Before Air India Boeing 787 Crash, Fuel Switches Were Cut Off, Preliminary Report Says (npr.org) 131
Slashdot reader hcs_$reboot shared this report from NPR:
A pair of switches that control the fuel supply to the engines were set to "cutoff" moments before the crash of Air India Flight 171, according to a preliminary report from India's Air Accident Investigation Bureau released early Saturday in India... Indian investigators determined the jet was properly configured and lifted off normally. But three seconds after takeoff, the engines' fuel switches were cut off. It's not clear why.
According to the report, data from the flight recorders show that the two fuel control switches were switched from the "run" position to "cutoff" shortly after takeoff. In the cockpit voice recording, one of the pilots can be heard asking the other "why did he cutoff," the report says, while "the other pilot responded that he did not do so." Moments later, the report says, the fuel switches were returned to the "run" position. But by then, the plane had begun to lose thrust and altitude. Both the engines appeared to relight, according to investigators, but only one of them was able to begin generating thrust.
The report does not draw any further conclusions about why the switches were flipped, but it does suggest that investigators are focused on the actions of the plane's pilots. The report does not present any evidence of mechanical failures or of a possible bird strike, which could have incapacitated both engines at the same time.
According to the report, data from the flight recorders show that the two fuel control switches were switched from the "run" position to "cutoff" shortly after takeoff. In the cockpit voice recording, one of the pilots can be heard asking the other "why did he cutoff," the report says, while "the other pilot responded that he did not do so." Moments later, the report says, the fuel switches were returned to the "run" position. But by then, the plane had begun to lose thrust and altitude. Both the engines appeared to relight, according to investigators, but only one of them was able to begin generating thrust.
The report does not draw any further conclusions about why the switches were flipped, but it does suggest that investigators are focused on the actions of the plane's pilots. The report does not present any evidence of mechanical failures or of a possible bird strike, which could have incapacitated both engines at the same time.
Tier 2 time. (Score:2, Interesting)
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Re:Tier 2 time. (Score:4, Informative)
From what I understand, it is not easy to toggle those switches accidentally, especially both of them at the same time. They have a metal bar on either side and to move the switch, you can't just push it into the other position... you have to lift it up and then move it; there's a spring-loaded locking mechanism that enforces this.
So it was either deliberate or a massive, massive fuckup by one or both of the pilots.
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Another post here mentions an FAA bulletin that says to inspect, and replace if necessary, the fuel switches. Not sure if investigators have been able to determine the condition of the switches, and if the toggle locks were working, but that might be telling.
That said, we humans develop "muscle memory", and if you're used to pulling on a toggle bat handle then flipping it, that motion becomes subconscious.
I'm not sure where they are on a 787, but maybe they need to be moved to a less accessible location, an
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I'm not sure where they are on a 787,
Plane engines have been known to catch on fire. Turning off the fuel supply would help in that situation.
but maybe they need to be moved to a less accessible location, .
Locating controls to turn forcibly off the engines near the throttle controls makes sense to me.
and spring-loaded hinged covers added (at the very least)
The switch normally requires the pilot to lift (pull on the knob) then move the position. Normally, that is.
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They're directly in front of the throttles. There are two toggle switches for the two engines, each of which has a centre detent that requires you to grasp the switch and pull it up in order to move it from RUN to CUTOFF. There is a metal guard on each side to prevent you from accidentally knocking the switches. I think the positioning and protection against accidental operation are reasonable.
You don't want to make them too inaccessible. There are situations where yo
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Thanks. Yeah, I'd vote to move them. I agree that they might be needed in an emergency, but life and engineering is full of compromises, including ergonomics and the constant quest for safety, which often involves working around human idiosyncrasies. Pilots are surrounded by lights, gauges, switches, and other controls. There are many they need to access in emergencies.
As I mentioned, it's very easy to become accustomed to pulling up on a switch to move the bat handle. Pilots would be very used to doing thi
Re: Tier 2 time. (Score:2)
These aren't the emergency cutoffs, these are the ones they operate every takeoff and landing. Aorbus forces you to throttle all the way down before cutting them off, which might be enough to wake your brain up to the fact you are running the wrong checklist, but if you are in that state of erroneous automatic action there isn't a lot you can do from an interface design standpoint. The right answer is to run the checklist as a checklist each time very intentionally, but people, even pilots, aren't good at t
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The interesting thing here is the timing, 0.1 seconds. Two switches that need be pulled out and then moved to the CUTOFF position can't be changed within 0.1 seconds unless someone uses both hands and a synchronicity of 0.1 seconds seems very tight but possible if timed right. For a pilot to be able to do this they must turn and bend over in their seat while strapped in to be able to reach the switches with both hands. This means that it was intentional or the switches were faulty in some way and switched t
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From the report [aaib.gov.in]:
the Engine 1 and Engine 2 fuel cutoff switches transitioned from RUN to CUTOFF position one after another with a time gap of 01 sec
The dot is missing. No idea if they actually meant 0.1 or if it's actually 1 second.
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I can't see any reason why someone would write 01 sec instead of 1 sec but I can see someone writing 01 sec by mistakenly pressing AltGr/Ctrl instead of "."
We'll have to wait for a more comprehensive report that don't have that ambiguous time to make sense of that time gap.
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They took the timing from the master event log that lists H:M:S.
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Again, as posted elsewhere in this discussion, there was and is an FAA bulletin regarding those (and other) switches, that the locking feature might not work correctly (or at all). Where I work we use similar switches that go into products. The lockout tabs are tiny and could easily wear away and/or be broken off.
As I posted above, IMHO it's (obviously) too easy to inadvertently cut off the engine fuel. It needs to be made more difficult, including spring-loaded covers over the switches.
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Again, as posted elsewhere in this discussion, there was and is an FAA bulletin regarding those (and other) switches, that the locking feature might not work correctly (or at all). Where I work we use similar switches that go into products. The lockout tabs are tiny and could easily wear away and/or be broken off.
No the FAA bulletin was that some of the switches were installed with the locks disabled. It is possible that the lock failed but the bulletin was not about that.
As I posted above, IMHO it's (obviously) too easy to inadvertently cut off the engine fuel. It needs to be made more difficult, including spring-loaded covers over the switches.
That is a possibility of adding another mechanism. The investigators need to determine if the locks worked first.
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That may actually be the underlying cause. If the switches were in the "run" position but the latching had not fully engaged, the vibrations of takeoff combined with the spring may have caused them to toggle. In general, the springs are centered on switches, so that would also explain them returning to the "run" position and the tension causes oscillations.
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Supposedly one was toggled a second or two after the other, so it looks intentional.
I'm reluctant to call it deliberate without more information, but it certainly looks deliberate. There's a tiny chance the pilots thought the engines were failing before they hit the cut offs, and hit it as part of a rebooting procedure? I don't know, not a pilot, but even that seems really implausable.
It's starting to look intentional and now the obvious questions are why. The obvious culprit group (Pakistan and pro-Pakista
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Re:Tier 2 time. (Score:4, Informative)
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Hopefully the NTSB's tier 2 people are ready; since they did in fact try turning it off and turning it on again and there's still more to the situation.
I don't think the NTSB will be handling this investigate since it happened outside their jurisdiction. They'll be very interested in the investigation results I'm sure.
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The NTSB is brought in on a consultancy basis alone. In this case they are already involved. They provided the equipment and some personnel to help recover the data from the black box. But make no mistake they have no part in the investigation beyond what the AAIB tells them. They don't get any magic jurisdiction because the plane was made in the USA. They may get an advanced copy of the report to review in order to prepare recommendations to the US companies involved in making the plane though.
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I don't think the NTSB will be handling this investigate since it happened outside their jurisdiction. They'll be very interested in the investigation results I'm sure.
The NTSB will not lead the investigation but will (and do) provide assistance. The main reason is that since the plane was made by Boeing with GE engines and if at least one American was on board, the NTSB (and airplane safety agencies from other countries) will send investigators. Also the NTSB generally has the most experience with airplane crash investigations than any other national agency.
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Hopefully the NTSB's tier 2 people are ready; since they did in fact try turning it off and turning it on again and there's still more to the situation.
I don't think the NTSB will be handling this investigate since it happened outside their jurisdiction. They'll be very interested in the investigation results I'm sure.
From TFA:
The Initial notification of the accident as per ICAO Annex 13 was sent to National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), USA which represented the State of Design &
Manufacture. As per the information notified to AAIB, the fatalities amongst passengers also
included citizens from United Kingdom, Portugal and Canada. The initial notification of the
accident as per ICAO Annex 13 was also sent the AAIB-UK, GPIAAF-Portugal and
Transportation Safety Board (TSB)-Canada which represented the other States whose
citizens suffered fatalities in the accident.
NTSB, USA appointed an Accredited Representative and Technical Advisers from Boeing,
GE and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to assist in this Investigation. A team led
by the NTSB Accredited Representative comprising of representatives from Boeing, GE and
FAA arrived at Ahmedabad on 15.06.2025 and participated in the Investigation. A team of
officials from AAIB, UK also arrived at Ahmedabad and visited the site with DG, AAIB.
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Hopefully the NTSB's tier 2 people are ready; since they did in fact try turning it off and turning it on again and there's still more to the situation.
The report noted NTSB and FAA investigators assisted as well as representatives of Boeing and GE being present during the investigation.
Re: Tier 2 time. (Score:2)
maverick.
it is not the plane
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The pilots did not turn the fuel switches off and on again to try to fix it, you made that up.
What the actual report says is that three seconds after takeoff, the fuel switches were each turned from run to cutoff, one second apart. The engines slowly started losing thrust as the fuel in the lines exhausted. One pilot is heard on the cockpit voice recorder asking the other why did he cutoff, the other claims he didn't. 10 seconds after switching off, the fuel switches were switched back on, 4 seconds apart.
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Does not sound deliberate. Could be that the switches failed, and it's not known what visible condition they were in when the pilot noticed the fuel cutoff. Those switches are not mechanically closing fuel lines, they are electronics going into a control unit. So there's a variety of mechanical failures possible, along with electrical failures, logic failures, and actuator failures at the end of the chain.
The fuel cutoff is not merely indicated by the switch condition. The CVR sounds more like one pilot not
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You're claiming that both the switches failed one second apart, then magically fixed themselves when switched back on.
The engines exhaust temperatures started climbing after the switches were turned back on, and one engine started producing power 2 seconds before the crash. The switches were functional at the time of the crash.
There is ZERO mention of toggling the switches back and forth in the report, you are making that up in your head. The report clearly states they turned the fuel switches back on. Once
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You're claiming that both the switches failed one second apart, then magically fixed themselves when switched back on.
The engines exhaust temperatures started climbing after the switches were turned back on, and one engine started producing power 2 seconds before the crash. The switches were functional at the time of the crash.
There is ZERO mention of toggling the switches back and forth in the report, you are making that up in your head. The report clearly states they turned the fuel switches back on. Once. Not multiple times. This would have been mentioned had it happened.
There was no mention of the switches being in the run position, you made that up. There was no conversation beyond what was mentioned in the report, that is a fabrication by you as well.
The report says the switches were found physically ON position. The switches are not mechanically linked to the fuel valve. They are just electronic switches. There is a shit-ton of things that can go wrong, mechanically and electrically, all the way from the switches, to the control unit, to the actuator circuits, and the physical valves. This includes the sensors (if any) that tell the position of the switches. We don't know what the switch positions looked like to the pilots. We don't know what the digit
Re: Tier 2 time. (Score:2)
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That makes zero sense whatsoever. There is no reason they would separate the operation of that switch to "ground logic" and "in air logic" AND set it up so the only failure condition is in the air. You're making crap up to justify blaming Boeing when there is exactly zero evidence to do so.
Re: Tier 2 time. (Score:2)
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One possibility I can think of is that switches were set on ground during takeoff roll, but while the aircraft's wheels were on ground, ground logic would apply.
I doubt the switches to turn on the fuel supply would be set to off yet the pilots could start the engines only while on the ground. It would have been one of the things the pilots set to RUN when starting the plane. The data recorder notes the switches were flipped 3 seconds only after take off.
Doesnt explain why it the switches were set to cutoff but it could have happened well before takeoff.
I doubt the switches could have been set to CUTOFF during takeoff as the preliminary report states the change in position. That would be a recipe for disaster for controls to work like that. We will have to wait for
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There isn't even a hint that there is "more to the situation", no matter how much you want this to be a conspiracy or Boeing's fault.
Actually there is a hint that there's more to the situation, right in this report it is pointed out that an FAA advisory from 2018 indicated that the mechanical locks on these switches can wear out and fail to engage. In fact the AAIB report even points out that they questioned whether Air-India carried out an inspection of these switches based on the FAA advisory and were told no, since it was advisory only they weren't inspected.
It's not clear yet (and given what they look like it may never be) if the swi
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an FAA advisory from 2018 indicated that the mechanical locks on these switches can wear out and fail to engage
No the SAIB NM-18-33 [europa.eu] advisory did not say that. The advisory said these switches have a locking mechanism to prevent accidental flips. Some of them were installed with the locking mechanism disabled. "The Boeing Company (Boeing) received reports from operators of Model 737 airplanes that the fuel control switches were installed with the locking feature disengaged." Over time, the switch could wear out and fail to engage but the advisory was more concerned about "inadvertent operation".
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Boeing does determine which pilot foreign airlines put in the cockpit, the airlines do.
No. Airlines do not have final authority over which pilots are in the cockpit. All pilots have to be certified to fly that plane according to each country's governing body.
A: No 737 Max crashed with a properly trained pilot in command. B: No 737 Max crashed with a US pilot in command.
What do you mean "properly trained pilot" and US? Is that your way of trying to insinuate the pilots were unqualified because there were "foreigners"? That is not true. All pilots were qualified according to Boeing as Boeing said they did not change the plane enough to warrant recertification of any pilots who had their 737 certification
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A: No 737 Max crashed with a properly trained pilot in command. B: No 737 Max crashed with a US pilot in command.
What do you mean "properly trained pilot" and US? Is that your way of trying to insinuate the pilots were unqualified because there were "foreigners"? That is not true. All pilots were qualified according to Boeing as Boeing said they did not change the plane enough to warrant recertification of any pilots who had their 737 certifications
Indeed. What a bald-faced fucking lie. The pilots did not have the information they needed because Boeing did not provide it.
Regulations written in blood (Score:3, Informative)
Someone probably accidentally poked a wrong set of switches, or they got caught in clothing or muscle memory of pilot was bad.
Unless it was clear unqualified pilot case or something similar, we'll probably get a new training regulation how to avoid this, or if this was a problem with switches themselves some kind of a fix (maybe a switch cover or similar) that will be deployed.
Re:Regulations written in blood (Score:4, Interesting)
Unless it was clear unqualified pilot case or something similar, we'll probably get a new training regulation how to avoid this, .
You could read the 15 page report which lists qualifications of both pilots:
The chief pilot (PIC) had over 8500 hours on this model, the second pilot has considerably less but had over 1100 hours.
or if this was a problem with switches themselves some kind of a fix (maybe a switch cover or similar) that will be deployed.
The report also noted SAIB NM-18-33 [europa.eu] regarding problems with some of these switches on Boeing planes notably some were installed with a locking feature disabled.
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Problem is that subcontinental culture isn't that trustworthy when it comes to these sorts of checks. It's not quite as bad as other main state that came from the Raj, which found a massive plurality of pilots flying on forged licenses a few years ago after an accident investigation, but I would still be VERY careful in trusting preliminary findings.
It is clear you questioned the pilot qualifications without reading a 15 page report. When pointed out these qualifications are in the report, now you are questioning the entire report.. Doubling down because you didn't know something; but according to you everyone else must be wrong.
So I'm going to wait for final findings in terms of figuring out what pilot experience is.
You apparently did not read findings from a 15 page report. I doubt you will read the final report which could span hundreds of pages.
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Again, I remember the report from Pakistani crash. Very similar culture
Let me get this straight, you are basing everything in this crash on another crash in a different plane (Airbus 320) in a different country (Pakistan) in a different circumstance (landing) 5 years earlier because India and Pakistan have "similar cultures". Bahahahaha. 1) I dare you to call a person from India, "Pakastani" and vice versa. You will be lucky not to get stabbed. 2) These crashes are not related. That never crossed your mind?
They found that captain didn't even have a license after they dug through enough paperwork. It was forged.
Well that is a lie. From the Pakistan International AirlinesFlight 83 [avherald.com]
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Correct. Because those are countries with very similar culture of corruption that used to be same country within living memory, who both base their current systems largely on this heritage.
As this is looking like suicide (due to one second discrepancy in switch off of fuel to each engine, i.e. "click - click", not "double click" (unless reporting resolution is 1 second, and whichever one did it hit it just at right time where one hit previous second on the tracker, and one on the next).
Summary: this raises
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Correct. Because those are countries with very similar culture of corruption that used to be same country within living memory, who both base their current systems largely on this heritage.
Bahahaa. These countries are similar according to you. Go into your nearest Indian restaurant and call everyone Pakastani. I'll wait.
As this is looking like suicide (due to one second discrepancy in switch off of fuel to each engine, i.e. "click - click", not "double click" (unless reporting resolution is 1 second, and whichever one did it hit it just at right time where one hit previous second on the tracker, and one on the next).
Ah yes. More rampant speculation by you based on no evidence. Listen, I'm not saying it was aliens . . . but it was aliens.
Summary: this raises more questions than gives answers. Wait for final report, as that will involve Boeing and FAA to a much greater degree and there will be more time to ascertain documentation and identity of pilots among other things.
Summary: you will make assertions based on no evidence. When challenged you present even more wild claims. Based on no evidence. It's turtles all the way down, eh?
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Did you just claim that assertions made based on facts presented in preliminary report as well as references to another mishap in a similar culture and cultural references are all "not evidence"?
P.S. Why do you think Indians and Pakistani would behave like that in a restaurant?
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Did you just claim that assertions made based on facts presented in preliminary report as well as references to another mishap in a similar culture and cultural references are all "not evidence"?
Bahahahahaha. Everything you presented was based on another country, in another plane, under different circumstances. But they are similar because you said they were. According to you. Based on your recollections. Of falsehoods.
P.S. Why do you think Indians and Pakistani would behave like that in a restaurant?
If you don't know you should go to the nearest Indian restaurant and call them Pakistani. I'll wait for your return.. Hint: the thought that Indian and Pakistani are not similar cultures never crossed your mind, did it?
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I'm sorry for your emotionality. Feel free to calm down and come back to this discussion.
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I'm sorry for your emotionality. Feel free to calm down and come back to this discussion.
And I await your return from the restaurant. The beating you'll get may alert you to the possibility that your premise of "India and Pakistan have similar cultures" might be highly flawed. But based of your reliance on speculations and falsehoods, it does not seem likely.
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You know, it's a very valid option to say "yeah ok, I was wrong" and just be done with it.
Whatever embarrassment you think you're going to get from admitting being wrong is far smaller than the embarrassment you are heaping on yourself by continuing to argue your obviously flawed and incorrect argument, which is based on nothing more than arrogance, mild racism, bad assumptions, and idiocy.
Just saying.
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I think you need to project your emotional state harder. There are some emotions you're experiencing that I'm not quite sure about. All I can see if frustration, anger and impotence.
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Re: Regulations written in blood (Score:2)
Think about how one would "accidentally" bump two switches, approximately one second apart. Even if the "accident" occured as a result of one of the crew guarding the throttle position (see the video in a previous post) and then bumping the switches to off, that would occur nearly simultaneously. The approximate one second delay suggests that one switch was lifted over its detent followed by the other.
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I read that they were switched off 0.1s apart, and switched back on 1s apart. It still seems odd as you need to grasp and lift the switches to move them past the detent when switching to CUTOFF.
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The thing is, you need to grasp and lift the switch to move it past the detent when switching from RUN to CUTOFF. It's pretty hard to do accidentally.
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Granted. Lots of modern accidents are about just that level of a freak mishap. For example last year a US military training aircraft death came about because a pilot unplugged his harness after landing at specific time, in specific order, while bending in a specific way. Which led to it grabbing the ejection handle, and due to the order of things he was doing, he straitened up before noticing the problem, ejecting himself while no longer attached to the chute.
Why would it be possible (Score:2, Funny)
to easily switch off fuel supply of a running engine?
It is an edge case and should be the equivalent of a WordPerfect command.
Re:Why would it be possible (Score:4, Informative)
Yes and no. The switch is a up/down switch [youtube.com] located under the throttle controls; however, to prevent accidental flipping, they should have a locking feature that requires the pilot to pull on them first then move them. But as the FAA noted in a 2018 bulletin [europa.eu] some of them were installed with the locking feature disabled. Operators should have inspected and replaced any faulty switches in the last 7 years.
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There are a few situations where you might want to do it. Some of them include:
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To prevent or stop a fire. That needs to be a fast and uncomplicated procedure.
You could add interlock logic: If the aircraft is below $altitude, inhibit the switch. But that ignores use cases like "we're going down and about to crash in a field, let's cut off the engines to reduce the risk of fire."
It's tempting to keep making the logic more complicated: If the aircraft has been airborne for less than $duration and the we're below $altitude, delay shutdown for $x seconds while blaring an alarm, except
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Why does your car have a key to stop the engine? I think you didn't think this through. There are very real safety risks to these engines in certain situations. For example these switches are triggered while passengers embark and disembark the aircraft, or while ground staff are operating. In flight they would be used if an engine has a failure, or during a fire, or if you're trying to hot-restart the engine.
These switches get used multiple times a day. They aren't an edge case.
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You should write less and read more.
The fact that they were operated by mistake in flight and caused a massacre means precisely one thing - they aren't well thought out in the configuration present in that aircraft.
Which is confirmed by what someone posted in a response, here: https://ad.easa.europa.eu/blob... [europa.eu]
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they aren't well thought out in the configuration present in that aircraft.
That configuration - a switch placed immediately behind each engine's throttle lever - is almost universal in every jet designed since they eliminated the Flight Engineer position.
A320 (basically every Airbus looks similar) [skalarki-electronics.com]. 737-300 [squarespace-cdn.com]. 747-400 [throttletek.com]. Embraer is weird: they put the start/stop controls immediately in front of the throttles.
I could go on, but the point is: this isn't some poorly-considered design fluke in the 787. This is how it is done, and for a good reason: there are many situations where it's
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Because if an engine is on fire, you probably don't want to have a multi-step procedure in order to cut off fuel to it, and extinguish the fire before attempting restart.
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Remember MCAS? Here's a thought - could there be some sneaky Boeing software that flips the fuel system state (which would then register on the data recorder as a pilot-initiated hard switch) without the knowledge of the pilots?
That is possible but this 787-8 was not new and had been with Air India for 11 years. The MCAS related crashes was on brand new 737-MAX planes servicing Air Lion and Ethiopian Airlines, 2 months and 4 months respectively. Any software would likely be older and the plane had flown for over a decade on Air India.
but must be pulled and toggled
Not according to SAIB NM-18-33. Some switches were installed that disabled the "pull" requirement.
Some other notes (Score:5, Informative)
The report acknowledges that the FAA issued a Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB) on December 2018 regarding fuel switches on Boeing planes. SAIB NM-18-33 [europa.eu] advised operators of Boeing planes to inspect their fuel switches as some had been installed with the locking feature disabled. The locking feature was intended to prevent accidentally flipping as it required the pilot to lift up the switch (pull on it) then flip it.. The bulletin advises operators to replace switches if faulty. The report does not detail if Air India inspected the switches on this plane.
Last major maintenance on the plane occurred at 38504 hours with the plane recording 41868 hours at the time of the crash. The next scheduled maintenance was due in December 2025. The landing gear controls was still in the down position as the pilots had not yet retracted them. The Ram Air Turbine deployed and started automatically.
Summarized timeline of events: (UTC)
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It is incredibly unlikely that the switches had this problem.
The report states 'Both fuel control switch were found in the “RUN” position.' This is right above a picture of the fuel switches recovered from the crash. It is insanely unlikely the investigators would have decided not to check the switches, or fail to mention a problem they found with them.
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The report states 'Both fuel control switch were found in the “RUN” position.' This is right above a picture of the fuel switches recovered from the crash. It is insanely unlikely the investigators would have decided not to check the switches, or fail to mention a problem they found with them.
1) The report noted the switched were flipped back to RUN according the data recorder at 8:08:52. 2) The switches (like most parts of the plane were damaged) so checking them for functionality might be problematic. Figure 13 in the report shows the throttle/switch control area as heavily burnt. 3) This is a preliminary report where the agencies have not investigated every aspect. A more thorough investigation would focus on the switches. Were these switches affected by the issue? Did Air India inspect them?
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How often do the switches fail by switching to CUTOFF? And what's the probability of two switches mechanically failing simultaneously? It seems like an astronomically low probability event. Even one switch turning to cutoff by itself would be a big fucking deal .. and the premise here is that two switches failed within one second of each other?
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How often do the switches fail by switching to CUTOFF? And what's the probability of two switches mechanically failing simultaneously? It seems like an astronomically low probability event. Even one switch turning to cutoff by itself would be a big fucking deal .. and the premise here is that two switches failed within one second of each other?
According the preliminary report, the FAA issued an advisory [europa.eu] in 2018 predicting this type of failure. The FAA advised inspection and replacement of faulty switches; however, it was an advisory not a mandate so Air India and other airlines did not have to check or fix the problem. This accident might be the first incident of this problem involving deaths. The final report note any prior incidents where the switches have failed. Based on this incident causing deaths, I speculate the FAA will not convert the a
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And you think the crash investigators did not know about this advisory? Obviously your google skills are way ahead of their years of experience, as evidenced by your ability to ignore the insanely small probability of both switches failing one second apart.
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And you think the crash investigators did not know about this advisory?
Er what? I posted "The report acknowledges that the FAA issued a Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB) . . ." The summary did not mention the SAIB at all.
Obviously your google skills are way ahead of their years of experience, as evidenced by your ability to ignore the insanely small probability of both switches failing one second apart.
Please show where I ignore "the insanely small probability of both switches failing one second apart." I do not know how many times this may have occurred as I do not have omnipotence. But neither do you. I however pointed out the final report would probably note any prior incidents where the switches have failed.
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What I saw reported was that Air India did not inspect the switches, since it was not mandatory.
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No timestamp for one or both of the pilots indicating, "Oh my goodness!"
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A few more bits. That inspection is very simple and does not take any technical skill to perform. Any pilot with enough experience to sit in the front seat should recognize that the fuel control switches were not airworthy if the safety gate was not functional. (let alone an AMT).
That would require the pilot (and airline) to check those switches. I do not know it is on the preflight safety checklist to check those switches specifically for that function but I doubt it.
They must be grasped with some force and lifted up over the gate before moving down. Then the other one, They are too far apart to move both with one hand, on purpose no doubt.
Did you read SAIB-NM-18-33 (or my post) where some switches were installed with the lifting up feature disabled? From the bulletin:
. . .fuel
control switches were installed with the locking feature disengaged. . . If the locking feature is disengaged, the switch can be moved between the two positions without lifting the switch during transition, and the switch would be exposed to the potential of inadvertent operation. Inadvertent operation of the switch could result in an unintended consequence, such as an in-flight engine shutdown.
Also, the underlined immediate memory action steps for a dual engine failure on this aircraft includes moving both of these switches to cutoff and then to run as step three of the emergency procedure.
Did you read the preliminary report (or my post) where one pilot specifically asked why the switches where flipped to "CUTOFF" with the other pilot stating he did not flip them?
There is still not enough information released yet to come to a conclusion about the cause of this accident.
The prelimin
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You seem very invested in this event, do you have some connection to it?
I've actually read a 15 page report. Some people here have wildly speculated many things without even reading the report just as they speculated on the causes right after the crash..
Murder / Suicide (Score:5, Informative)
Re:Murder / Suicide (Score:4, Insightful)
Blah blah blah backseat pilot. Been covered elsewhere that the switches were installed without the protections on some planes, and there doesn't seem to be a record of Air India making the specified update to correct it.
Not that you might not be wrong, but you shouldn't be so certain.
Why in the hell would the pilot lie about his actions at that moment?
Re: Murder / Suicide (Score:2)
Why in the hell would the pilot lie about his actions at that moment?
Because, assuming that returning the switches to 'run' was sucessful, an incident report would have been filed, the guilty party fired and his name disgraced for all time.
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Because, assuming that returning the switches to 'run' was sucessful, an incident report would have been filed, the guilty party fired and his name disgraced for all time.
1) And you are assuming "guilty party" means the pilot flipped the switches. It did not occur to you that the switches could have flipped on their own under certain circumstances? That would be worthy of an incident report if controls moved on their own. It has been known to happen [wikipedia.org]. 2) If the pilot accidentally flipped a switch, how would he be fired and "disgraced for all time" for making a mistake?
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how would he be fired and "disgraced for all time" for making a mistake?
That's a pretty big assumption at this point. What if it wasn't a mistake? It's interesting to note that the event timing published in the preliminary report [aaib.gov.in] fails to note the timing for the 'switch off' events and subsequent CVR comment. While other events are timed to the second (the EAFR time resolution is actually better than this).
It did not occur to you that the switches could have flipped on their own under certain circumstances?
Both switches failed? That's a highly improbable dual failure without some external influence. Two influences, actually. About a second apart. And the cited MCAS failure was
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I think if a pilot accidentally pulled a switched from "ok" to "certain death" and noticed, his immediate reaction would not be wasting seconds in a convolute attempt to avoid a job reprimand. He would go OH SHIT OH MY GOD SORRY and correct the problem.
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Because, assuming that returning the switches to 'run' was sucessful, an incident report would have been filed, the guilty party fired and his name disgraced for all time.
Yes, the crazy suicidal pilot was concerned about paperwork and getting fired on the off chance he survives and wouldn't be smart enough to simply smack the copilot and push down on the yoke.
Did you engage a single braincell when you wrote what you wrote?
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Why in the hell would the pilot lie about his actions at that moment?
The same reason the pilot of MH370 turned off all transponders and comms and flew to God knows where to crash the thing. So nobody would ever know what happened.
But was it murder? (Score:2)
When you're trying to rationalize irrational behavior... Down the rabbit hole we might go...
The MH370 investigation basically dead-ended against the pilot's background. Too soon to say in this case. In my initial reaction to this story, I put super-suicide first as a motive, but what if it was primarily murder? I don't think either of the pilot's could have been a Qanonatic, but one of them could have gotten an encrypted message that "the enemy" is going to be on board "your flight" on that day...
And of cou
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Rick & Morty: Morty's Mind Blowers (Score:2)
A more freaky world than it used to be (Score:2)
When I was a kid it was possible for non-passengers to visit passengers on board before the flight was closed for takeoff. I remember doing that with my aunt and uncle. There was basically no security.
Next we started getting highjackings on a regular basis. Security was implemented, but non-passengers could go onto the concourse. My dad used to pick me up at the gate back then when i would fly in to visit.
Eventually only passengers could be on the concourse. After 9/11 everyone was freaked out.
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Is this article just another in the trend?
If you read the preliminary report, the IAAIB notes that it is possible that the switches were accidentally flipped as some of them were installed with a safety feature disabled that prevented accidental flipping.
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I wonder what other safety features you're allowed to disable.
Brakes? Yeah, maybe brakes.
Oxygen? Yeah. Seems like disabling emergency oxygen is a good option to have.
Pressurization? I can see why a pilot might need to turn off cabin pressurization. I mean, options are good to have.
WHY THE FUCK should anyone have the option to disable accidental use of the FUEL CUT OFF switch? That's about as retarded as it gets.
And yeah, I said retarded.
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WHY THE FUCK should anyone have the option to disable accidental use of the FUEL CUT OFF switch? That's about as retarded as it gets.
There was no option tor the airlines or pilots to disable the locking feature. Some switches installed by Boeing disabled the feature by mistake. The FAA advised airlines to inspect and replace the switches back in 2018; however, it was not a mandate. Air India did not have to do either if they did not want.
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Even an FAA mandate would also not have compelled Air India to inspect or replace the switches if this particular aircraft was flying between India and the UK.
Solution (Score:4, Interesting)
Before any pilot gets on a plane they have to sit in a room by themselves for 5 minutes with a loaded gun on the table.
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That's all well and good, unless the goal of the pilot is to take out a planeload of people, as it was on 9/11. Your loaded gun in a room isn't going to stop that scenario.
Two simple questions. (Score:2)
1. Were the safety guards, which were optional, installed?
2. We know investigators are looking into the computer system, does this mean the computer can also set the switch settings?
If the answers are "no" and "no" respectively, it was likely an accidental bump.
If the answers are "yes" and "no", then one of the pilots lied.
If the answer to the second one is yes, then regardless of the answer to the first, I'd hope the investigation thoroughly checks whether the software can be triggered into doing so throug
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1. Were the safety guards, which were optional, installed?
The safety guards are not optional as far as I know.
2. We know investigators are looking into the computer system, does this mean the computer can also set the switch settings?
The data recorder registers the switches were flipped to CUTOFF. The voice recording notes one pilot questioning why the switches were flipped. The data recorder notes the switches flipped back to RUN. As far as I know these switches do not appear to be fly-by-wire where the computer can set these switches.
If the answers are "yes" and "no", then one of the pilots lied.
And there is no possibility that the switches failed in some way like being loose? The plane was nearly 12 years old with over 41,000 flight hours. Fur
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