Schneier, Journalist Poke Holes In TSA Policies 296
Fallen Andy points out an article in The Atlantic written by Jeffrey Goldberg. He and Bruce Schneier teamed up to put the TSA's policies to the test at the Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport. They found plenty of evidence for security theater, and rather less for actual security. Quoting:
"'The whole system is designed to catch stupid terrorists,' Schneier told me. ... As I stood in the bathroom, ripping up boarding passes, waiting for the social network of male bathroom users to report my suspicious behavior, I decided to make myself as nervous as possible. I would try to pass through security with no ID, a fake boarding pass, and an Osama bin Laden T-shirt under my coat. I splashed water on my face to mimic sweat, put on a coat (it was a summer day), hid my driver's license, and approached security with a bogus boarding pass that Schneier had made for me. ... 'All right, you can go,' [an airport security supervisor] said, pointing me to the X-ray line. 'But let this be a lesson for you.'"
Well... (Score:5, Insightful)
lol (Score:3, Insightful)
"'But let this be a lesson for you.'"
Yes, the security checks are total bogus. Glad we have shown that in the open right now...
Comment removed (Score:4, Insightful)
Obamaism (Score:5, Insightful)
When I went through at JFK and asked questions about why they were segregating my bag the supervisor came over and accused me of suffering from "Obamaism".
I complained and TSA dismissed my complaint that the supervisor was making a joke. Really? TSA thinks that a citizen asking about his rights is a joke? Really?
Technically, the TSA did its job right. (Score:5, Insightful)
After all, they didn't arrest, because he didn't present a threat. And he didn't. So it's a bit difficult to say that the system failed, based on this story.
However, it's interesting to see exactly how little actual security there is at the airport. Bruce is right - the only thing new is better cockpit doors and passengers who'd rather die than get high-jacked.
Re:Technically, the TSA did its job right. (Score:3, Insightful)
But you knew that already. Everything Bruce says is common knowledge. Do you really need him to reaffirm it?
Re:Strictly speaking the system worked (Score:5, Insightful)
1. It's trivial to get around airport security.
2. Everyone knows this.
3. There hasn't been any hijackings.
Therefore:
4. There is no-one attempting hijackings.
Whom does this surprise? (Score:4, Insightful)
You would think that if it were effective, they would be capturing people with provable ill intent. And you'd further think that if they did this, they'd want to tell th e world, loudly! After all, they could justify their own existence that way.
Yet somehow, we haven't heard of one Mighty Terrorist being caught by TSA. ONe must assume that this is because they are not /being/ caught. So... if TSA is not catching terrorists, what the hell are they doing?
The sole purpose is to make people feel protected (or violated, depending on your perspective). There's a sizeable portion of the population who feels reassured when senior citizens and soccer moms get pulled out of line for a closer search.
Land of the free.
Right.
The best we can do (Score:5, Insightful)
I think the current state of airport security is just that - the best the agency can do, with it's current resources, budget and enormous demand for speedy throughput.
I myself have pondered the possibility of some kind of conspiracy, but all I'm seeing is an outdated, overwhelmed structure under a lot of pressure.
This is a very difficult problem to solve:
- fast processing of people
- spotting potential threats with minimum resources
- overstretched, tired, worn-out employees
- far from state-of-the-art equipment
- unbeliavable throughput
If the throughput is 1/100 of the LAX or JFK demands, then maybe it would be possible to look at each passanger, "check in" with them, evaluate their level of nervousness, clothing, carefully check for tell-signs etc.
With 1 second per passenger that's impossible and the best an agency can do is issue blanket policies including racial/name-based profiling, travel patterns, databases of destinations etc. and hope for the best.
I truly believe that the security policies are not an adequate protection. I don't think that's by design, rather a limitation of the design.
No conspiracy theory here, just lots of frustration with what I perceive as needless delay and inconvenience, bordering with disrespect and abuse in some cases (large-scale profiling and temporary detention of people entering the US etc.).
So what if he had terrorist propaganda? (Score:5, Insightful)
The flag features, as its charming main image, an upraised fist clutching an AK-47 automatic rifle. Atop the rifle is a line of Arabic writing that reads Then surely the party of God are they who will be triumphant. The officer took the flag and spread it out on the inspection table. She finished her inspection, gave me back my flag, and told me I could go. I said, "That's a Hezbollah flag." She said, "Uh-huh."
Correct me if I am wrong, but all the TSA crew are meant to watch for is if you are bringing anything onto a plane that could then be used to bring it down or hijack it.
Propaganda on the other hand cannot possibly bring down a plane from the sky, and it is surely protected to some extent by freedom of speech.
Re:Technically, the TSA did its job right. (Score:2, Insightful)
Exactly right. Bruce is missing something that he normally understands quite well. Security begins and ends with the individual. Anyone trying anything funny on an airplane for the next 30 years will immediately get swarmed by the rest of the passengers who won't give a shit for their own lives so long as they can prevent the terrorist from carrying out his plan.
There is no system or process you can build that is stronger or more robust than this.
Re:Schneier bothers me (Score:5, Insightful)
I suspect that it has something to do with his focus on the human element of security. The fact that you can build a cryptosystem that the feds can't break on your own computer with free tools, a modest knowledge of c, and some acquaintance with number theory is pretty damn cool. The fact that your fellow citizens will cheer as the feds waterboard the key out of you really puts that in perspective, though. It is hard to be a cypherpunk utopian when less than 1% of the population can be bothered to follow a step-by-step FAQ to set up PGP, and even geeks respond to google's data mining of their email by telling you how nice the interface is. Techies can argue, correctly, that the great firewall or any other censorware is full of fairly pitiful holes. That doesn't change the fact that it puts up enough resistance(which isn't much) to keep 95% of china's equivalent of average Joe from trying to get past it.
In a way, I think that the cypherpunk ideal fell apart when they built it and nobody came. All sorts of strong crypto are available to everybody, for free, and aren't even all that much trouble to use. Almost nobody bothers, probably so few that those who do just stand out by doing so.
I don't like the idea; but I strongly suspect that Schneier's decline in inspiration has more to do with his assessment of the state of security than it does with any specific sellout.
Theater to test theater? (Score:2, Insightful)
Comment removed (Score:3, Insightful)
Re:Whom does this surprise? (Score:3, Insightful)
Answer: Lots of people.
It's the sad truth. I mean, when you think about it, these practices got put in place by people who thought it would be a good idea (for whatever reason). There are also lots of people who just buy in to the security theater of "Oh, they check my ID, so that must filter out the terrorists" that hadn't ever looked at the policies from this point of view.
Common sense isn't very common.
Re:lol (Score:4, Insightful)
It's not intended to make people safe or feel safe, that's just the excuse and the reason why the excuse works. Really TSA is just another step to reduce people's rights and move to a de-facto authoritarian state... Never doubted it, this story just proves it: they never even cared that it's effective to catch terrorists, nothing to do with that, just get people used to random unwarranted searches and seizures and arrests. It's the government and media that sucks up to it that keep people scared, keep them afraid, keep them in a state of terror... oh wait, isn't that what the evil terrorists are supposed to do not the government that "protects" from them? Does anyone even remember what does the word "terrorist" mean? Sorry for rent, it accumulates every once in a while...
Re:Technically, the TSA did its job right. (Score:5, Insightful)
And yet we're wasting billions of dollars of our money building worthless systems on top of that. That's your money, and my money. I want it to stop. The best way to do this is to show how useless it is.
I think you misunderstand Bruce's objections. He does not simply object to the fact that the TSA is insecure. He objects to the fact that the TSA wastes huge piles of money, and those huge piles of money could be used for better things.
Re:Schneier bothers me (Score:4, Insightful)
Worse than that, it seems like anyone who knows anything about cryptography is automatically suspect these days. "If you have nothing to hide, then why do you need that"?
Re:Schneier bothers me (Score:2, Insightful)
Well, you gut the first attendant, while they are on the ground screaming in pain the other passengers will look on horrified and panic.
Kick the cockpit door in(there pretty easy) and make your demands, meanwhile your partner(s) also gut a few people to keep everyone in order.
Sound familiar?
Re:Not true (Score:3, Insightful)
They used to check you ID both before you enter security and at the gate (and when checking in bags). A couple years back they dropped the gate check and now they only check it before the security line. They mark the boarding pass at security but it's not like a retarded five year couldn't copy that.
Re:Schneier bothers me (Score:3, Insightful)
I agree on one hand, but in a way I think that he is asking the TSA to do what I don't want them to do in many ways, which is behavioral profiling. This also does not work (at least has a very low specificity and sensitivity), and could make our lives a lot worse by harassment instead of uniform policies.
Stopping somebody because they are sweating is a bit ambitious, and is similar to what has been going on:
http://govtsecurity.com/transportation_security/TSAsSPOTunit/ [govtsecurity.com]
which is worse for most nerds. I am not surprised by this article, and do not have any quick solutions. We can't stop the security theater (honestly, would you want to not have ANY Xray of luggage or metal detection?) and I am not sure that any behavioral detection is better...
Re:Whom does this surprise? (Score:1, Insightful)
Sometimes security theater will be set up to look for a specific kind of response.
Not saying this is the case here.
I was on a job once and we set up a tight security with a hole in it. You had to know what to look for to find it.
Hidden agents were watching the hole. When someone went through it, they got picked up and questioned.
There where 4 people that used it. 1 was a fluke, the three others were wanted.
It was never announced becasue they wanted people to be confident that security was morons. Plus, if someone was wanted, but gave good information we would let them go. None of this torture them, get crap information most of the time and lock them up crap. Honest, friendly and living up to your promises get a lot more accurate information then ANY torture technique.
This was in the end of the cold war.
Bruce says the obvious (Score:3, Insightful)
Much of the article talks about someone not getting things that are not illegal to fly with confiscated. He makes a big deal about carrying a flag. The screener looked at the flag. It wasn't confiscated. BIG DEAL. It isn't illegal to carry a flag on board. He wasn't arrested for ripping up paper in a bathroom. BIG DEAL. It isn't illegal to rip up paper in a bathroom. He wasn't stopped for wearing a teeshirt.
He starts out by saying he was doing things that terrorists wouldn't do, and then complains because he wasn't questioned about doing those things.
Then the "saline solution" hole. Yes, every time you create exemptions from rules you create loopholes for bad guys to get through. Thanks for advertising the saline solution loophole, I'll remember it. Do you think that the TSA screeners should be testing fluids for what they are? There are an awful lot of different things, and any false positive is going to be lept on as another example of TSA stupidity while some poor schmuck is detained for nothing.
So, a terrorist who isn't stupid steals a credit card and buys a ticket under someone else's name. He prints a fake boarding pass with his real name (?) to get past TSA. Then he uses the original pass to get on the plane. We're told that this hole can be closed by simply checking the names at the time someone gets on the plane.
Uhhh, hand raised here. Question? If a terrorist is smart enough to steal a credit card with someone else's name to buy the ticket, won't he be smart enough to get a FAKE DRIVER'S LICENSE WITH THE SAME NAME so he can get past your new, stricter policy? You haven't closed the triangle at all. You've just made everyone feel more secure when they aren't. That's the game you are complaining about.
Hey. Every security measure can be bypassed by someone intent enough on doing it. TSA didn't find some of the things this guy was carrying that he shouldn't have been. Gee. Humans aren't perfect. Combine that and the ability to bypass anything, of course you get the logical result that we might as well not do anything to stop people from taking whatever they want on board.
Re:Schneier bothers me (Score:3, Insightful)
He rocks the boat...
And therin lies the fundamental difference between a noted expert in the Security field and the average joe. Bruce can and does rock the boat, where the average joes opinion would barely make a splash against the side of an inflatable raft.
While I agree there seems to be more grandstanding nowadays, if anyone is going to effect some level of change, the chances are far greater with his sig at the bottom of the Security report.
As with all things Security, it's always taken in baby steps unless something VERY large happens.
Re:Schneier bothers me (Score:5, Insightful)
No, the one advance in security is not the door to the cockpit, it's the understanding on everyone's part that cooperating with a hijacker isn't in anyone's interest anymore, and the half a dozen guys (and maybe a few women) who will be beating the terrorist to a bloody pulp as the rest of the passengers applaud.
United 93 was a test. The next time, the plane won't go down while the bad guys get killed.
Re:The best we can do (Score:3, Insightful)
I think the current state of airport security is just that - the best the agency can do, with it's current resources, budget and enormous demand for speedy throughput.
I agree that actual proper security isn't viable given the resources available, but the current state of affairs is far from "the best the agency can do." Currently the security system wastes millions of dollars and costs travelers massive inconvenience and countless hours of time all to create the illusion of security. I agree that real security in the airport may be more or less impossible, but the best the TSA could do would be to get rid of all the completely ineffectual security and stop wasting millions in tax-payer dollars, and millions of hours of travelers' time.
As matters stand now, what the TSA is doing borders on fraud.
Re:Obamaism (Score:1, Insightful)
Oh, I can do one better.
Once, in the not too distant past, I was under investigation for fraud (never taken to court, just some asshole decided it would be nice to 'get even' by calling the man with some bogus crap).
As the DA investigator was standing in my doorway, I asked him about Due Process and what happened to "Innocent until proven guilty".
His response (no shit): "You haven't proven your innocence yet".
I couldn't figure out if he was serious, or it was a lack of being able to speakuh da engrish... Jose had a real problem and had to ask me to reiterate my statements more than once.
BUT, to have an asshole as the DA investigator that could even misconstrue basic legal proceedings like that is, well.... Telling.
--Toll_Free
Re:lol (Score:5, Insightful)
How is that any sort of argument? Planes weren't raining out of the sky before the TSA was around, or even before any security measures were being taken.
I will sell you this rock, it keeps tigers away....
Re:The best we can do (Score:5, Insightful)
I think the current state of airport security is just that - the best the agency can do, with it's current resources, budget and enormous demand for speedy throughput.
Sure it's the best they can do. The point, though, is that the best they can do is COMPLETELY ineffective -- and yet they still spend $7B per year doing it. Why?
Suppose you had <insert incurable disease>, and I told you that for $10,000 per year, I would sell you a cure.
"Does it work?" you ask.
"No," I respond "but it's the best anyone can do."
Would you buy it? Or would you spend your $10K on something else that actually gives you value?
Re:The best we can do (Score:5, Insightful)
This is total bullshit. You're making the common mistake of examining their current budget, their current results, and assuming that achieving more results would require either more money or less speed.
This is simply false. It is false because it overlooks a simple fact: the current use of the budget is horrendously inefficient. In other words, better results can be achieved without making things slower (and indeed, while making things faster) on the same budget.
Most of what the TSA does is useless. Eliminate that, and suddenly you have a bunch of free money sitting around and people going through security faster. Take that money and put it into things that are actually useful. Now you have faster, better security for the same amount of money.
Why doesn't this happen? Mainly because this better security would be a lot less visible. This makes moron travelers feel less safe (even though they are actually more safe) and opens bureaucrats up to blame in the event that someone gets through it. All rationality flies out the window in the ceaseless finger-pointing that follows any failure, and the vast majority of bureaucrats are far more concerned with protecting their own asses than protecting the country.
Re:Schneier bothers me (Score:3, Insightful)
United 93 was a test. The next time, the plane won't go down while the bad guys get killed.
Yep. Had to happen once, but won't happen twice.
Re:Schneier bothers me (Score:3, Insightful)
No no, it all makes perfect sense. It's all about behavior profiling. You see, any terrorist will take pains to hide his activities. Therefore anyone who looks like a terrorist most certainly isn't one. Anyone who carries guns, bombs, or other contraband openly is by definition safe, and so doesn't need to be searched.
That's a good theory but ... what if they know that we know they're trying to hide their activities? And what if we know that they know that we know they're trying to hide ... that means that they would have to try and hide ... because then we'd know they knew we knew they were trying to hide ... so they wouldn't bother. See? It's really simple when you sit down and analyze it.
Re:Schneier bothers me (Score:5, Insightful)
This isn't something I have to worry about forgetting, it's something he better not forget. He's not going to make it.
Re:Technically, the TSA did its job right. (Score:5, Insightful)
No. No he isn't. TFA directly quotes him discussing EXACTLY what you say he is "missing":
"'Only two things have made flying safer: the reinforcement of cockpit doors, and the fact that passengers know now to resist hijackers.'"
The point that you, and many others are missing, however, is a couple lines down:
"the country would be just as safe as it is today if airport security were rolled back to pre-9/11 levels. 'Spend the rest of your money [elsewhere, for better effects.]'"
ie. The security of airlines is NOT at issue. The EFFECTIVENESS OF TSA, is. You would do better to save money by cutting back on TSA, and INVESTING it elsewhere. Elsewhere may be more maintenance on commercial jets, improving air traffic control, or perhaps even a few more air marshals.
TSA is wasting lots of money, needlessly hassling travelers, and for all that, there's no appreciable improvement in security.
Re:Schneier bothers me (Score:5, Insightful)
Re:Well... (Score:5, Insightful)
I wouldn't doubt that the whole system isn't there to catch actual terrorists, but to simply condition the populace into accepting this kind of routine as a the standard quo. Fo
You left off "shizzle".
Re:Schneier bothers me (Score:3, Insightful)
Worse than that, it seems like anyone who knows anything about cryptography is automatically suspect these days. "If you have nothing to hide, then why do you need that"?
Sad but true. Of course, if people actually thought about this, they'd all have strong crypto. If the Feds grab your laptop, for example, they'll look for anything they can nail you on, "terroristic" or not. This confiscatory behavior on the part of the TSA is officially called "intelligence gathering" but what it really is is a widespread fishing expedition.
... would you really trust that machine to pass scrutiny by agents highly motivated to get something on you for their trouble? That's the real problem here. As has been discussed many times here on Slashdot, so many things are felonies nowadays that odds are, if they want you, they'll make something stick. Believe me, you don't ever want to be inside the Justice System as an ordinary citizen. You just don't, and forget about whether you're innocent or not. Fortunately, precedent has been set that encryption passphrases are subject to the Fifth Amendment: let's hope that sticks.
If any of you carry computers around with you that are used regularly by, say, your co-workers
So folks, encrypt your stuff. It's easy [cryptography.org], it's painless and it's free [truecrypt.org], and it wouldn't hurt to proselytize a bit, and get your friends and family to try it out as well. The more popular encryption becomes, the harder it will be to outlaw.
Re:Whom does this surprise? (Score:3, Insightful)
Re:Whom does this surprise? (Score:3, Insightful)
The security didn't catch this guy, and the passengers subdued him. I'm a little confused as to your point.
Re:Schneier bothers me (Score:5, Insightful)
I wonder how likely this is to happen. Think about it - we have a government that has systematically become of the most purposelessly invasive influences in our lives, that has routinely skirted the law, and routinely questioned the validity of our constitutional democracy - if we can't stand up to that by throwing out the yahoos in office who vote for this stuff, would they seriously be able to stand up to someone on a plane?
Re:Well... (Score:5, Insightful)
We have a financial system that is built upon the government, huge corporations and consumers borrowing insane amounts of money to keep the myth of a strong US going. The TSA's primary purpose is to create a show designed to make the public-at-large feel safe and keep spending their money by flying. If a significant percentage of people stopped flying because of fear, the entire airline industry would collapse.
After 9/11, Bush was all over the airwaves telling people to continue to go to work and not stop spending their money because we need to keep the economy strong. Of course, when an anthrax tainted letter was found in a congressional mail sorting facility, congress closed its doors. But we simple consumers need to just keep borrowing money and consuming to keep the economy strong and if that means creating a government agency to create a theater show, then that's just what our government will do.
Re:Schneier bothers me (Score:3, Insightful)
Oh, and don't forget the second advance. The FFDO program. (Commonly known as the "Guns in the cockpit program") By the time you get your second kick in on that door the pilot will be responding with a hail of bullets.
Re:Schneier bothers me (Score:5, Insightful)
I knew a guy who worked airport security pre-9/11. One day they were running a security drill, and pulled him aside when he let a guy through the checkpoint with a two-piece rifle. Why did he allow him to pass? "Because it wasn't a working rifle. It wasn't put together."
Re:Well... (Score:5, Insightful)
I wouldn't doubt that the whole system isn't there to catch actual terrorists, but to simply condition the populace into accepting this kind of routine as a the standard quo.
I know people desperately want to see this as a subtle plot by hidden puppetmasters, but really, as with all conspiracy theories, Hanlon's Razor needs to be considered:
"Never attribute to malice that which can be adequately explained by stupidity."
The desire to seek explanations involving some controlling individual or group is as old as humanity itself. The vast pantheon of gods invented to explain the frighteningly random whims of nature bear witness to this. Unfortunately, that's simply not the way it is. Nature is implacable. Tornadoes and tidal waves are inevitable, as is stupid security theater. Security theater is itself a kind of appeal to "the gods" to keep us safe. The truth is, people are just plain fucking stupid, particularly large groups of people put in charge of something that can't really be prevented. Yes, they do think this is to "stop terrorists". It's not logical, it's just blind reaction. In its own way, this is actually worse than the machinations of a secret cabal, because there's no central controlling authority to expose and thwart. It's just a giant morass of human nature. Half the population has an IQ of under 100, and many of them work for the TSA. All we can do is keep explaining their error and hope they learn.
Re:Well... (Score:4, Insightful)
... telling people to continue to go to work and not stop spending their money because we need to keep the economy strong. Of course, when an anthrax tainted letter was found in a congressional mail sorting facility, congress closed its doors.
Sadly, I think one of the best things you could do for the economy would be to get congress to run away more often...
Re:Schneier bothers me (Score:2, Insightful)
The fact that your fellow citizens will cheer as the feds waterboard the key out of you really puts that in perspective, though.
Not needed. M$ (and almost certainly the US government through a secret security letter) have full and almost unhindered access to every network connected windows, and possibly linux, box on earth.
To preempt one argument: No, they're not going to be easily detected - they'll use steganography for network traffic and only install the spying software (via M$ update) on "persons/countries of interest".
Encryption is pointless when they have the keys to your computer. They built it after all and the general population intuitively understands that.
---
WGA. Guilty until proven innocent. For millions. Again and again.
Very interesting, care to elaborate on that? A nice bit of evidence would be well appreciated.
Re:Obamaism (Score:4, Insightful)
Sorry, but just how is carrying a 2oz bottle (what's that in real units anyway?) better for security than carrying a 3oz bottle of fluid ?
Re:lol (Score:3, Insightful)
Got cite? Wikipedia only lists 6 hijackings in the 1970s. Perhaps all these other ones weren't notable enough to list?
Re:Schneier bothers me (Score:5, Insightful)
As a culture, we've pretty conclusively shown that we'd rather someone else do the dirty work. We'll see: it'll happen again.
Re:Technically, the TSA did its job right. (Score:3, Insightful)
His conclusions are not original, and their is much he is missing, including the problems of identity matching that are at the forefront of much research in the area.
His conclusions aren't original, but somehow, even after five years of people saying, loudly, what totally irrelevant theater the TSA is, the TSA still has a budget of more than $5 billion. That's half as much as the government spends on "general science" research and twice what they spend on "energy" research. I suspect he'll shut up about TSA as soon as we stop wasting so much money on them.
For example, you still seem to be missing his entire point. Solving "the problems of identity matching" won't make TSA any more effective because TSA is not the effective part of airline security. The effective part of airline security is that passengers will no longer be compliant participants and that the cockpit is no longer accessible to hijackers.
To make a home security analogy: reinforcing the cockpit door is equivalent to locking the front door of your house; changing passenger attitude is equivalent to posting a guard at that door; expanding TSA search policies, data mining, and screening procedures is equivalent to planting a "Brinks" sign in your front yard. It cost a few hundred million to reinforce the doors. The attitude change was priceless in terms of the lives lost to cause it, but $0. The TSA is $5 billion/year in direct costs plus the uncountable costs of passenger frustration and inconvenience.
Re:Schneier bothers me (Score:2, Insightful)
At this point, you're going to run up against the one advance in airplane security that *has* been made post-9/11: you're not getting through the reinforced cockpit door with anything less than a battering ram.
No, the one advance in security is not the door to the cockpit, it's the understanding on everyone's part that cooperating with a hijacker isn't in anyone's interest anymore, and the half a dozen guys (and maybe a few women) who will be beating the terrorist to a bloody pulp as the rest of the passengers applaud.
United 93 was a test. The next time, the plane won't go down while the bad guys get killed.
Don't be so god damned cocksure.
Do you really think that it's completely impossible that a half-dozen well-trained terrorists with effective weapons of some kind operating together as a team following a well-thought-out plan wouldn't be able to control an untrained, uncoordinated, and basically unarmed mob in a very confined space long enough to get through the cockpit door?
Because the next bunch of hijackers will be prepared to handle the passengers as well as the crew.
Do you really think that's not possible?
If so, why?
Meh.
The only REAL improvement in airline security comes from the fact that there's a good chance that the pilots in the cockpit are ARMED.
So when Mohammed cracks through the cockpit door, he is subject to an immediate 9mm brain splattering.
And THAT is BY FAR the biggest deterrent to any hijacking attempt. There's no way a terrorist organization can afford to invest the resources necessary to pull off a suicide hijacking unless it's almost certain to be successful. Even on 9/11, only the pilots knew it was a suicide attack, IIRC. That means that with years of planning, Al Qaeda could only find four terrorists with the ability and the will to perform a suicide hijacking. The "muscle" on 9/11 didn't need to have the will to perform suicide attacks.
Now they do.
Think any terrorist organization would waste half-a-dozen motivated-for-suicide, fanatical, and highly effective operatives on a hijacking when it's all too likely to end with a BANG BANG BANG the moment the cockpit door gets opened?
Re:Schneier bothers me (Score:3, Insightful)
voting someone out requires voting someone else in, and that may not be the best choice. There is also a level of abstraction to the conduct of our government in washington.
on the other hand, being confronted by someone who wishes to directly cause harm to you and those around you is not nearly as abstract, and doesnt have to be replaced with someone that you hope has better intentions. The jackass on the plane just needs to be stopped.
There are two types of free, I think there are also two types of sheep.
Re:Well... (Score:1, Insightful)
Yup. Which is why, from the article:
"because I wanted to see whether my fellow passengers would report me to the TSA for acting suspiciously in a public bathroom."
No one will, even if they suspect him. Those other bathroom occupants are more scared of the police or security than the reporter is. They know that if they complain, the complainer is immediately under suspicion too or, at the very least, likely to be held to explain their rational for reporting the activity.
iow, the TSA has done such a piss poor job harrassing legitimate flyers and citizens of the country for their legal travel and movement about the country that those who they supposed to protect are more fearable of the government enforcers harrassing and finding them than they are of actual terrorists showing up and doing harm.
Re:Well... (Score:4, Insightful)
You must be knew here.
Re:Schneier bothers me (Score:3, Insightful)
Clearly, I cannot drink the wine in front of you!
What's really funny is that I got modded Insightful.