Boeing Rejected 737 MAX Safety Upgrades Before Fatal Crashes, Whistleblower Says (seattletimes.com) 91
The Seattle Times: Seven weeks after the second fatal crash of a 737 MAX in March, a Boeing engineer submitted a scathing internal ethics complaint alleging that management -- determined to keep down costs for airline customers -- had blocked significant safety improvements during the jet's development. The ethics charge, filed by 33-year-old engineer Curtis Ewbank, whose job involved studying past crashes and using that information to make new planes safer, describes how around 2014 his group presented to managers and senior executives a proposal to add various safety upgrades to the MAX. The complaint, a copy of which was reviewed by The Seattle Times, suggests that one of the proposed systems could have potentially prevented the crashes in Indonesia and Ethiopia that killed 346 people. Three of Ewbank's former colleagues interviewed for this story concurred.
The details revealed in the ethics complaint raise new questions about the culture at Boeing and whether the long-held imperative that safety must be the overarching priority was compromised on the MAX by business considerations and management's focus on schedule and cost. Managers twice rejected adding the new system on the basis of "cost and potential (pilot) training impact," the complaint states. It was then raised a third time in a meeting with 737 MAX chief project engineer, Michael Teal, who cited the same objections as he killed the proposal.
The details revealed in the ethics complaint raise new questions about the culture at Boeing and whether the long-held imperative that safety must be the overarching priority was compromised on the MAX by business considerations and management's focus on schedule and cost. Managers twice rejected adding the new system on the basis of "cost and potential (pilot) training impact," the complaint states. It was then raised a third time in a meeting with 737 MAX chief project engineer, Michael Teal, who cited the same objections as he killed the proposal.
Ethics classes (Score:5, Insightful)
I've always wondered why ethics classes are mandatory for engineers in many schools now.
It's usually the business people that have the ethics issues.
Re:Ethics classes (Score:5, Informative)
There is always the debate though between “nice to have” features and “need to have.” From what I have read about this, it was not something required by regulators, or (theoretically) safe operation of the aircraft. Boeing clearly should have sought a better solution for sanitizing AOA and air speed data though given the reliance on a single sensor for a system with unlimited authority.
Re:Ethics classes (Score:5, Insightful)
Not only that, but they refused to include the feature (or the means to disable it) in any of the pilot training because the primary selling point for the aircraft was that it required no new training. They actively *hid* the feature from the customer.
It's like if Tesla never told anyone about the autopilot feature in their cars and it just suddenly kicked on randomly while you were driving with no notification or explanation or obvious way to turn it off.
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Boeing changed one critical element of the trim cut-out switches, which (was stupid and) should have forced some training. If one switch disabled all automatic input to the electric trim, and the other the electric trim motor itself (like the NG) the Ethiopian plane likely would have survived. The lack of disclosure of MCAS likely led directly to the Lion Air crash, as the crew there only failed when they tried to diagnose the problem.
BUT, to the original article’s point, the safety system proposed w
Re:Ethics classes (Score:5, Insightful)
From what I have read about this, it was not something required by regulators
From what I have read Boeing was largely responsible for regulating itself.
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/0... [nytimes.com]
https://www.npr.org/2019/04/04... [npr.org]
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Well yeah of course that's the Definite Superbest way silly, anything else
*checks flashcard*
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Well yeah of course that's the Definite Superbest way silly, anything else
*checks flashcard*
I know I shouldn't feed the zero ranked AC troll.... /Rolls dice
But what the fuck are you talking about?
Re: Ethics classes (Score:1)
He's talking about one of the classic bullshit excuses companies and the politicians they corrupted use to demonize and destroy regulations.
I've of which being that it stiffles innovation.
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The Titanic was not required by regulations to have a space on a lifeboat for all it's passengers. At the time the number of lifeboats depended on a tonnage formula that left them short by quite a way, and hey it's unsinkable so they will never be needed anyway. Let's reduce out costs.
Just because regulations don't require it does not mean that it is ethical to do something. Clearly a century later Boeing needs to relearn that lesson.
Ethics classes are mandatory for engineers now? (Score:3, Insightful)
You do, do you mind providing any verifiable citations for that statement. Exactly when were such mandatory classes implimented exclusively for engineers?
“It's usually the business people that have the ethics issues.”
Except in the case of MCAS, the engineers were overruled by the business people. The root cause being a management decision to mount a newer bigger engine forwar
Re:Ethics classes are mandatory for engineers now? (Score:5, Informative)
But it's different than the prior variant. The FAA requires expensive training for pilots when that's true. That's what prompted all of this. The handling difference doesn't actually need MCAS, it's just there to avoid training for the difference.
So they made this system to try and hide it, and didn't accurately disclose what that does to pilots. And didn't design reasonable limits to it's time and extent of operation.
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100% agree with you.
I've only piloted small planes a bit, and I've commented on MCAS since before the 2nd crash. Your comment gave me the perspective: it's an insult to a pilot to think he or she (or it) can't handle keeping the plane out of a stall. Even small planes have stall warning systems. If anything, modify the stall warning system to include an earlier warning in the case of a 737 MAX, and maybe include degrees (levels) of warning.
How hard is this to an already trained and experienced pilot: "If
Re:Ethics classes are mandatory for engineers now? (Score:4, Interesting)
In many professions there are ethics classes, I can assure the title is utterly bullshit, the classes should be titled and taught as, getting fired for opposing your employer to maintain public safety class, how to suck up that shite and everyone goes, meh, tough fucking luck. Let's be honest, not that it's bad, why by a gutless empty shallow slime ball, waiting to be set up as the fall guy, when you can just tell the boss like it is, the tougher the resistance the more aggressive the application of integrity and bad reference will result in report to regulating authorities, of course employment will be doomed not fired straight away but you can bet it is coming, so start looking.
Been there, done that, expect it to occur in your professional life, in one way or another and if you are could at your profession it is a meh, you soon pick up where you left off and in a better place, if you are crap at your profession, well, prepare yourself for the long term consequences Mr Fallguy because make no mistake, they are coming and the only way to fend them off, is if your employer is more legally a professional than you, if not, you are pretty well fucked and it is often only a matter of time.
If you are crap at your profession, get another profession, do not leave a trail of harm and suffering.
Re:Ethics classes (Score:5, Insightful)
It's usually the business people that have the ethics issues.
Unfortunately, unlike engineer, there is no mandatory qualification to anyone becoming a manager.
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Exactly. And somehow they have power and authority over engineers.
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It's because ethics classes are a waste of time in business schools.
Prediction; nothing will come of this. The engineer will lose his job, the managers will get a bonus.
Re: Ethics classes (Score:4, Interesting)
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There will be a lot of firings over this,
Of that, I have no doubt.
and safety/QA will move to the top.
I think you're being overly optimistic. If Boeing can settle this for less than what they saved during development, then it's likely that the 787 MAX process will pave the way for future development. Only if the settlements cost more will those specific business decisions be reviewed.
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An internal study even said that they had to return control of making aircrafts BACK to the chief engineer and the MBAs could not be allowed to interfere with him/her.
The real question that I have, is will certification be returned to FAA only (which will require the feds to return the aviation taxes back to FAA that the GOP stole)
or will the government continue to try to cut regulations and allow companies to 'self-regulate'?
If the later
Re: Ethics classes (Score:2)
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Yes and no. An ethics class SHOULD be required of everyone.
I was required to take a business ethics class when I was in college. This was in the 80s when typical business students admired "businessmen" like Michael Milkin and some guy named Trump. Most of the students, much like their heroes, couldn't understand the difference between "legal" and "ethical" behavior.
I got the only "A" in the class of about 80 people. And all I did was use common sense to choose the "don't be an asshole" option on every q
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That there are people who actually believe forcing people to take ethics classes will make them ethical is itself pretty scary.
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I've always wondered why ethics classes are mandatory for engineers in many schools now.
It's usually the business people that have the ethics issues.
People who train as engineers are well placed to become managers. For example: when I trained as an engineer I decided early on that I did not want to remain in a purely technical role beyond 10 years after I graduated. So I took an MBA class and left R&D, which enabled me to work in sales, finance, project management, and most recently quality management. My engineering background was useful in all of these roles.
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I've always wondered why ethics classes are mandatory for engineers in many schools now.
It's usually the business people that have the ethics issues.
If you give the ethics classes to the engineers who lack the authority to implement changes for safety, then you do not have to give the ethics classes to the managers. It is a win-win.
Corporate mass murder is a huge issue (Score:5, Interesting)
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At least with a monkey, you'll get the right decision about half the time on average...instead of never.
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At least with a monkey, you'll get the right decision about half the time on average...instead of never.
I get what your saying, but a monkey is NOT a quarter.
Re:Corporate mass murder is a huge issue (Score:5, Insightful)
Boeing did indeed go too far here, but where should the line be drawn?
We can make a 100% safe aircraft - however it would never carry passengers, and cost far too much to actually fly. So obviously the line has to be drawn somewhere lower than 100% safe - so who gets to decide that, and who gets to reject safety recommendations?
Well, the FAA should be that body, and they failed here. They approved Boeings design, and they approved the regulatory process that that approval came under. Boeing has a lot of fault here, but so does the FAA.
Its interesting to note that the FAA and the US just bulled the European Union Aviation Safety Agency into accepting the FAAs approval of Boeings fixes, lest Airbus aircraft mysteriously come under additional scrutiny in the future... (the EASA was up until recently adamant that they would require their own check flights and evidence before approving the MAX for return to service in the EU - the FAA and the US government have been very harsh about that, threatening various things and the EASA caved this week on it).
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Straw man.
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No, it's exactly the point.
I can easily prevent the 737 MAX from ever crashing, by assuring it never flies. Boeing want to sell it as a viable passenger aircraft, so they reject my solution.
Now we're negotiating a compromise. While my start point was extreme, it was nonetheless valid and viable, so Boeing need to shift a long way towards it before I'll accept that their aircraft is sufficiently safe.
I can prove it: Right now the passenger safety of the 737 MAX is protected by.. assuring it never flies.
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Yep, no fatalities since the second crash.
Air transport safety has always been a compromise. For example, crashes would be much more survivable if the seats all faced backwards. But they would have to be of much stronger and heavier which means you would be able to fit many fewer of them to an aeroplane and thus it would be much more expensive to fly.
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For example, crashes would be much more survivable if the seats all faced backwards. But they would have to be of much stronger and heavier which means you would be able to fit many fewer of them to an aeroplane and thus it would be much more expensive to fly.
You're right, but for the wrong reason.
If you turned the seats around and changed nothing else, crashes would still be more survivable and with fewer injuries. People wouldn't have to assume the crash position, either -- they would be safer if they didn't, in fact.
We don't face backwards because customers don't like that. It feels weird and unnatural to move backwards. Airlines face the seats forward because the first airline to face everyone backwards will lose most of their customers.
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Rear facing seats would result in a higher blunt force trauma rate however, not fewer injuries - rear facing seats and no crash position means you get flying objects directly to the head during sudden deceleration.
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Self-regulating.
When did that ever work? As soon as you allow that, it's over. If that's not conflict of interests, then I don't know what is.
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For sure, the fault is both FAA and Boeing.
The problem is common: somewhat well-meaning govt. agency imposes safety regulations. Corporations, by their nature, gameplay ways around regulations, with cost-cutting always their top priority, such that they lose sight of the safety issue. This game is well-known, and shows that 3rd-party design review is needed.
As an engineer with a little knowledge of flying, I would have mandated that 1) MCAS output be limited to fine adjustments only- no large / gross elev
Risk analysis (Score:4)
Re:Risk analysis (Score:5, Interesting)
It was cheaper to risk people being killed (and paying out for the deaths) than doing the job properly.
I thought after the Ford Pinto corporations (people) would learn. guess not.
Ford found it cheaper to settle lawsuits for a number of deaths over x time, rather than add a dime worth of parts to shield the gas tank from a screw tip just in front of it over x,xxx,xxx cars.
I thought this was being taught in schools? I had to study it in econ, forget what level econ.. can't be too deep, i was going for for something not econ-related, but i still had to take it.
Didn't the last crown vic do that to? Rear-end kerblammo, and for the same exact reason?
I'm so ashamed of post-777, post-merger boeing. A fine example of how not to make airplanes.
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Apparently, learning that sort of things in school is not sufficient. Even if people know in intellectually, there are still to many unscrupulous managers who prefer the cheap, unsafe or dirty "solution" anyway.
Maybe learning in court will help. I'm including "dirty" here because it gives us an example of how such things should be handled: Volkswagen and the diesel affair. That one was not decided in court, but the size of the fine in the US suggests there was a lot of pressure behind closed doors.
If more c
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This was all covered very clearly in Fight Club.
Tyler Durden (I think):
"Now, should we initiate a recall? Take the number of vehicles in the field, A, multiply by the probable rate of failure, B, multiply by the average out-of-court settlement, C. A times B times C equals X. If X is less than the cost of a recall, we don't do one."
Well, you have to look at the bigger picture (Score:3)
The additional costs would have come out of the pockets of American investors. I mean, come on - the dead people aren’t even American.
I don't know... (Score:2)
Re:I don't know... (Score:5, Insightful)
can we trust Whistleblowers anymore?
We don'y have to trust whistleblowers. All we need to do it investigate their claims. Without any obstruction.
You know what they say about obstructrion right? /whispers it makes it harder to learn the truth.
I say anyone with a whistle to blow should whip it out, pucker up, and blow as hard as they can.
And that goes for any political party and any industry.
I taught my children from a very young age. I told them "If you see injustice, if you see something you know is wrong, like a weak kid getting bullied or picked on. You need to stand up and say something."
I knew this might put them at risk some day, and I knew that it might be difficult. But the alternative is far worse.
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100% agree, but, how to prevent "swatting" for example?
In other words, how to uphold the 4th Amendment, protect the innocent, etc.?
I guess I'm saying that law enforcement-types need some restraint, need to be required to gather more information and evidence before raiding some innocent person and destroying their lives. Or, govt. / society will be hit with more large lawsuits.
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100% agree, but, how to prevent "swatting" for example?
Is this code?
How to prevent swatting? My approach?
1)Do computer forensics on all available information. Skip trace it all out to the ends. immediately.
2)Call, email and text all possible known contacts in the vicinity.
3)Assess the information gathered.
At this point i'd love to be 5 minutes away from the initial call, But 15 seems possible. 30 minutes is closer to reality.
4)Communication
5)physical presence.
6)Assessment
I'll go on if you request, but you get the points right?
The answer is you don't just start
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Explain!
I'm cautious... (Score:3, Interesting)
I think this story should be taken with a grain of salt. This team proposed multiple safety upgrades, one -- and apparently only one -- of which turned out to matter... but how often are sets of safety upgrades recommended by such teams, how often are they applied, and how often do they matter? Is this truly a case of executives refusing critical upgrades in blatant disregard for human life, or is it a case of one of dozens of expensive but unnecessary upgrades turning out -- surprisingly and unusually -- to matter?
I don't know, and I doubt anyone else commenting here does either.
Re:I'm cautious... (Score:4, Interesting)
DUH! For an aircraft loaded with people - numbering in the HUNDREDS - EVEN ONE is way to fucking many ! ! !
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DUH! For an aircraft loaded with people - numbering in the HUNDREDS - EVEN ONE is way to fucking many ! ! !
Not the point. You can *always* add more safety features, but there has to be some point at which you say "This is enough". Clearly, Boeing should have added one more than it did, but the fact that this one more was suggested along with a set of others that apparently haven't been needed calls into question whether the need was really so clear.
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Valid point - BUT . . .
By your logic, the 'bean-counters' win IF the projected civil/legal fines are less than the change-costs, then . . .
just a glorious "fuck-off and die" to the poor souls that caught in the cross-fire between the 'customers' and the lawyers.
>,
or even better - https://www.spaceanswers.com/s... [spaceanswers.com]
using 15+ PSI PURE O2 in a test that I KNOW was warned against!
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"This team proposed multiple safety upgrades, one -- and apparently only one -- of which turned out to matter"
in this case, or at least up until now.
i don't know why you would want to take that risk though.
Should have been a clean sheet aircraft (Score:5, Insightful)
Not surprising, the MAX was a (relatively) quick and dirty response to the A320 NEO and the loss of market share was the overriding concern.
This is a perfect example of not having enough time to do something right, but having enough time to do it over.
Sad that almost 350 had to die because Boeing management wouldn't take an extra year or so to do a totally new aircraft that wouldn't have the need for a kludge (I honestly can't think of a better term) like MCAS.
Now because of this, Boeing is holding off on the new mid-sized aircraft (to take over for the 757 and compete against the A321).
Re: Should have been a clean sheet aircraft (Score:3)
A new aircraft wouldn't have sold as well. The whole point of the MAX is that it requires no pilot training and is a like-for-like replacement for existing 737 NGs.
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A new aircraft would probably have sold even better, because it would be 10-15% lighter and would require far less maintenance than a 737.
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Unclear.
The biggest growth customers for Boeing has a lot of "issues" with their pilot training standards already. Adding an entirely new training regimen would force slow adoption of the new craft, no matter how enthusiastic the airline might be. Boeing clearly felt the pressure to sell a plane that required zero new training for experienced 737 pilots, and that is the heart of the poor decision making process leading to these crashes.
Keep in mind that maintenance crews also need to be trained. So "less
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Training is a one time thing. Line maintenance is a daily occurance.
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Don't worry. Trump has come to the rescue of Boeing. The hefty Tariff that he's put on Airbus planes probably makes them uncompetitive in the US Market. MAGA and all that ***p
Won't really affect too much. Airbus already makes the A220 and A320 in Mobile for the US market.
Whistleblower? (Score:3)
Is it really blowing the whistle if you don't do it when the foul is committed and it mattered, but only after the game is over and the stadium is empty?
If this guy knew of this shit and didn't come forward before hand, he's just as guilty in my book.
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Cry 'WOLF' all you want - but until someone (in this case 350+) dies, nobody will listen !
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Cry 'WOLF' all you want - but until someone (in this case 350+) dies, nobody will listen !
I'm not convinced you ever learned the moral of the boy who cried wolf story. /hint it doesn't fit this scenario
There was shepherd boy out guarding his flock on the edge of town. He had the overnight shift. It was a tedious and droll task.
He was very bored.
One night he Cried out! "Wolf! Wolf!"
And the townspeople came running. It was a big to-do and for the shepherd a much needed break from the monotony that was shepherding.
The townspeople were disappointed that they had been roused from their beds at a la
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AND . . .
Somebody cries 'PROBLEM' (err, WOLF) and nothing happens.
Again another issue is brought forward - and nothing happens.
And again, for another issue.
These things get IGNORED because it costs too much to investigate.
THEN SOMEBODY (350+) DIES ! ! !
Guess the WOLF got in - - - again ! ! !
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btw
It wasn't about deliberate lying - it was for personal ATTENTION !
SO . . . even though many issues are for 'ATTENTION' (atta; boy points, promotion, etc.), if safety is an issue, it NEEDS to be addressed properly - INVESTIGATE, and take appropriate action.
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btw
It wasn't about deliberate lying - it was for personal ATTENTION !
SO . . . even though many issues are for 'ATTENTION' (atta; boy points, promotion, etc.), if safety is an issue, it NEEDS to be addressed properly - INVESTIGATE, and take appropriate action.
/translate
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Agree to Disagree - OK? Hi. Ryzilynt
Subtle nuances in children's stories (SIMPLIFIED versions of Aesop's Tales) are often missed / overlooked.
https://aesopsfables.org/ [aesopsfables.org]
https://aesopsfables.org/F228_... [aesopsfables.org]
OK. So it highlighted 'lying' at the end, still it was really about 'self-aggrandizement' - or "mirth"
"to amuse himself at times"
Nice to have an intelligent rebuttal to my posts - grin
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Oooops, missed this one - - -
http://www.read.gov/aesop/043.... [read.gov]
"One day as he sat watching the Sheep and the quiet forest, and thinking what he would do should he see a Wolf, he thought of a plan to amuse himself."
cheers . . .
This is directly from the Boeing site (Score:4, Interesting)
"The Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) flight control law was designed and certified for the 737 MAX to enhance the pitch stability of the airplane – so that it feels and flies like other 737s.
MCAS is designed to activate in manual flight, with the airplane’s flaps up, at an elevated Angle of Attack (AOA).
Boeing has developed an MCAS software update to provide additional layers of protection if the AOA sensors provide erroneous data. The software was put through hundreds of hours of analysis, laboratory testing, verification in a simulator and two test flights, including an in-flight certification test with Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) representatives on board as observers.
The additional layers of protection include:
Flight control system will now compare inputs from both AOA sensors. If the sensors disagree by 5.5 degrees or more with the flaps retracted, MCAS will not activate. An indicator on the flight deck display will alert the pilots.
If MCAS is activated in non-normal conditions, it will only provide one input for each elevated AOA event. There are no known or envisioned failure conditions where MCAS will provide multiple inputs.
MCAS can never command more stabilizer input than can be counteracted by the flight crew pulling back on the column. The pilots will continue to always have the ability to override MCAS and manually control the airplane.
These updates reduce the crew’s workload in non-normal flight situations and prevent erroneous data from causing MCAS activation.
We continue to work with the FAA and other regulatory agencies on the certification of the software update."
https://www.boeing.com/commerc... [boeing.com]
I thought part of the problem was that there was only a single AOA sensor. This mentions two.
Re:This is directly from the Boeing site (Score:5, Informative)
There are two, but MCAS only uses one of them. It is unclear why Boeing thought that was OK.
Re:This is directly from the Boeing site (Score:4, Insightful)
There are two, but MCAS only uses one of them. It is unclear why Boeing thought that was OK.
If that's true I have no sympathy for Boeing at all ( it used to be : building planes is hard, i get it)
I always thought the "rule" for aviation engineering was redundancy.
Re:This is directly from the Boeing site (Score:4, Informative)
It says right there, in clear English, "Flight control system will now compare inputs from both AOA sensors." That can literally only mean that there were always two (2) sensors, and that they formerly (before "now") only used one of them.
What's really sad is that they should have three sensors if their goal is to cross-check.
Also, while we're here... "There are no known or envisioned failure conditions where MCAS will provide multiple inputs." Yeah? They envisioned single-sensor MCAS doing the job at hand, too.
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What's really sad is that they should have three sensors if their goal is to cross-check.
It sounds like that was the goal of the software update they wanted to do. There would not be a third real sensor but two real sensors and a third "virtual" sensor. The virtual air speed sensor would use data from other senors, do some calculations, and come up with an air speed. If there was a multiple sensor failure then this would show up in comparing the three sensors. The virtual air speed sensor used the same angle of attack sensor that failed on the MCAS. This meant that a failure of the AOA sen
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There's a reason why there is often only two sensors. The probability of losing one is rare and losing both is rarer.
Well, they messed up those probability calculations. In each case, the AoA sensor had failed on a relatively new aircraft and was replaced by one that had been repaired somewhere else to an unknown standard (source: here [nytimes.com]; probably is paywalled).
So real-world experience suggests these AoA sensors are way more fragile than expected. Is this Boeings fault? Probably not; well-designed stuff fails all the time because something unforeseen happens (dust and an Apple butterfly keyboard, anyone?). But Boeing is
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You were doing great until you got to the end.
First and foremost, this was not about an unforeseen situation. This story is literally about the problems being foreseen, and a manager or managers deliberately vetoing the fixes.
Second, the Apple butterfly keyboard is an example of garbage design. There is dust in the real world, and Apple's keyboard was not designed to deal with that fact. We live in the real world, where there is dust, so Apple's design was inadequate for the proposed purpose. It was a massi
Re: This is directly from the Boeing site (Score:1)
It's true. The plane always had two sensors, both wired up to the plane system.
As a matter of fact, boeing offered a paid option that would display the sensors value, and another that would light up a light of the sensors values disagreed to much.
But for whatever brain dead reason, mcas only used one sensors as input. Despite the fucking fact that there was an algorithm already implemented to detect those exact sensors failing!
Remember what Feynman said about Challenger? (Score:5, Insightful)
"For a successful technology, reality must take precedence over public relations, for nature cannot be fooled."
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Yep, but the next narrowly defined bonus is all that top management cares about.
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Boeing Rejected 737 MAX Safety Upgrades (Score:2)
Bad Boeing !
Bad, BAD Boeing !
Bean-counter $aving$ are REALLY GONNA' CO$T !
Damn /. filter would NOT let me post in all CAPs !
challenger had the same type of issues! (Score:3)
challenger had the same type of issues!
This plane brought to you by... (Score:5, Insightful)
This plane brought to you by Late State Capitalism, where the Short Term Profit is King,
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Because you must be doing great if the only thing you can think to favorably compare yourself to is a 30 year old accident in a failed Communist state...
Optional extras (Score:2)
Once airborne they notify you that if want the plane to be intact upon landing you have to purchase the premium package.
Too bad other software doesn't have this (Score:3)
Especially now with the DevOps "slap it together, get it out there, fix forward in production" development style, it's too bad other software engineering disciplines don't have a way for engineers to complain about quality or not being listened to. Safety-sensitive stuff apparently has a few more quality checks, but even with those it still seems engineers aren't listened to when they bring up concerns.
This whole issue seems to revolve around Boeing's desire to remove recertification requirements, reduce training costs, and not have the plane classified as a whole new aircraft type. No beancounter or business person would ever believe an engineer when so much money could be saved by cutting corners. Do SW engineers working on safety-sensitive stuff have professional responsibility PE-style where they can be held liable for issues they fail to bring up?
A summary so people are up to date.. (Score:2)
1. Boeing modified the Flight Control System to compensate for a mass shift in the airframe when the aircraft was modified.
2. This flight control system augmentation required a sensor to feed it data.
3. For redundancy you need more than one sensor
4. If there is more than one sensor for the system it requires extra pilot training (because a system requiring redundancy is IMPORTANT)
5. Boeing Management chose to put only one sensor in to avoid the extra costs to purchasers.
So - you see - right here there is a
Who wrote this? Lol (Score:1)