Second SFO Disaster Avoided Seconds Before Crash 248
sabri writes "On July 25th, flight EVA28, a Boeing 777 flying from Taiwan to SFO, was on the final approach for runway 28L when they were alerted by ATC that they were only at 600ft above the ground at less than 4NM from the threshold. SFO's tower directed the flight crew to climb immediately and declare missed approach. Assuming they were flying at 140 knots (typical approach speed of a 777), they were less than 2 minutes from the runway and at a 3 degree angle (approx 500ft/min descent), about a minute from impact. This is the same type of aircraft and runway used by the crashed Asiana flight. Similar weather conditions and awfully similar flight path. Is there a structural problem with computer-aided pilot's ability to fly visual approaches?"
This /. headline is sensationalist drivel (Score:5, Insightful)
Yes, they were below the glidepath, and yes they blew the approach and had to go around: but this is hardly seconds from disaster or even a close thing. 600' at a normal approach speed is not "close" to the ground and 3.8 NM is more than 3 minutes at Vref which is certainly adequate time to respond.
These kinds of things happen and the only reason we're even hearing about this one is that it happened at SFO 28L.
I expected a little less sensationalism and a lot more intelligence from slashdot.
Re:NO (Score:5, Insightful)
To be fair, it does show how dependent these pilots are becoming on their computers. And if they fuck up this often when ILS is down, you have to wonder if they would ever catch it if ILS was miscalibrated or spoofed.
Re:NO (Score:2, Insightful)
Actually, it doesn't show that. You can't draw any meaningful conclusions with a sample of 2 incidents reported, no estimate of the total number of landings in similar conditions, and no idea how many near-misses didn't make it into the news.
Someone should be doing this study properly (if they weren't already), but you need a better data set than Google News.
Re:copy paste (Score:4, Insightful)
I prefer to have the pilot in the transport plane. This way if it crashes they die too. It is a pretty good way to convince them to fly properly.
Re:NO (Score:5, Insightful)
To be further in tune with the facts here.... There are more approach aids than the ILS. Safety in aviation is layered and in the case of approach aids there are at least three more ways a pilot should be able to use to judge his approach and correct. There are the VASI lights which tell you if you are too high or low. There are the markings on the runway, which are of standard sizes and locations which aid the pilot who is looking out the windows. Then there is the "visual picture" that the pilot will have seen many times before when landing, even if only in the simulator.
Any of these *should* have been enough to safely land.
My guess is that what really happened here is a combination of ATC directions and pilot errors. ATC likely directed a short approach which started pretty high making it difficult for the pilots to properly stabilize the approach. The inexperience of the pilot in command contributed to the issue because it took him longer to make all the complex adjustments, get the gear down, flaps down, get on the glide path at the proper airspeed and complete the landing checklists and he lacked experience to recognize what was happening. The PIC got behind the aircraft and by the time they realized the sink rate was way to high they where to low and slow to recover. They landed way short.
This is an old story, told time and time again. A flying aircraft does not wait for the pilot who doesn't keep ahead of the situation. Landing and take off phase of flight are fast paced (compared to other phases) and also the least forgiving of falling behind. The PIC fell way behind and failed to fly the aircraft properly. He failed to recognize the danger and deal with the problem and was lucky to survive. In this case I don't think ILS wold have mattered.
Re:Captain Wi Tu Low is at it again (Score:2, Insightful)
I have to admit I'm disturbed by how comfortable people are in this country with Asian stereotypes. Reminds me of the "chink" joke made about Jeremy Lind in a NY paper. Apparently the mods agree. It's not funny.
Re:NO (Score:4, Insightful)
To be further in tune with the facts here.... There are more approach aids than the ILS
Any of these *should* have been enough to safely land.
And that is the problem. Visual approaches are becoming increasingly difficult for the magenta addicted flight crew. If a heavy gets directions from ATC which will make their life very difficult, she (the pilot announcing the go-around was female) must have only one response: "unable".
Re:Captain Wi Tu Low is at it again (Score:3, Insightful)
In this case I don't think it's a question of Asian stereotypes. It's a question of homophones. Plenty of homophonic western names get mined for comedic content as well (Anthony Weiner, anyone named Dick, etc.).
Re:This /. headline is sensationalist drivel (Score:4, Insightful)
Yes, they were below the glidepath, and yes they blew the approach and had to go around: but this is hardly seconds from disaster or even a close thing. 600' at a normal approach speed is not "close" to the ground and 3.8 NM is more than 3 minutes at Vref which is certainly adequate time to respond.
There are several reasons why this is an important story:
- Yes, they were more than two minutes from touchdown, but that does not mean two minutes crashing: the descent rate determines that, and according to Flightaware, they were descending at 480ft/min. Which gives a little over a minute before crashing;
- They were way below the glideslope on a visual approach, and apparently not aware of it. It took ATC to warn them, with a little over a minute to spare; If anything would have blocked that radio transmission (another station, perhaps: remember Tenerife), they may even have hit the water;
- They were headed for the same runway as the Asiana flight, under the same conditions: ILS unavailable, but other aids still working (especially PAPIs). This simply shows that the crew lacks the experience to safely conduct an approach and landing under these circumstances.
Re: NO (Score:5, Insightful)
This was brought up in the other crash, that ATC keeps giving exceedingly difficult directions because the AIRPORT has allowed the nearby area to be unsafe... Don't disturb suburbs, malls, and factories that weren't built and shouldnt have been zoned when the runway was built because "they'll feel bad".
So they issue increasingly dangerous commands to pilots and just expect them to turn on the robot. Then the airport doesn't keep it's maintenance up or scheduled construction and TURNS OFF some the electronic aids used by the robot... Yet doesn't modify the instructions to make them safer.
The previous crash brought up that this standard approach is more like somebody screaming "TURN NOW!" From the backseat...as a matter of "common practice" again, because it "upsets" neighbors zoning allowed in the flight path not because of technical need.
Re: NO (Score:5, Insightful)
ILS approaches take time. You have to set up to intercept the final fix at a specified altitude with the aircraft flying the right direction on the localizer. This final fix is usually about 5 miles out and 3,000 AGL. Flying a full standard ILS approach is not normally done because it takes at least 5 min to establish on the localizer going outbound, Cross the outer marker, do the outbound leg and procedure turn to get yourself on the localizer and glide-slope before you cross the outer marker again. Even a "radar assisted" approach takes 3 or so min to get you on the localizer and glide-slope at a set altitude over the outer marker.
Why do I go though all this? To tell you that turning off the ILS on a clear day is not a factor here. They simply do NOT fly ILS approaches on clear days at busy airports. Nobody has the time. They fly visual approaches almost exclusively because it's faster and easier. They may have the ILS approach configured and may actually look at the needles during the approach, but if you are flying visual approaches, you spend more time looking out the window.
ATP pilots are usually quite capable of flying their aircraft in very difficult circumstances. The experience and training required to be rated in a large commercial aircraft are pretty high. The folks who meet these requirements are fully capable of flying with or without the automation and must demonstrate their abilities before they are allowed to sit in the cockpit. Flying visual approaches without automation (ILS or otherwise) is not a problem for these guys. Some are better than others at this, but everybody can. It's basically how everybody starts learning how to fly. Small single engine land aircraft fly these kinds of approaches nearly every time and most pilots learn to fly in single engine aircraft.
What is a problem is that ATC many times asks pilots to do really dangerous things. Flying short, steep and unstabilized approaches makes automation pretty much useless. Given this new revelation, it seem to me that ATC procedures contributed to this accident. I don't think that we have a case where dependance on automation is a problem. What we have is ATC asking pilots to do dangerous things when low and slow. This accident isn't about the ILS being turned off. The weather was clear, nobody would have used the ILS had it been on anyway.
Re: NO (Score:5, Insightful)
What is a problem is that ATC many times asks pilots to do really dangerous things. Flying short, steep and unstabilized approaches makes automation pretty much useless. Given this new revelation, it seem to me that ATC procedures contributed to this accident. I don't think that we have a case where dependance on automation is a problem. What we have is ATC asking pilots to do dangerous things when low and slow. This accident isn't about the ILS being turned off. The weather was clear, nobody would have used the ILS had it been on anyway.
When ATC gives you a clearance which you can't comply with, any PIC has just one answer: "unable".
Many of these carriers are mandating their pilots to use automation, so the ILS being turned off is a major issue, regardless of them having 250 hours in a SEP/MEP.
And again, the only person responsible for the safety of any flight in a servicable aircraft is the captain. He can override ATC at any time, of the safety of the flight dictates him to do so. All he needs is to declare an emergency [youtube.com].