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Yet the countries with the advanced high-tech military hardware still fell to the swarming hordes that out-produced them materially. A lesson the US probably should keep in mind going into the 21st century.

The Japanese were convinced that Dolittle's raid was conducted by submarine launched bombers to such an extent they spent an enormous amount of effort developing them.

Like many such items during the war - these subs attempted too many innovations in one jump and were not reliable. The Germans and the Japanese had a penchant for attempting to produce super weapons as opposed to incremental improvements in existing stuff. Some of what they produced was incredible, but none of it was really ready for prime time, or available in sufficient quantity to significantly have any effect on the war.

One of the most draconian decisions of the war was on the part of the US - it was recognized that the Sherman was no match for the heavier German tanks. There were some improvements, but the US counted on the fact that we were producing and delivering tanks at a rate that outstripped the Germans ability to destroy them or replace their own.

You might want to read Arthur Clarke's old story "Superiority."

The wonder weapon often has significant hidden flaws or doesn't make it to the battlefield in time be decisive.

A downed Zero was recovered from the Aleutians in July 42, rebuilt and flown for testing:

"The Zero had superior maneuverability only at the lower speeds used in dogfighting, with short turning radius and excellent aileron control at very low speeds. However, immediately apparent was the fact that the ailerons froze up at speeds above two hundred knots, so that rolling maneuvers at those speeds were slow and required much force on the control stick. It rolled to the left much easier than to the right. Also, its engine cut out under negative acceleration [as when nosing into a dive] due to its float-type carburetor.

"We now had an answer for our pilots who were unable to escape a pursuing Zero. We told them to go into a vertical power dive, using negative acceleration, if possible, to open the range quickly and gain advantageous speed while the Zero's engine was stopped. At about two hundred knots, we instructed them to roll hard right before the Zero pilot could get his sights lined up."

Advanced U.S. fighters produced toward the war's end still couldn't turn with the Zero, but they were faster and could outclimb and outdive it.

Without self-sealing fuel tanks, the Zero was easily flamed when hit in any of its three wing and fuselage tanks or its droppable belly tank. And without protective armor, its pilot was vulnerable.

Koga's Zero [americanheritage.com]

A little tangential here, but it may be interesting to engineering nerds.

I got a description of some of the workings of standard carrier catapults from a co-worker who used to be stationed on one. This is maybe 20 years old, so our tech may have changed since then. Apparently they have (had?) a supply of hour-glass shaped steel widgets on board color-coded to match the aircraft being launched. When it was time to launch, they would grab the appropriate size/color and insert it as an intentional weak-link in line with the cable before firing up the winch. When the cable was properly tensioned, the steel widget would break and release the cable throwing the plane into the air.

Kind of a neat design idea if you can't just haul the cable along fast enough to throw the plane.

Currently steam for the launchers, though electromagentic rails are being designed as upgrades.

The hydralics are used to slow the arresting cables down. And for the big elevators.

It was. The aircraft were fitting for water landings and the subs had cranes to lift them back on deck.