Launch Command Preserved In Power Failure, But Nuclear Designs Still Risky 167
With a follow-up to Tuesday's story, Martin Hellman writes "Slashdot reported that a system failure at Warren AFB in Wyoming affected 50 ICBMs and that 'various security protocols built into the missile delivery system, like intrusion alarms and warhead separation alarms, were offline.' Assuaging fears that America's nuclear deterrent might have been compromised during this failure, the source article notes that the missiles still could be launched from airborne command centers. Other reports cite an administration official offering assurances that 'at no time did the president's ability [to launch] decrease.' Given the difficulty of debugging software and hardware that is probably not a good thing. The history of nuclear command and control systems has too many examples of risky designs that favor the ability to launch over the danger of an accidental one."
Ability to launch (Score:1, Interesting)
'at no time did the president's ability [to launch] decrease.'
That's true. The ability to launch was non-existent before, during, and after this incident.
Re:Why is 50 a problem when losing the biscuit was (Score:3, Interesting)
The president losing the launch codes is a little harder for the reds to exploit then possibly a systematic failure
Unless it was the reds that "founf" the biscuit. They don't actually have to use it, all they have to do is put it into play. The time necessary to disregard, authenticate a new code is longer than a missle launch. Which is why the US nuclear threat is three pronged, land, sea, and air. The only missles that do not need a Permissive Action Link are sea launched, surface or sub-surface.
Re:Canard. (Score:1, Interesting)
Re:Canard. (Score:1, Interesting)
you speak as though you are an authority on the nuclear command and control protocols of the united states.
you haven't the faintest idea what you are talking about.
us strategic defense is possibly the most heavily engineered solution that man has ever created. the amount of man-hours that mathematicians and engineers have invested into developing the system is staggering.
just ponder the possibility that your paper-thin "knowledge" on the idiosyncracies of the most secret and complex enterprise the world's most powerful nation engages in might not function the way you think it does.
Re:Canard. (Score:2, Interesting)
One of the simplest is that it takes the near-simultaneous activation of two mechanical, key-locked switches to send the fire command to the missile, and these are separated by enough distance that one person can't do it alone. And it only gets to that point after a number of other manual steps have been taken to prep the launch.
Not only that, with Minuteman systems a key turn by both the commander and deputy in a launch control center doesn't directly launch the 10 missiles they are in charge of; instead their key turns are registered as a launch "vote" within their squadron. The 50 missiles in the squadron do not actually receive the launch command until at least two of the five launch control centers in the squadron submit launch votes within a second or two of each other. This both prevents any of the launch control centers from individually launching their flight of missiles and allows for all enabled missiles in the squadron to be launched by just two launch control centers if the others are put out of action.
Re:Why have them (Score:1, Interesting)
You are wrong. SAC never had anything but strategic nuclear weapons; airborne launched bombs and ICBMs are strategic; for targeting cities. However the US Army fielded Davy Crocketts and a variety of nuclear artillery in Germany, up to the Pershing II missle armed with the M85 thermonuclear warhead (max 80kT). These were designed to stop Soviet tanks from rolling across the German plain, as the Soviets outnumbered the entire NATO tank contingent, all European and US tanks, by a 2 to 1 margin. It was well known that if the Soviets chose to invade Europe, they would be across Europe in a few days, and to give NATO time to deploy these tactical nuclear weapons would need to be used.
Also, there was a TAC nuclear weapon; the B57 had a yield of 10kT and could be deployed by a fighter or even a Navy helicopter as a nuclear depth charge. There were also nuclear land mines too; those are also tactical.
Re:Why have them (Score:5, Interesting)
If the US launched an all-out strategic attack on an opponent
China? Russia? What do you think the odds are that we would be doing a First Strike against any nuclear power? Correct answer: Zero, nada, zip. This means they would be used as a second strike, which is by definition, strategic positioning of weaponry, and the founding idea behind the Nuclear Triad. They wouldn't be bombing boots on the ground in China, too much chance for collateral damage, and the real goodies aren't even the soldiers (which can be handily taken care of with conventional weapons.) The real goodies are infrastructure. If the shit were literally to hit the fan and you have to second strike (as I discount ALL possibilities of a first strike by the US), you nuke dams, power plants, nuclear facilities, military installations, and maybe even factories and shipyards. Yes, soldiers would die, but the real target is infrastructure. If China landed troops on the west coast, tactical nuclear wouldn't be an option except as a hail mary. You don't piss in your own chili that way.
While the Geneva Convention is against it, the most effective way is to nuke rice patties making them unusable for years, literally starving the troops. Same reason for bombing dams, to destroy the ability to feed themselves as arable land is now flooded with radiation and washed away in the resulting flood. Then, I'm not exactly a huge fan of the idea of "rules" of war. Seems pointless since one side always ignores, and the other side always cheats when they can. If you notice, every war since all the rules have been put in place has been a long slogging battle with more death than would be possible if the rules were ignored (Korea, still ongoing, Vietnam, lost, middle east, etc.) And yes, I am aware that I am in the minority on that point, which doesn't negate the truth of the matter.
Re:Canard. (Score:1, Interesting)
And those key switches are just electrical connectors behind a panel secured by ordinary phillips-head screws. It doesn't take a genius to see that with a screwdriver and some wire those 'widely separated keys' are just theater.
AC
Re:Why have them (Score:1, Interesting)
Re:Canard. (Score:3, Interesting)
Where is it incorrect?
You need the POTUS and SECDEF concurring. SECDEF is the one who tells POTUS we're under attack. If POTUS went to SECDEF and said "launch a nuke", SECDEF would look at POTUS and go "what the fuck?"
There's also the matter of illegal orders. The military personnel all the way down the chain to the jolly, candy-like buttons are responsible for knowing that what they are doing is not illegal, and for refusing to do it if it is.
If we're not under attack, or Congress has not authorized war, tossing nukes at other nations - or our own - is murder, hence illegal.
If we are under attack, or there is reason to go to war, everyone in the chain will know it and be in place to carry out their mission by the time POTUS is asked by SECDEF to authorize it.
We're not going to wake up some morning to find that we've nuked Canada because the Commander in Chief was sleep-talking in nuclear authorization codes to an evil Secretary of Defense.