Want to read Slashdot from your mobile device? Point it at m.slashdot.org and keep reading!

 



Forgot your password?
typodupeerror
×
Communications AT&T Yahoo!

Yahoo DMARC Implementation Breaks Most Mailing Lists 83

pdclarry writes: "On April 8, Yahoo implemented a new DMARC policy that essentially bars any Yahoo user from accessing mailing lists hosted anywhere except on Yahoo and Google. While Yahoo is the initiator, it also affects Comcast, AT&T, Rogers, SBCGlobal, and several other ISPs. Internet Engineering Council expert John R. Levine, a specialist in email infrastructure and spam filtering, said, 'Yahoo breaks every mailing list in the world including the IETF's' on the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) list.

DMARC (Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting & Conformance) is a two-year-old proposed standard previously discussed on Slashdot that is intended to curb email abuse, including spoofing and phishing. Unfortunately, as implemented by Yahoo, it claims most mailing list users as collateral damage. Messages posted to mailing lists (including listserv, mailman, majordomo, etc) by Yahoo subscribers are blocked when the list forwards them to other Yahoo (and other participating ISPs) subscribers. List members not using Yahoo or its partners are not affected and will receive posts from Yahoo users. Posts from non-Yahoo users are delivered to Yahoo members. So essentially those suffering the most are Yahoo's (and Comcast's, and AT&T's, etc) own customers. The Hacker News has details about why DMARC has this effect on mailing lists. Their best proposed solution is to ban Yahoo email users from mailing lists and encourage them to switch to other ISPs. Unfortunately, it isn't just Yahoo, although they are getting the most attention."
This discussion has been archived. No new comments can be posted.

Yahoo DMARC Implementation Breaks Most Mailing Lists

Comments Filter:
  • SPF.. (Score:4, Interesting)

    by Bert64 ( 520050 ) <bert AT slashdot DOT firenzee DOT com> on Wednesday April 09, 2014 @05:14PM (#46708471) Homepage

    Implementing SPF can also do the same thing, the issue is that mailing lists don't rewrite the from headers so despite having been forwarded through the mailing list server the original sender is still shown in the headers, only the mailing list server isnt really supposed to be sending mail *from* other people's addresses...

    So either you allow mail to come from anywhere with any sender address, which lets mailing lists and email forwarding work fine but also makes spoofed spam very easy...
    Or you don't, and break the above...

    Really legit mailing lists should be rewriting the sender headers to reflect that the mail has been redelivered by the mailing list, the only difficulty this would cause is when users try to reply directly to messages rather than forwarding their replies to the list itself.

  • by Jeremiah Cornelius ( 137 ) on Wednesday April 09, 2014 @05:18PM (#46708495) Homepage Journal

    Microsoft does the same for Hotmail/Live/Outlook. They claim suspicious use of your account was detected, and that to return access to you, you must change password, with a supplied phone number for secondary account control.

    Bullshit. I had this happen across 5 MS hosted mail accounts in the same week - each were purpose-specific accounts to legitimately isolate commercial activity.

    Google? The bastards try to wheedle your mobile number out of you at every PW change or update. They practically hide the UI to bypass this request.

    Needles to say, all three are used only as "burner" addresses, now.

  • Re:SPF.. (Score:4, Interesting)

    by Zocalo ( 252965 ) on Wednesday April 09, 2014 @05:27PM (#46708567) Homepage
    A better solution might be to move the original sender's "From" to another header ("Return-Path", "Reply-To", - whatever works best for the list software/admin) and set a new "From" to an address that would feed any replies to the list's submission/moderation queue. If the address of the person replying is on the mailing list or the list accepts any submission address, it goes into the normal queue for remailing, if not it either gets discarded as a bogus reply that is probably spam or goes into a moderation queue, depending on the list.

    This is still an implementation flaw in the way DMARC and SPF work with mailing lists rather than a problem with mailing lists though, so the onus really belongs with DMARC and SPF to better provide a way to support mailing lists. Including a way to specify in the DMARC/SPF configuration for the that the sender is a mailing list and that they need to validate the original sender against a different header instead - "X-Originally-From", rather than the mailing list's domain in the current "From", perhaps?

It's a naive, domestic operating system without any breeding, but I think you'll be amused by its presumption.

Working...