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Before Crash American Officials Had Twice Considered Grounding Boeing's 737 Max -- But Didn't (businessinsider.com) 132

An anonymous reader quotes Business Insider: Southwest Airlines and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) officials who monitor the carrier were unaware that a standard safety feature, designed to warn pilots about malfunctioning sensors, on Boeing 737 Max jets was turned off when Southwest began flying the model in 2017, reported Andy Pastzor of the Wall Street Journal... Like other airlines flying the Max, Southwest didn't learn about the change until the aftermath of the Lion Air crash [in October of 2018], Pastzor reported.

According to WSJ's investigation, which reviewed documents, the carrier then asked Boeing to reactivate the alerts on its Max fleet, causing FAA inspectors to contemplate grounding the Max fleet until it was determined whether or not pilots needed additional training -- but the idea was quickly dropped. Once the feature was reactivated, some FAA officials again considered grounding Southwest's 737 Max fleet to determine whether pilots needed new training -- and again, the discussions, which happened via email, were dismissed after a few days, Pastkor reported.

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Before Crash American Officials Had Twice Considered Grounding Boeing's 737 Max -- But Didn't

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  • by Anonymous Coward on Sunday April 28, 2019 @12:40PM (#58505654)

    Allowing industry to police itself costs lives, over and over, in every direction.

  • The scandal here (Score:5, Interesting)

    by NoNonAlphaCharsHere ( 2201864 ) on Sunday April 28, 2019 @12:42PM (#58505666)
    The scandal is that the 737 Max is a fundamentally different plane than the standard 737. Somehow Boeing managed to convince the FAA and the airlines that pilots didn't need much additional training (read: save a bunch of money) to be certified on the Max when they were already certified on the Standard -- which isn't the case.
    • Re:The scandal here (Score:4, Informative)

      by Tough Love ( 215404 ) on Sunday April 28, 2019 @12:51PM (#58505714)

      Right, rundamentally different, and fundamentally more broken [forbes.com]

    • by ilguido ( 1704434 ) on Sunday April 28, 2019 @01:24PM (#58505882)

      Somehow Boeing managed to convince the FAA and the airlines that pilots didn't need much additional training

      FAA let Boeing self certify its aircraft and aircraft technology for years now. That is the real problem: FAA handed Boeing a blank cheque. According to this article [seattletimes.com], Boeing had its authority on self certification extended in 2009 (I think the article hints that Boeing already had some significant freedom before then).

    • by Anonymous Coward

      Somehow Boeing managed to convince the FAA

      Blowjobs and job offers go a long way.

    • by jeremyp ( 130771 )

      No, the problem is that it is fundamentally the same plane as all the previous Boeing 737's but with physically bigger engines that won't fit under the wings in the same position as previous models.

      They should have designed a fundamentally different plane, but didn't because they needed something in the market now to go head to head with Airbus.

    • The scandal is that the 737 Max is a fundamentally different plane than the standard 737. Somehow Boeing managed to convince the FAA and the airlines that pilots didn't need much additional training (read: save a bunch of money) to be certified on the Max when they were already certified on the Standard -- which isn't the case.

      Apparently this was a big selling point, when trying to counter the Airbus offering.

      At the same time anything that changes the way a vehicle handles should be a flag for more training. Changing the center of pressure and gravity are included in them. I am curious how many engineers in the airlines so this as a potential issue?

    • The issue is not that the 737-MAX is a fundamentally different airplane, the issue is that to compete with the A320 Neo, which it was made as a direct response to, it should absolutely have been a new airplane to the point of being a whole new type. However to avoid the cost and speed up time to market they chose to stick to an airframe so old that it was never designed to carry engines anywhere near as big as modern turbofans, let alone the really big ones they'd need to compete with the A320 NEO.

      What r
  • by Viol8 ( 599362 ) on Sunday April 28, 2019 @12:45PM (#58505680) Homepage

    ... look like a fight in a kids playground when the dust has settled I suspect. The more we learn about this the worse its looking for Boeing and the FAA. If Muilenberg and his execs arn't worried they bloody well should be because if some VW execs can potentially be jailed for fraud imagine what causing the deaths of 350 air passengers through negligence and cost cutting drives will get you.

    • Piss poor black people in Africa or orientals don't count as real people, like a plane load of rich waspy amurricans crashing between New York and LA would have.

    • Re: (Score:2, Insightful)

      by Anonymous Coward

      if some VW execs can potentially be jailed for fraud imagine what causing the deaths of 350 air passengers through negligence and cost cutting drives will get you.

      Germany is not Murica. I see scape goats, promotions and early "retirement" packages.

    • by Anonymous Coward

      You forget that the culprit is an american company.
      Most likely nothing will happen.

      See also Monsanto: never convicted of any wrongdoing until it was bought by a german company.

    • by uncqual ( 836337 )

      There is quite a difference between the Boeing and VW cases (at least to the extent that we know about things now).

      VW actively deceived and intentionally implemented software to deceive - it was not an accident, it was not an oversight, it was not the result of cutting costs or reducing review. What VW did was also 100% certain to result in "out of spec" emissions performance. That's fraud.

      On the other hand, at this point, I've heard nothing that indicates that Boeing was anything but alarmingly sloppy (pos

    • Re: (Score:2, Troll)

      The problem with this is that it is going to throw a lot of light into dark places in American Aerospace. The problems going on at Boeing are systemic to a whole lot of companies in American Aerospace/Defence, they're just the ones that got 'caught'.

      They're run by mid level managers that have no clue. There is 'being conservative' and there is 'refusing to ever do anything ever again because this is already certified'.

      I would start questioning the entire airplane at a component level. I doubt that these are

  • by tsa ( 15680 ) on Sunday April 28, 2019 @12:47PM (#58505692) Homepage

    Why do we always hear that the authorities were warned but didn't do anything? It happens with plane crashings, shootings, other terrorist attacks and even the Titaninc went down because the person in power didn't think it necessary to act. We humans seem to have some erroneous subroutine built in when handling with this kind of situations.

    • Re:Why always (Score:4, Insightful)

      by Tough Love ( 215404 ) on Sunday April 28, 2019 @12:52PM (#58505726)

      Southwest got lucky and no 737s dived into the ground on American soil. Just dumb luck. Still doesn't make it right.

    • Re:Why always (Score:4, Insightful)

      by Nkwe ( 604125 ) on Sunday April 28, 2019 @01:04PM (#58505782)

      Why do we always hear that the authorities were warned but didn't do anything? It happens with plane crashings, shootings, other terrorist attacks and even the Titaninc went down because the person in power didn't think it necessary to act. We humans seem to have some erroneous subroutine built in when handling with this kind of situations.

      Because authorities receive lots of "warnings" from all sorts of people that like to complain about everything. There isn't time to follow up on every potential issue. Sure, sometimes it is due to incompetence, but frequently it is simply the sheer number of complaints - many of which are nuisance - that make it hard to filter out and decide what to follow up on. In addition, hindsight is always 20-20.

      • by tsa ( 15680 )

        I don't think so because a sensible government has people to sort out the noise.

        And we never hear the authorities tell us that terrorist attacks came out of nowhere. The culprits were often known by the police, or there were other warnings.

    • Re: (Score:2, Insightful)

      by Freischutz ( 4776131 )

      Why do we always hear that the authorities were warned but didn't do anything? It happens with plane crashings, shootings, other terrorist attacks and even the Titaninc went down because the person in power didn't think it necessary to act. We humans seem to have some erroneous subroutine built in when handling with this kind of situations.

      Because in this case doing something in a timely manner would have benefitted the public but been extremely detrimental to Boeing's bottom line and we can't have the public benefitting at Boeing's expense now can we?

      • That argument doesn't hold much water. Have you looked lately at Boeing's bottom line? If they'd addressed the issue it would likely have cost a ton less than it's costing them now. They're also making the airlines lose a pile of money. A single airline being pissed enough that they turn to Airbus for their next round of jets is going to hurt far more than any preventative stuff would have.

        • That argument doesn't hold much water. Have you looked lately at Boeing's bottom line? If they'd addressed the issue it would likely have cost a ton less than it's costing them now. They're also making the airlines lose a pile of money. A single airline being pissed enough that they turn to Airbus for their next round of jets is going to hurt far more than any preventative stuff would have.

          It holds water if Boeing made the decision to do nothing and that they'd be better off just letting passengers die in the unshakable belief that they'd get away with it and they were right in a sense, the FAA did allow them to get away with just doing nothing and letting passengers die. What Boeing did not take into account is that the rest of the planet would do something and not let passengers die. Boeing is good but they do not always assess risks correctly, in this case because they only took the reacti

    • Re:Why always (Score:5, Insightful)

      by Solandri ( 704621 ) on Sunday April 28, 2019 @01:31PM (#58505924)
      Because the news never reports the times when authorities were warned, but the warning was properly dismissed as not a concern. There are two possible failure modes and two possible success modes.
      • A: Warned and did nothing. Warning turned out to be incorrect. Success.
      • B: Warned and did something. Warning turned out to be incorrect. Failure.
      • C: Warned and did nothing. Warning turned out to be correct. Failure.
      • D: Warned and did something. Warning turned out to be correct. Success.

      If you artificially limit your analysis to cases C and D like the media tends to, then it looks like you should always take warnings seriously. But cases A and B are actually far more common, albeit unreported by the media. If the government evacuated every building every time someone called in with a bomb threat, the economy would grind to a halt because your local police gets dozens of such threats each day. The vast majority of such warnings are hoaxes or errors, and the authorities properly dismiss them as not credible. They just go unreported by the media because "nothing happened" is not newsworthy.

      • Concerning B - not so fast there.
        If "warning turned out to be incorrect" because of subsequent engineering analysis or other verification, then all is good.
        But, if testing and analysis and oversight are lax, then you might never get to the truth. The problem is that if "warned and did something" and the warning was actually correct, then doing something prevented disasters. But, since no disasters then occurred, it cajoles people into a complacency that there was nothing wrong or no need to further analyz

      • by rastos1 ( 601318 )

        If the government evacuated every building every time someone called in with a bomb threat, the economy would grind to a halt ...

        In your country the place is not evacuated after a bomb threat? I live in a small country (6M) that is not a focus for terrorists and NO bomb threat ever proved credible as far as I can remember (~40 years). There was one attack in 2016 that resulted in explosion and was prosecuted as terrorism, but I'm not sure there was any warning and nobody was hurt. In my opinion it should

    • by ledow ( 319597 )

      Because if you act on every nutjob's reports, you never get anything done. Similarly, just because a thousand people report it doesn't mean it's actually a problem.

      You know that the UK airport safety advisers advised the US airline safety people specifically about their cockpit access pre-9/11? And were ignored? How utterly terrible, eh? But how many times does it go wrong compared to not?

      At this level, admitting a fault that's not a problem could crash the share prices of major companies, initiate a la

      • Re:Why always (Score:4, Informative)

        by sjames ( 1099 ) on Sunday April 28, 2019 @02:31PM (#58506176) Homepage Journal

        The UK warning is a really bad example for your argument. The fix was cheap and easy, the warning came from competent people in the industry (not random nutters) and the consequence of that rare failure was huge, expensive, and still reverberating through the industry and the larger society.

        As for the current case, had action been taken either before the first crash (lat's face it, it really was an accident waiting to happen), or after the first crash, a case might have been made for quietly fixing the problem without grounding the fleet. The operative expression is "a stitch in time saves nine". Then there wouldn't have been a second crash, orders wouldn't have been canceled left and right, and instead of a serious loss of confidence, Boeing would have enhanced it's reputation.

    • Money! Shut something down, or slow it down for to fix defects, and money may be lost! All money making involves some risk, and that's the calculation being made here.

      Into this mix toss in politics. Protect the big money that pays for your reelection, keep pushing the idea that governments shall never do even the smallest thing that might cost money or jobs, and blame any problems when they happen on the other side.

    • by ceoyoyo ( 59147 )

      Because nobody cares when the authority makes the right decision.

    • Because the world is far more complicated than taking the next issue off the queue and clicking the button that fixes the issue. In any complex system, things will fall through the cracks. The only way to really address this systemic failure is to attempt to achieve functioning systemic stasis, which destroys innovation, including innovations to systemic stability or safety.

  • From the article [Regarding the AoA error-indication safety feature]:

    "Boeing has yet to specifically address why the feature was turned off, but in March, it unveiled a software fix and updated training procedures for the 737 Max"

    I'm guessing it had something to do with this, which was reported yesterday:

    "At least four current or former Boeing employees called a Federal Aviation Administration hotline to report issues with the company's 737 Max line of jets on April 5, the day after Ethiopia's minist
  • Reminder (Score:5, Insightful)

    by PopeRatzo ( 965947 ) on Sunday April 28, 2019 @12:58PM (#58505762) Journal

    There still isn't a permanent administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration, just a couple of "acting" administrators appointed by Trump.

    • Re:Reminder (Score:5, Insightful)

      by Darinbob ( 1142669 ) on Sunday April 28, 2019 @02:22PM (#58506150)

      Maybe he's finding it hard to find someone with the proper mindset he wants who will completely dismantle the regulatory body from within?

      • Re: (Score:2, Informative)

        by Anonymous Coward

        That's patently false. We know that Trump has converted most of the administrative heads to temporary heads because it avoids Congressional approval and oversight. The intent of the law was to allow a brief stay of a temp if something happens to an administrator, not to convert the entire administrative body of the US government into temp positions that need no Congressional approval. It also allows the president to immediately threaten the administrator with termination if he/she does not conduct the ac

    • Reminder:
      The Boeing 737 Max was certified by the FAA March 8th, 2017. Michael Huerta [wikipedia.org] (who had been Acting Administrator for over a year) was nominated by Obama and then confirmed by the Senate as the permanent Administrator on January 1, 2013 for a 5 year term.

      Do you want to do the math and see if 2013 + 5 is > 2017? Let me give you a hint, in a similar fashion to Huerta's progression (from Assistant Administrator to Acting Administrator), Trump made Daniel Elwell Acting Administrator on January 7, 2018

  • I think you a word there.

  • Truer words have never been written...

    "For a successful technology, reality must take precedence over public relations, for Nature cannot be fooled."

    - Dr. Richard Feynman in his closing statement in his final report to the commission for the space shuttle Challenger disaster

    • Yeah, I've quoted that a few times already re: the 737 max. His appendix is worth reading in its entirity [nasa.gov] if you haven't already.

      Feynman was of the opinion that NASA's bureaucracy (the entire management layer) essentially needed to be torn down in its entirety and rebuilt. Unfortunately, he was apparently the only one on the Rogers Commission who thought this. Even more unfortunately, after the Columbia broke up on reentry years later, few people pointed out that the same bureaucratic issues Feynman p
  • by cmurf ( 2833651 ) on Sunday April 28, 2019 @02:54PM (#58506288)
    I do not see how a software update fixes the problem, even though the software fix is also necessary. The MAX has a different stick force in a particular configuration, and MCAS is intended to be a moderator to that stick force so that it's more like an NG series. Ostensibly, MCAS exists to avoid a new type certification, and thus difference training, on the MAX. OK fine. The problem is that this moderator can be (effectively) turned off, and disabling it is explicitly a checklist line item for at least two non-normal situations: runaway trim, and MCAS upset. Disabling this stick force moderator means the pilots are exposed to the actual natural aerodynamic behavior of the airplane, for which they've received no difference training. They are in effect flying an airplane they are no longer type rated to fly. I think that's unacceptable. Whereas if Boeing makes it impossible to disable MCAS and its autotrim commands, that satisfies one part of the type certification problem, but then it introduces a new one which is the NG and original series do not have an automation feature that behaves anything like MCAS. And therefore the pilot needs difference training to understand it. I don't see how they get out from some form of difference training requirement, just by issuing a software update. And if it is required now, why wasn't it required from the outset. Who's pressuring everyone to stop the discussions of difference training being necessary?
    • I'm also concerned that the problem is deeper than Boeing is admitting. If, in testing, the MCAS needed to have much more authority than in its initial design, is this just covering up a major difference in flight envelope? i.e. if the MCAS was designed to modify a small corner of the flight envelope, but that didn't work as expected, then it's possible the analysis of the flight envelope differences is wrong. That would mean "fixing" it is not just a matter of making the MCAS more fault tolerant, but st
  • The 2 crashes happened in foreign countries that are not under the jurisdiction of the FAA. I'm not saying that there's nothing wrong with the plane. But the summary and article make it sound like the FAA dropped the ball and people died because of it.

    • It sounds like that because they did. The aviation industry is an example of international cooperation. A new aircraft doesnâ(TM)t have to be individually certified in every country. A single certifying agency does it, and the others agree to recognise that certification.

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