but am now getting hooked while going through the archive. I think it's hilarious, but then I grew up in Los Alamos...
The linked comic is funny in a postmodern way (wondertwins vs. historical quantum theory) and the art is fantastic. A lot better than I could ever do.
One of the first things a new staff member does (Score:3, Interesting)
One of the first things I have a new hire do is read Feynman's appendix to the Challenger Report. Primarily to instill a respect for dealing with data, not desires or pressures, and to (re)enforce the concept that "it worked last time", does NOT make it right or safe to do the same thing again.
The pressure / desire from above or parallel organizations within the company is constant, and usually precipitated by the latest operational interruption. All to frequently the refrain is along the lines of "but last time you authored a deviation, this is only a little bit more". When I feel the pressure is starting to cause situational ethics creep, I pull out Feynman's appendix, and read it myself, or have the affected person on my staff read it.
It is amazing how effective it is in restoring sanity, and a healthy respect for the ability of the hardware to kill you (and / or your customers).
Richard Feynman gave many things to this world, and especially certain segments of it. It's my opinion however that one of his best and most unsung gifts was the Challenger Report Appendix. It should be required reading for ANYONE who will ever touch or direct action on hardware that could even remotely present a potential for injury or death.
The message was not rocket science, but as the Columbia accident proved the rocket scientists still can't get it right.
Re:External Pressures Ruin Engineering (Score:4, Interesting)
Re:External Pressures Ruin Engineering (Score:3, Interesting)
This was a combination failure. Like most failures it requires many things to come into alignment before the disaster occurs. The Space Shuttle and Sky Bridge did fail because of one thing, but several factors that came together that occurred simultaneously then this disaster occurred. If any one of these factors where to be mitigated or removed then this disaster will not occur or if any did happen then there will be a recoverable situation.
My friend when I was in the US Air Force, Lt Col Ellison Onizuka, died in the Challenger disaster and I took that more than anything else. I was just a 1st Lt when that occurred and we where the only few Asians as officers at Edwards AFB. I remember learning that management at NASA, Morton-Thiokol, and other contractors okaying the flight even though they where outside the known parameters. Richard Feynman best experiment in the hearings was putting a piece of O-ring material in to cup of ice water and the O-ring material was brittle. I have since taken a Richard Feynman view of the of the world and now work in research lab where critical thinking is in order all of the time and top down management is a joke. We laugh at Dilbert who view top down management in the same way but in more humorous light. However when it comes to lives we need to mitigate or remove management from putting pressure on engineering or any other person so management can "look good" rather than the safely of people.