Nuclear Missile Command Drops Grades From Tests To Discourage Cheating 122
An anonymous reader writes: Earlier this year, just over half of the military officers put in charge of U.S. nuclear launch facilities were implicated in an exam cheating scandal. The Air Force conducted regular exams to keep officers current on the protocols and skills required to operate some of the world's most dangerous weapons. But the way they graded the test caused problems. Anything below a 90% score was a fail, but the remaining 10% often dictated how a launch officer's career progressed. There might not be much functional difference between a 93% and a 95%, but the person scoring higher will get promoted disproportionately quicker. This inspired a ring of officers to cheat in order to meet the unrealistic expectations of the Air Force. Now, in an effort to clean up that Missile Wing, the Air Force is making the exams pass/fail. The officers still need to score 90% or higher (since it's important work with severe consequences for failure), but scores won't be recorded and used to compete for promotions anymore. The Air Force is also making an effort to replace or refurbish the aging equipment that runs these facilities.
Re:Sample Question (Score:5, Interesting)
I'll let you in on a secret.
Just having the code stopped the problem they created the code to fix. Since it fixed the problem, it makes sense for it to be an easy number. I suspect the rpesident will be under a little stress if he had to actually use it, so you want to minimize mistakes.
The security guy makes a classic security review mistake. Ignoring why and the practicality and the impact.
So that actual number is irrelevant, and no, you don't punch the code and then missiles launch.