No More SSL Revocation Checking For Chrome 152
New submitter mwehle writes with this bit from Ars Technica: "Google's Chrome browser will stop relying on a decades-old method for ensuring secure sockets layer certificates are valid after one of the company's top engineers compared it to seat belts that break when they are needed most. The browser will stop querying CRL, or certificate revocation lists, and databases that rely on OCSP, or online certificate status protocol, Google researcher Adam Langley said in a blog post published on Sunday. He said the services, which browsers are supposed to query before trusting a credential for an SSL-protected address, don't make end users safer because Chrome and most other browsers establish the connection even when the services aren't able to ensure a certificate hasn't been tampered with."
What? (Score:4, Interesting)
So he admits Chrome is broken, so he doesn't fix it and blames the CA's . . makes sense.
So basically he wants CRLs? I thought he didn't want CRLs?
False warnings (Score:5, Interesting)
I harp on this constantly. At work, we fairly routinely issue people new certificates and revoke the old ones, even when there's no belief that the certs were compromised. As a result, you can send somebody an email and later that day get new certs. This is a problem because all the digitally signed emails you sent earlier now register as revoked and Outlook proceeds to tell you this, that the email can't be trusted, etc...
This happens frequently enough that I encounter this 2-3 times a week. The email has always been valid, they just got new certs between their sending the messages and my opening the email(possibly for historical reasons).
Same deal as with the california cancer warning - stick it on EVERYTHING, and it gets ignored. If you put cancer warnings on apples, they may not pay attention to the cancer warning on that bottle of test chemical.
Re:False warnings (Score:2, Interesting)