Boeing Now Also Ordered to Fix Anti-Ice System on 737 Max, 787 Jets (seattletimes.com) 47
America's Federal Aviation administration "will require a fix for a new 737 MAX design problem discovered by Boeing that, although it's a remote possibility, could theoretically disable the jet's engine anti-ice system," reports the Seattle Times:
A different flaw in the MAX's engine anti-ice system design drew scrutiny in January and forced the company to drop a request for an exemption from key safety regulations. And now, it's not just the MAX with an engine anti-ice system problem. Airlines have reported a separate issue with a similar system on Boeing's 787 Dreamliner that has caused what the FAA calls "relatively minor" damage to the engine inlets on some two dozen of these widebody jets in service.
Though the FAA considers neither problem to be an immediate risk to flight safety, in February it issued separate notices of two proposed airworthiness directives to require the fix for the engine anti-ice system on the MAX and to lay out inspection and repair procedures for that system on the 787, pending a redesign that provides a permanent fix... When there is an immediate safety risk, the FAA issues a more urgent emergency directive that must be acted upon before further flight. Jets are grounded until it's dealt with. That's not the case with these two proposed airworthiness directives. Indicating that the risk is considered slight, both of the proposed directives will be open for public comments until April. Only after that will action be mandated...
On the MAX, the proposed FAA directive states that Boeing identified a potential single point of failure when it reviewed the internal design of the unit that provides a backup power supply to aircraft systems if the primary electrical system fails. Such a failure could potentially result in the loss of the anti-ice systems on both engines, with no indication or warning that would alert the pilots, the FAA directive states... In November 2022, Boeing sent a service bulletin alerting airlines and describing the required fix, which the FAA will now mandate...
Unlike this MAX issue, the fault discovered on the 787 Dreamliner has resulted in actual damage to engines on passenger aircraft. The FAA airworthiness directive on the 787 states that "damage was found during overhaul on multiple inlets around the Engine Anti-Ice duct within the inlet aft compartment." Rather than a production issue, it was a matter of the seals being insufficiently durable. Even when the plane was flying in dry air and the anti-ice system was not switched on, the seal degradation led to hot air leaking into the inlet compartment, "exposing inlet components to high temperatures," the FAA states. Boeing said this resulted in "thermal damage and discoloration to a limited area of the surrounding composite and metallic structure inside the inlet...." The FAA's proposed airworthiness directive warns that heat damage to the inlet structure could lead to "reduced structural strength and departure of the inlet from the airplane."
"Departure of the inlet" is a bland way of describing the front of the pod around the engine fan detaching, potentially striking the jet's wing, tail or fuselage. Such disintegration could result in "subsequent loss of continued safe flight and landing or injury to occupants," the airworthiness directive states...
"A separate question is how this flaw with the 787 anti-ice duct seals and the single point of failure in the backup power supply on the MAX slipped through the FAA's original certification of these aircraft."
Business Insider also reports that Boeing "is holding off on a planned expansion of production for its 737 Max planes after an Alaska Airlines flight lost a chunk of the plane while airborne in January."
Though the FAA considers neither problem to be an immediate risk to flight safety, in February it issued separate notices of two proposed airworthiness directives to require the fix for the engine anti-ice system on the MAX and to lay out inspection and repair procedures for that system on the 787, pending a redesign that provides a permanent fix... When there is an immediate safety risk, the FAA issues a more urgent emergency directive that must be acted upon before further flight. Jets are grounded until it's dealt with. That's not the case with these two proposed airworthiness directives. Indicating that the risk is considered slight, both of the proposed directives will be open for public comments until April. Only after that will action be mandated...
On the MAX, the proposed FAA directive states that Boeing identified a potential single point of failure when it reviewed the internal design of the unit that provides a backup power supply to aircraft systems if the primary electrical system fails. Such a failure could potentially result in the loss of the anti-ice systems on both engines, with no indication or warning that would alert the pilots, the FAA directive states... In November 2022, Boeing sent a service bulletin alerting airlines and describing the required fix, which the FAA will now mandate...
Unlike this MAX issue, the fault discovered on the 787 Dreamliner has resulted in actual damage to engines on passenger aircraft. The FAA airworthiness directive on the 787 states that "damage was found during overhaul on multiple inlets around the Engine Anti-Ice duct within the inlet aft compartment." Rather than a production issue, it was a matter of the seals being insufficiently durable. Even when the plane was flying in dry air and the anti-ice system was not switched on, the seal degradation led to hot air leaking into the inlet compartment, "exposing inlet components to high temperatures," the FAA states. Boeing said this resulted in "thermal damage and discoloration to a limited area of the surrounding composite and metallic structure inside the inlet...." The FAA's proposed airworthiness directive warns that heat damage to the inlet structure could lead to "reduced structural strength and departure of the inlet from the airplane."
"Departure of the inlet" is a bland way of describing the front of the pod around the engine fan detaching, potentially striking the jet's wing, tail or fuselage. Such disintegration could result in "subsequent loss of continued safe flight and landing or injury to occupants," the airworthiness directive states...
"A separate question is how this flaw with the 787 anti-ice duct seals and the single point of failure in the backup power supply on the MAX slipped through the FAA's original certification of these aircraft."
Business Insider also reports that Boeing "is holding off on a planned expansion of production for its 737 Max planes after an Alaska Airlines flight lost a chunk of the plane while airborne in January."
Wow! (Score:3)
Wow! Is there a concerted effort going on to discredit Boeing or have they really gone that bad after being acquired by bean counters oriented management? Countless similar stories about Boeing recently.
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Boeing is a for-profit. All it cares about ultimately is profits. Let any corporation do what it wants and eventually it will put profits above all else with total disregard for safety and basic human decency. That's what corporations do and Boeing is one of them.
You're barking up the wrong tree: the real culprit is the people who should let Boeing off the leash, i.e. the FAA.
Re:Wow! (Score:4, Insightful)
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If they care about profits, they should make safe planes that people trust. Otherwise people will refuse to fly on them, and airlines will refuse to buy them. What it really seems like they are doing is prioritizing short term profits above long term profits. I guess the management assumes that long term, they will have made their bag of cash and moved on.
I don't think it's even that. I'm sure the bean counters thought they were building an organization that would be really profitable in the long-term, the problem is it's really hard to optimize for that objective directly. To properly optimize for profit you need a way to accurately account for things like "quality" and "safety", but those aren't easy values to quantify so it becomes really tempting to undervalue them. Or you find they're too expensive to account for internally so you outsource and make the
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If they care about profits, they should make safe planes that people trust.
They did. The entire trust you had in them was based on the information that was available to you. You can make a product that is good, or your can put effort into hiding how bad it is. Many corporations earn "trust" through the latter and hoping for the best.
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Boeing is a for-profit. All it cares about ultimately is profits.
Agreed. I guess all matters now is their vision of profits; short-term, middle-term, long-term?
Re: Wow! (Score:1)
I hate reading comments like yours... they are depressing and infuriating. Because of how right you are. :-(
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Meanwhile A separate question is how this flaw waivers/self certification/backroom deals? They're flying their new planes under the same cert as the '60s versions... which should be ok if operating/maintaining is the same. So... look at picture of the 737 original release version coc
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Wow! Is there a concerted effort going on to discredit Boeing or have they really gone that bad after being acquired by bean counters oriented management? Countless similar stories about Boeing recently.
I take it you've been comatose over the past four years?
On the contrary, I have just realized tonight that maybe, just maybe there was a concerted effort going against Boeing. What's wrong with looking at all the possibilities even if some are not likely probable? There is still a chance there like winning at the lottery or something...
Re:Wow! (Score:4, Informative)
They make airplanes that fly people into the ground and have parts that fall off because bolts are missing. The only thing making Boeing look bad is Boeing.
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Boeing did this to themselves, they were once a paragon of safety and quality, and now their reputation is in the toilet purely due to their own actions.
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Not just that. It's also true that a problem early in the chain can have lots of different effects later in the chain. Fixing those later problems doesn't fix the earlier problem, so different later problems will surface.
The original problem was that Boeing's self-certification was shit, so they didn't catch LOTS of problems that should have been redone before they shipped the first plane.
Re: Wow! (Score:4, Interesting)
Re:Wow! (Score:4, Insightful)
Well, basically bean counter management has shown us what the problem is.
The engineers could see it 20 years ago when Boeing HQ moved from Washington State to Chicago. Why? "To be where the action is", supposedly. But we know the real reason, it's to get away from the whiny know-it-all engineers who are presenting nothing but problems that cost money to fix, money that could've gone into the CEO and upper management pockets.
The only reason it's taken this long is that's how long developing a plane takes. Maybe a few hiccups during the 787 development (remember the battery fires? And they were using top quality Japanese batteries from a well respected manufacturer) would be an early warning sign, but it probably got hidden under the new aircraft shakedowns
Boeing earned a reputation back in the day - remember "If it ain't Boeing I ain't going?". These days, I don't blame someone for wanting to choose an Airbus.
It's gotten quite bad lately - Boeing has publicly admitted they have no plans for any new aircraft until the mid 2030s. Airbus is taking orders for new aircraft at twice the rate Boeing is. And last year, AIrbus delivered twice as many aircraft.
Boeing's really at a crossroads - continue down the path of maximizing profit and be gone in 20 years, or to realize what's wrong and start changing course. All these problems with new aircraft are scaring away customers. Marketshare at Boeing was predicted to be around 40% with Airbus at 60%, but 2023 it showed that it was Boeing at 33% and AIrbus at 66%. (Only a couple of decades ago, Boeing had 60% of the market).
And even worse, the past few years, they haven't been good financially. The last quarter of 2023 was the first profitable quarter in years. All Boeing needed was "a boring 2024", which was basically tempting the gods.
The only reason Boeing has a chance to recover - despite falling marketshare, mounting losses, more stop production orders, experienced workers and engineers leaving, and other things is ironically, AIrbus. Airbus has a huge order backlog of over a decade. The only reason airlines are buying Boeing is because Boeing's backlog is much shorter, so if you need a plane quick, Boeing is your only option.
Profit is one thing, but in general, people want sustainability as well - there's no point making huge profits if you close up shop the next day. Think of it this way, Boeing is basically starting to circle down the drain.Will they be around in 20 years? Hard to tell. They would've have been the first company to give in to greed and pass.
Re:Wow! (Score:5, Insightful)
Couple of things to add to your post, which might be of interest to some people.
When it comes to the 787, remember the multiple issues with the fasteners - firstly, using non-aviation grade ones to get the first fuselage ready to be rolled out to great fanfare for the 7/8/07 date, only for that to result in a 2 year delay in first flight. And then the replacing of those fasteners causing subsequent issues with cracks and needing further rework.
And people also tend to forget that Boeing has one of the most successful aircraft projects in history in the 787, but its yet to make a profit - they are very quiet on the “deferred production costs” debt that they accrued over the first 1000 airframes, but its still over $15Billion. Normally, an aircraft programme is making profit for the company by the time its delivered 300 or so, but the 787 wont be profitable by the time its hit 2000 deliveries.
How did this happen? Because while the 787 was undergoing its development issues, racking up debt, rather than booking this “now”, Boeing booked it against future deliveries, so they could promote a larger profit “now” instead.
The moneys been spent, and its internal debt, but what it means is that Boeing has less available cash to hand than it suggests it does, because of that deferred debt.
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And people also tend to forget that Boeing has one of the most successful aircraft projects in history in the 787, but its yet to make a profit - they are very quiet on the “deferred production costs” debt that they accrued over the first 1000 airframes, but its still over $15Billion. Normally, an aircraft programme is making profit for the company by the time its delivered 300 or so, but the 787 wont be profitable by the time its hit 2000 deliveries.
The 787 Squeezeliner is the reason I prefer to fly Airbus. Its so bad that I'll pay extra not to fly on one and I think airlines are starting to take note. In order to make the 787 attractive to buyers (airlines, leasing companies) they had to squeeze on as many seats as possible to lower the per seat/KM cost, this means the seats are narrow and uncomfortable (Recaro CL3710s, the bane of the tailbone). When Boeing unveiled the 787 they advertised it with a standard 8 abreast economy section (akin to a A330)
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Perverse incentives lead to perverse results. Management by nihilist bean-counters is concerned mainly with the next quarter's financials. Wall St. ultimately doesn't give a fsck as long as they get theirs. Longer-term thinking usually comes from the company's founders and engineers.
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It's more than that. Boeing went in direction of outsourcing risk in last couple of decades. As in it would spin off development of certain parts of aircraft to outside contractors, and then being the only buyer of said technology negotiate prices down to levels that weren't profitable for the contractor.
Which led to cuts going too far at the contractor level, leading to many of the problems today. Because while you can outsource development losses, you can't outsource responsibility for underdeveloped part
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When you screw up dramatically a couple of times you get more scrutiny. The public loves to pile on, so that feeds itself. Also, Boeing is an American legend so there's the "back in my day" effect.
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Wow! Is there a concerted effort going on to discredit Boeing or have they really gone that bad after being acquired by bean counters oriented management? Countless similar stories about Boeing recently.
Yes there is. that effort is being spearheaded by Boeing.
Here's another question (Score:5, Interesting)
"A separate question is how this flaw with the 787 anti-ice duct seals and the single point of failure in the backup power supply on the MAX slipped through the FAA's original certification of these aircraft."
Another equally alarming question is how the FAA vetted the design of the MCAS, which has no redundancy. How does such a critical system impacting flight controls not have redundancy? That's not a thing ever aero design! And yet the FAA certified it - or let Boeing self-certify it.
And I'll tell you what that screams of: either
- Corruption: someone at the FAA should be in the slammer right now
- Such profound defunding of the FAA that it can't even fulfill its most basic missions: someone in the administration should be in the slammer also.
And all I can see is nobody doing fucking time in the slammer, after years and hundreds of deaths.
Re:Here's another question (Score:4, Interesting)
Not only did MCAS have no redundancy, it didn't even have a way to manually disable it without losing the ability to trim the control surfaces.
off-duty pilot disabled MCAS (Score:2)
Not only did MCAS have no redundancy, it didn't even have a way to manually disable it without losing the ability to trim the control surfaces.
An off-duty pilot in the cockpit of a Boeing 737 Max 8 jet jumped in to help crew disable a malfunctioning flight-control system as it experienced difficulties in October, (2019)
The next day, with a different crew, the same plane crashed into the sea off Jakarta, killing all 189 people on board.
https://edition.cnn.com/2019/0... [cnn.com]
Disabling MCAS disabled power trim (Score:2)
That isn't quite true. Disabling the MCAS and auto trim also disabled power trim. You could still use the manual trim wheels that move the control surfaces using cables. However under high aerodynamic loads (e.g. steep angle of attack), you're unlikely to be able to physically turn the manual trim wheels. It's hypothesised that this was the situation on the Ethio
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The only reason turning off power trim stopped MCAS is that it used power trim. Even then MCAS would continue trying.
We actually know what happens if you fight MCAS on power trim. MCAS wins.
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Boeing actively hid the MCAS system from regulators. The max was a pisspoor engine mod, trying to cheap out on a much needed new design.
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Another equally alarming question is how the FAA vetted the design of the MCAS, which has no redundancy.
Well, it's quite clear you don't seem to understand how the FAA functions. They do not vet individual designs at all. In fact they are incredibly hands off, providing a set of rules and allowing certain manufacturers (like Boeing) to self certify they are following the rules. This isn't out of the ordinary for government departments in most of the west, the only look at things piecemeal, or investigate retrospectively when something goes wrong.
Additionally MCAS did have redundancy, the issue was it was *OPT
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Those that look shall find (Score:2)
At least where screw-ups in the design of Boeing jets are concerned.
self certified (Score:2)
"A separate question is how this flaw with the 787 anti-ice duct seals and the single point of failure in the backup power supply on the MAX slipped through the FAA's original certification of these aircraft."
huh? I thought one of the problems the MAX highlighted was the FAA simply wasn't doing their job, they were trusting Boeing to self certify.
How to fix Boeing (Score:2)
Fire the board and all top management
Move the HQ back to Seattle
Acquire Spirit
Find new management with engineering and aviation background
Redefine the purpose of the company to making excellent airplanes, with profit a secondary consideration
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The 737 Max (Score:2)
Fuck Boeing (Score:1)
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Time to fire another manager (Score:2)
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Yikes. (Score:2)
I literally just got off a 787.