Boeing Passenger Jet Nearly Crashes Due To Software Glitch (independent.co.uk) 106
Bruce66423 shares a report from The Independent: A potential disaster was narrowly avoided when a packed passenger plane took off just seconds before it was about to run out of runway because of a software glitch. The Boeing aircraft, operated by TUI, departed from Bristol Airport for Las Palmas, Gran Canaria on 9 March with 163 passengers on board when it struggled to take off. The 737-800 plane cleared runway nine with just 260 metres (853ft) of tarmac to spare at a height of 10ft. It then flew over the nearby A38 road at a height of just 30 metres (100ft) travelling at the speed of around 150kts (about 173mph). The A38 is a major A-class busy road, connecting South West England with the Midlands and the north.
The Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB), part of the Department for Transport, said the incident was the result of insufficient thrust being used during take-off. Pilots manually set the thrust level following a software glitch that Beoing was aware of before take-off. "A Boeing 737-800 completed a takeoff from Runway 09 at Bristol Airport with insufficient thrust to meet regulated performance," the AAIB report said. "The autothrottle (A/T) disengaged when the takeoff mode was selected, at the start of the takeoff roll, and subsequently the thrust manually set by the crew (84.5% N1 ) was less than the required takeoff thrust (92.8% N1 ). Neither pilot then noticed that the thrust was set incorrectly, and it was not picked up through the standard operating procedures (SOPs)."
The Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB), part of the Department for Transport, said the incident was the result of insufficient thrust being used during take-off. Pilots manually set the thrust level following a software glitch that Beoing was aware of before take-off. "A Boeing 737-800 completed a takeoff from Runway 09 at Bristol Airport with insufficient thrust to meet regulated performance," the AAIB report said. "The autothrottle (A/T) disengaged when the takeoff mode was selected, at the start of the takeoff roll, and subsequently the thrust manually set by the crew (84.5% N1 ) was less than the required takeoff thrust (92.8% N1 ). Neither pilot then noticed that the thrust was set incorrectly, and it was not picked up through the standard operating procedures (SOPs)."
Someone hates Boeing. God, Devil, Physics. (Score:4, Insightful)
Either that or the CEO was a total cheap idiot that cut every budget to the bone marrow.
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I just can't imagine how a company like Boeing can be so poorly run.
At some point in the past Boeing's management decided that they were to close to the workers, and moved their HQ to another state.
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I just can't imagine how a company like Boeing can be so poorly run.
I thought he was talking about TUI (the aircraft operator).
Automated systems should have picked this up, but the pilots should have known before then. The 737 NG (-800) is a well proven and reliable older design from a time before Boeing's current management screwed everything up. It's the 737 Max that has the serious issues.
...or Boeing hates us (Score:3)
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The latter. This is pure management screw-up, nothing else.
Re: Someone hates Boeing. God, Devil, Physics. (Score:2)
Re: Someone hates Boeing. God, Devil, Physics. (Score:3)
Exactly. In such cases, pilots would push the throttles somewhat further. They ought to know what N1 to set in accordance with their T/O weight, runway distance, noise regulations and what not. But they didn't.
Pilots should, under all circumstances, be able to master their aircraft regardless of what automatic system decides to fail that day.
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Pilots should, under all circumstances, be able to master their aircraft regardless of what automatic system decides to fail that day.
MCAS was an automatic system that forcibly took control of the elevators.
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And there is a procedure, to switch he system off. The pilots did know about the system, and hence obviously did not know how to do it.
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On an Airbus, pulling back on the stick disengages their equivalent of MCAS. I think I prefer the Airbus version.
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I was pretty happy that my last fights were Airbuses.
No idea about the fuse thing.
Point is: some crews were schooled how to handle it, many were not.
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The pilots did know about the systems ... AFTER the first failure. Before the first failure, Boeing did not think it was important enough to tell the Pilots.
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That has not been the reality for a long time.
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Pilots should, under all circumstances, be able to master their aircraft regardless of what automatic system decides to fail that day.
While I don't disagree, they've gotten to the point in chasing efficiency where a human can't tell the difference and computers need to do it. 85 vs 93% thrust ... unless they're literally watching a speed vs. runway distance graph of expected vs. actual there's no way to know the difference until they're like 'oh fuck, there's the end of the runway and we're going to slow to take off" because the difference is negligible and it's a handful of seconds at the end.
If pilots did it, they'd ensure they have th
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There are pilots, announcing on intercom: we are about to lift off.
Forgot to switch off, intercoms, and talk to the co pilot: what I need now is a hot black coffee, and that stewarded XYZ give me a blow job.
A steaming stewardess runs toward the cockpit!
A passenger shouts behind her: sweat heart! You forgot the coffee.
True story, a friend of mine was on that flight!
Obviously every lay man would recognize the acceleration is wrong. Stupid pilots not focusing on their own life, don't.
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True story, a friend of mine was on that flight!
Your friend is Matt Damon?
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No.
But I guess bullshit like that happens more often than we (you and me) know.
Re:Someone hates Boeing. God, Devil, Physics. (Score:5, Informative)
Once upon a time Boeing had expensive programmers on staff who were experienced dealing with this type of programming, they occupied most of an office park up the hill from my house. In the modern mania for cost cutting and subcontracting they were laid off years ago. Now that space is rented to a dozen different companies who mostly have nothing to do with the aircraft industry, because according to the MBAs who run the company programmers are a fungible input like aluminum suppliers. Read up on the MCAS programming which doomed the 737 MAX, the contract was given to a company which normally wrote programs for the financial industry, because all programmers are the same, aren't they? Two planeloads of people paid for that cost saving with their lives, and it almost sunk the company.
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The standards for aviation software need to be massively shored up, along with the standards for aircraft construction. They should then be rigorously enforced.
DO-178C, DO-254, and ARP4754A are clearly inadequate in specification and improperly monitored. Self-certification should be abolished outright. Rather, software and hardware should be scrutinised to a high level - software especially, as that's hardest to get right and the hardest for air crews to detect problems with.
For software, a few thoughts:
Pr
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That depends. Do you want a working airplane, or do you want a mathematical proof that your airplane always works assuming the various components work just as modeled (which they never do)?
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There are actual rail systems in use, for which some critical components ( believe it was the subway doors) have indeed been formally proven, and the trend in rail systems certainly goes in this direction. However, for SIL 4 that's just one option to get that certification, and all safety critical components of rail systems are typically developed to SIL 4 standards. This includes both onboard units and all the land based controllers for signal lights, track switches, gates. So please don't tell me that's n
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This isn't a rail system, and it isn't about the MCAS (that's a different screw-up, which also would not have been found by proving the system was correct assuming everything worked as modeled).
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Proof of formal correctness is just one aspect of a SIL 4 cert. Without an (FMEA [wikipedia.org]) no serious contender would even think about walking up to a safety assessor, and that MCAS clusterfuck would have revealed its silly design at the first step of such an FMEA. How this ever passed a precursory safety review is still a miracle to me, Boeing's safety processes must have been in shatters when that happened. Every elevator is made to higher standards - as it should be.
Regarding this specific system: for some reason
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The code itself isn't the only problem, the general ignorance of the needs of the customer were appalling. For instance, there are two Angle Of Attack (AOA) indicators, in case one malfunctions. Since the programmers didn't know how to handle multiple inputs they assigned one AOA to the primary MCAS and the other to the secondary MCAS which was supposed to be a failover. The failover procedure was even worse, it consisted of:
1) Disconnect the primary MCAS, which was not covered in the pilot training
2) La
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In the modern mania for cost cutting and subcontracting they were laid off years ago. Now that space is rented to a dozen different companies who mostly have nothing to do with the aircraft industry, because according to the MBAs who run the company programmers are a fungible input like aluminum suppliers.
Nobody who matters cares. This is the way it is supposed to be. Enjoy it for what it is. Spreadsheets make death an abstract concept.
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Either that or the CEO was a total cheap idiot that cut every budget to the bone marrow.
Why "idiot"? To the contrary, that guy is very skilled at maximizing the very thing he gets financially rewarded for: short-term stock price.
It'd be like blaming a chess player for sacrificing all his pieces save a single pawn to deliver a checkmate. The CEO follows the rules of the game, and does exactly what he receives incentives for.
And the rules are such for a reason. Let's say there are two business strategies:
* A that reliably increases stock price by 10% every year
* B that gives an one-time 20% inc
Re: Someone hates Boeing. God, Devil, Physics. (Score:1)
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He wasn't defending anything. He was pointing out the absurdity of capitalism. Markets doesn't give a shit about anything other than money. Human lives have zero value unless they are being traded, eg: Buying a slave.
Of course that's the reason regulations exist. But if those regulations get tossed out or neutered alone the way then you can expect the affect companies to revert to same old market driven greedy tendencies.
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some PHB got an big bonus for outsourcing to we co (Score:5, Insightful)
some PHB got an big bonus for outsourcing to we code and canning all of the in house software devs.
Sam Salehpour (Score:2)
I looked it up - Salehpour alleges the 787 fuselage pieces were not properly joined, so he's warning of rapid unplanned disassembly as the airframes age, not software problems like the MAX.
Let's hope he doesn't wind up like John Barnett and Joshua Dean.
More like pilot glitch (Score:5, Informative)
No Software Glitch (Score:5, Informative)
So what it sounds like is that the pilots are trained to use the auto-throttle system, the system turned itself off unexpectedly and without warning and they did not notice that the manual thrust was set too low for takeoff possibly because they were not thinking that the plane was going to use it.
A qualitifed 737 pilot would have to comment to get the full picture since I have no idea what pilots are expected to do and check but, from what the article basially says that this was caused by something turning itself of unexpectedly and, despite the fact that this was a know problem, nobody had updated the procedures to specifically check for this problem so it was not caught.
However, regardless of whether or not the pilots should have caught it, we should not have passenger planes where important flight systems spontaneously turn themselves off for no reason because that massively increases the chance of a serious accident since now the only thing preventing disaster is a pilot spotting that the plane has glitched out and while I have great respect for pilots, like the rest of us they are only human.
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important flight systems spontaneously turn themselves off for no reason
Indeed, just because we've crashed, keep those engines throttled up mr. computer.
It's why automation is a tricky balancing act. You *want* systems to both not disengage when someone say, bumps the stick, but also to disengage when someone directs input. Having a computer know which is which, even before 'known glitches' is not an easy thing.
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Indeed, just because we've crashed, keep those engines throttled up mr. computer.
I don't know what universe you live in but in mine a crash would count as a pretty good reason for turning things off so it would not be for "no reason" would it? If your system is mistaking a normal takeoff for a crash then your system is clearly very broken.
It's why automation is a tricky balancing act.
Yes, but then why is it we only seem to be seeing lots of serious failures like this with Boeing aircraft? Automation may be hard but clearly everyone else seems to be able to manage to solve it in a safe and reliable way so it is clearly not too ha
Re: No Software Glitch (Score:3, Insightful)
for software 'glitches' I'm probably giving the crown to AirBus. Of course they call them 'computer knows best' design decisions that literally stop a pilot from doing things commanded. Very good when the situation is what it was programmed for, not so much when the pilot *needs* to do out of the box stuff.
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Yes, obvious situations are obvious. Proves the point.
The fact that there are obvious situations does not logically imply that there also have to be non-obvious ones.So no, it does not prove your point.
for software 'glitches' I'm probably giving the crown to AirBus.
Really? There have been two crashes with all aboard killed that have resulted from Boeing's failures. Care to point to worse examples from Airbus because I've not heard of any Airbus planes crashing and killing everyone recently.
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Since you seem unable to fathom anything beyond literal specific example, I'm not playing entertain the troll.
Good Day.
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You're argument is there might not have to be non-obvious scenarios?
No, I was pointing out that your logic was utterly flawed when you claimed that because you used an obvious example it proved your point. You still have completely failedto explain why literally every other airplane manufacturer seems to be able to make planes that happily cope with all the non-obvious situations out there - as did Boeing itself in the past - and yet now suddenly only Boeing seems to be having such trouble that its planes are putting people in serious danger or, in two cases, crashing and
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To be fair, it's partially news bias. After a few accidents, even low-impact events tend to get reported of Boeing is involved, even if they weren't at fault (that time).
But is sure doesn't ALL seem to be news bias.
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Re: No Software Glitch (Score:3)
The only one Iâ(TM)m aware of is the 1988 Paris air show crash, where the pilot claims that the plane refused to let him increase thrust. The investigation though put the blame on the pilot simply not increasing thrust early enough, and not noticing the forest on the hill in front of him.
There have been a few cases where the lack of feedback from one stock to another in airbuses has led to pilots not understanding that they were both doing the opposite of the other, and the inputs were being averaged
Airbus design flaws (Score:1)
Caveat: from 2009 but to my knowledge they have not changed the way their systems work.
Air France Flight 447 wiki link: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/... [wikipedia.org]
Long story short: Pitot tubes iced up causing the autopilot to disengage and the stall warning to go off.
First officer Bonin made some mistakes in maneuvering (mostly pulling up) but these may well have been because the aircrafts flight characteristics were altered due to computer changes when the pitot tubes iced up. (Alt2 mode rather than normal)
1. This
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How long a period of time are we talking about? Takeoffs don't last an extended period of time, and regaining speed takes time, so quite plausibly the pilots reacted quickly.
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In any case in my opinion automation has reached a point of diminishing
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The problem is that they where not flying a Cessna or some other small aircraft. They where flying a `HUGE 737.
And just like with trains: Once you fucked up, you might have to sit there for several minutes and watch as the fuckup is slowly creeping on to you, as you are past the failure point.
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sometimes the system thinks the brake pedal has been depressed, when it hasn't, so I lift it with my foot a little
If that helps, then something is failed or partially failed, bent, or misadjusted. (Some brake switches no longer have adjustment)
Re: No Software Glitch (Score:2)
You're talking about going from maintenance throttle to idle, and you were expecting no change in speed. It's not likely you would have noticed the difference between 84% and 92% and a slightly incorrect rate of acceleration.
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"Boeing told investigators looking into the incident that they were aware of a “long history of nuisance disconnects during takeoff mode engagements”.
I simply *love* "nuisance disconnects". Yes, that's what you would naturally call the cause of you and your loved ones lying burned and shattered in a field.
Re:No Software Glitch (Score:4, Informative)
In fact, it appears to have been a known hardware glitch, followed by pilot error.
It appears the official report is here [service.gov.uk]
So it seems there's some sort of transient event which occurs when that switch is pressed which makes it appear that the servo motor isn't working properly, in which case the system (properly, or would be properly if the fault was real) disconnects and inform the pilots. So why hasn't Boeing fixed this problem? Well, as the original article didn't tell you, they have:
So the pilots didn't do the right thing when the system disconnected, the airline didn't keep their airplanes up to date on service bulletins... Boeing isn't quite blameless here (having made the original glitchy system), but they're no more than third in line.
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Sure, there is a hardware error, and most serious errors are a combination of multiple factors, but I would say that the pilot error here was leading. They should be able to fly the plane.
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From the article it says that the 737 has an autothrottle that can control the engine thrust during from take-off to landing ("The autothrottle system on a Boeing 737-800 can control the thrust from takeoff to landing, the AAIB added."). Unfortunately, the article indicates that there is a known glitch where it just turns itself off for no reason ("Boeing told investigators looking into the incident that they were aware of a “long history of nuisance disconnects during takeoff mode engagements”.").
This seems like a potentially serious glitch which has been around for a long time. Why hasn't this been fixed? They waiting for an accident before fixing this?
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There's been a fix available since 2021. So why hasn't TUI installed it? This information is in a document that The Independent quotes extensively, so they knew about it; evaluate the trustworthiness of The Independent appropriately.
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The pilot monitoring should be checking engine performance regardless of whether they're using autothrottle. There are lots of possible causes of insufficient takeoff thrust, and the automatics only protect you from some, even when they're working.
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Summary: The auto-throttle allows for a less intensive pilot training program. When the auto-throttle failed, the "pilots" didn't even realize they were in danger.
And I am expected to trust this? I gave up flying a few years ago... I am definitely NEVER fucking flying again unless it is military.
After thinking for a bit, watching an advertisement for a new jet ski as I crash kinda makes it worth it to fly.
Re: More like pilot glitch (Score:3)
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> TFS says the auto-throttle disengaged, but that was properly announced,
Correct.
> so the pilot took control and did it wrong.
Correct.
> Did I read that right?
Yes.
> If we can't trust pilots to take over when automation disengages then we have a bigger problem.
We can't trust our pilots to do the right thing 100% of the time. That is not a bigger problem, that's a statement of fact, no one is perfect.
To clarify, let me quote from the next post...
> the 737 has an autothrottle that can control the
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Again. (Score:2)
Boeing Passenger Jet Nearly Crashes Due To Software Glitch again.
Close the windows on take off & landing (Score:2)
I do. I think it's better to not know if your end is seconds away and there's nothing you can do about it.
Re:Close the windows on take off & landing (Score:5, Funny)
Close the windows on take off & landing
The new Airbus planes don't have shutters on the Windows. For sensitive travelers, I recommend the "Joo Janta 200 Super-Chromatic Peril Sensitive Sunglasses". At the first hint of trouble they turn totally black and thus prevent you from seeing anything that might alarm you.
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Zaphod was one of the best characters in the series.
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Eyelids are also a very effective method of blocking out unwanted visuals.
Software glitch? (Score:2)
Neither pilot then noticed that the thrust was set incorrectly, and it was not picked up through the standard operating procedures (SOPs)."
Sounds like pilot error. Sure, the software disengaged the autothrottle (apparently due to a known software bug), but the pilots failed to notice.
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... but the pilots also failed to notice.
FTFY
Pilot error (Score:5, Informative)
Let's not pile everything on Boeing here.
"the thrust manually set by the crew (84.5% N1 ) was less than the required takeoff thrust (92.8% N1 )" - that's calld a pilot error.
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If that is standard procedure, that's a pretty stupid standard procedure.
By my figuring, Boeing takes 2/3 of the blame. They are the ones that sold a buggy system. They are also the ones who created the deficient before-takeoff checklist that the airlines adopt. But the airline could have added a check to their list, and you can bet they are doing that now.
Re: Pilot error (Score:2)
In the kind of plane in question the auto-throttle system will move the throttle handles themselves, so it's normally irrelevant where the pilots leave them. So standard procedure is often to move the throttles forward a bit manually first, then press the to-ga button to set takeoff mode which tells the auto-throttle to move them the rest of the way
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"The autothrottle (A/T) disengaged when the takeoff mode was selected, at the start of the takeoff roll, ..." Boeing told investigators looking into the incident that they were aware of a “long history of nuisance disconnects during takeoff mode engagements”.
That's not pilot error. Though there was pilot error afterward.
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How about "may have been pilot error afterwards"?
To me it is not clear that there *was* pilot error. Lots of comments have said that "the automated system moves the throttles" or "the system takes control". That doesn't sound like pilot error.
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Let's not pile everything on Boeing here.
"the thrust manually set by the crew (84.5% N1 ) was less than the required takeoff thrust (92.8% N1 )" - that's calld a pilot error.
We don't need to pile everything on Boeing, just the bit where the pilots tried to take off with autothrust enabled which turned out to disengage itself sporadically (an issue Boeing knows about and has yet to fix).
Pilot error isn't the root cause, it's a contributing factor to the incident.
Software glitch? (Score:2)
Seems kinda like the crew screwed this up. Known issue, known steps to correct that the *manufacturer* was already aware of.
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Actually could still be Boeing's fuck up.
I don't know what the screens are like in the cockpit, but it's at least conceivable that when bouncing down the runway if the right side pilot was the one setting the throttle s/he could have not seen the bottom left part of the 8 making it look like a 9. If the pilot flying was on the left they might not have even had TIME to confirm the proper thrust setting as the first and foremost thing is to control the aircraft. Aviate > navigate > communicate. In that
Did no one say "Punch it, Chewie!"??? (Score:3)
Re:Did no one say "Punch it, Chewie!"??? (Score:5, Insightful)
Re:Did no one say "Punch it, Chewie!"??? (Score:4, Informative)
And that is why self driving where the human "driver" "just" has to pay attention and intervene when problems occur will be ... just dandy. Can't wait. I'll stay off the road, then.
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After visiting San Francisco for work for a week I ended up using the Waymo cars for almost all getting around town and I for one welcome for our robot car overlords. You are right though that these half-in systems won't work, it's full automation or bust pretty much
It was still just city driving, no highways yet but I was honestly impressed with the half dozen rides I used it for, it actually drives way more assertively than I expected it to. It's not perfect but the potential is undeniable.
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Last time I was visiting family in LI it was 3+ hour sjust to get from Nassau county back into the city. Just unreal out there
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Yeah. IIUC, level 3 automated cars are considered the most dangerous.
But I suspect here that part of the problem is "sensory overload". They're probably being expected to simultaneously pat attention to too many different inputs. Nuclear reactors had that problem at 3-mile island. (OTOH, I'm speculating in ignorance. There have also been comments saying that the automated system would override whatever the pilots chose to do.)
Anyone surprised? (Score:1)
Re: Anyone surprised? (Score:2)
No idiot alarm? (Score:3)
Strange there wouldn't be some kind of config warning like you would get when not setting the flaps if the wrong data was entered before takeoff.
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(this is a stretching of the truth for humorous effect, i've seen it said it's actually more like a 16-bit mainframe CPU but is undeniably antiquated)
bad summary (Score:2)
it was about to run out of runway because of a software glitch
As the article explained, this is not true. The pilots _manually_ set the thrust too low. The software glitch meant the pilots had to actually fly the plane instead of letting the software do it. They proved unequal to the task.
Re: bad summary (Score:2)
Non-linear RPM-thrust relationship makes it worse (Score:5, Informative)
There's a chart on this page that shows the relationship between N1 speed and thrust of what I believe to be the engine on the specific aircraft (CFM56-7B27) https://www.pprune.org/tech-lo... [pprune.org] - very roughly based on the graph, that's ~13,500 lbf per engine vs the ~17,500 desired though the chart is also for M=0.3 (thrust also decreases with airspeed and temperature and would be higher during takeoff near sea level).
In short, a ~8.5% reduction in fan RPM in that range might reduce engine thrust by over 20%.
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It should be noted that N1 (low pressure turbine/fan) and other N speeds are a percentage of rated RPMs.
But this plane was running Ubuntu...
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"major A-class road" (Score:2)
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It may not be the busiest part of the A38, but as the route to Bristol airport it's hardly a country lane.
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It may not be the busiest part of the A38, but as the route to Bristol airport it's hardly a country lane.
Yep, it's a 50 MPH single carriageway (one lane each way, non divided road) that is designated an A road... It definitely isn't a country lane. Here's the google maps link [app.goo.gl] for the road off runway 27.
That being said, whilst a major regional thoroughfare it's more for people trying to get from Bristol or the M4 motorway to the south west counties of Devon and Cornwall. To go to the Midlands or North you'd definitely be getting on a motorway. "A" roads are major transport links but not meant for the same le
Make management pay! (Score:1)
Misleading headline? (Score:1)
Boeing has screwed up a lot lately, but... (Score:2)
it needs to be pointed out that the high-profile 737MAX crashes and this incident did not happen on 1st world airlines. If these were purely about the designs and implementations of the aircraft then the incidents would be happening at United, Delta, Southwest, British Airways, Quantas, etc. Those airlines tend to have former military aviators in the cockpit and lots of training, both generally and in-type.
The infamous incidents have generally involved some unusual Boeing situation PLUS an aircrew insuffici
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Anything you want to tell us about whom you work for?
I've got two more in recent days, engine fire on a 777 in tokyo june 4th and in Toronto june 5th.
This place lists that stuff
https://airlive.net/category/e... [airlive.net]