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Iran Shuts Down Musk's Starlink For First Time (forbes.com) 131

Thelasko shares a report from Forbes: We have not seen this before. Iran's digital blackout has now deployed military jammers, reportedly supplied by Russia, to shut down access to Starlink Internet. This is a game-changer for the Plan-B connectivity frequently used by protesters and anti-regime activists when ordinary access to the internet is stopped. "Despite reports that tens of thousands of Starlink units are operating inside Iran," says Iran Wire, "the blackout has also reached satellite connections." It is reported that about 30 percent of Starlink's uplink and downlink traffic was (initially) disrupted," quickly rising "to more than 80 percent" within hours. The Times of Israel reports "the deployment of (Starlink) receivers is now far greater in Iran" than during previous blackouts. "That's despite the government never authorizing Starlink to function, making the service illegal to possess and use." "While it's not clear how Starlink's service was being disrupted in Iran," The Times says, "some specialists say it could be the result of jamming of Starlink terminals that would overpower their ability to receive signals from the satellites."

Multiple reports suggest Russia's military technology may be responsible. Channel 4 News describes Russia's activities as a "technological race with Starlink," which it says "is known to deploy trucks which deploy radio noise to disrupt satellite signals."

Simon Migliano, Head of Research at Top10VPN.com, said "Iran's current nationwide blackout is a blunt instrument intended to crush dissent," and this comes at a stark cost to the country, underpinning the regime's desperation. "This 'kill switch' approach comes at a staggering price, draining $1.56 million from Iran's economy every single hour the internet is down." He added: "Iranian authorities have proven they are prepared to weaponize connectivity, even at a tremendous domestic cost. We are looking at losses already exceeding $130 million. If the 2019 shutdown is any indicator, the regime could maintain this digital siege for days, prioritizing control over their own economic stability."
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Iran Shuts Down Musk's Starlink For First Time

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  • by greytree ( 7124971 ) on Wednesday January 14, 2026 @03:35AM (#65923094)
    How would a jammer work and what would the range be ?

    Surely a Starlink receiver receives signals from almost directly overhead, whereas the jammer's signals can only travel horizontally ?

    Gizmodo ( okay, not a great source ) says the Chinese had to use drones to do this:

    "SpaceX’s Starlink satellites are difficult to jam, and attempts to block their signals from the ground would be fruitless. Instead, the researchers suggest deploying nearly 1,000 jammers in the air using drones, balloons, or aircraft."

    https://gizmodo.com/chinas-simulated-attack-shows-how-it-could-jam-musks-starlink-over-taiwan-2000690672
    • by dragisha ( 788 ) <dragisha@m3[ ]rg ['w.o' in gap]> on Wednesday January 14, 2026 @03:43AM (#65923104)

      I think they are not targeting receivers with "noise", but satellites. Reports say packet losses skyrocketed to 90% (80% in some earlier reports), thus making service unstable.
      As for receivers, they are geolocating them one by one, and the police collect them. In Ukraine, they target them with drones and artillery.

      • by geekmux ( 1040042 ) on Wednesday January 14, 2026 @04:36AM (#65923150)

        As for receivers, they are geolocating them one by one, and the police collect them. In Ukraine, they target them with drones and artillery.

        ”Collect them”, is quite kind. Gut feeling traffic dropped drastically by way of force.

        Kill 1 citizen for operating a Starlink illegally, and people dismiss the threat.

        Kill 50 citizens for operating a Starliink illegally, and suddenly you’ve crafted one hell of a deterrent.

        • The threat of death was always there, and the Iranian people knew, and know it. It's just that things have become so bad that it's now an all-or-nothing, which is why they're not afraid to die. 12,000 have been massacred already, according to Iran International

          There are no deterrents left here: either the regime will succeed in massacring everybody, or it'll be overthrown

      • by gweihir ( 88907 )

        Reports say packet losses skyrocketed to 90% (80% in some earlier reports), thus making service unstable.

        Interesting. You can still get a lot through that, but TCP/IP basically becomes unusable around 50% packet loss. There are tools for tunneling TCP via IP or UDP over very lossy lines, although I think most are older.

        • by Anonymous Coward

          I've seen TCP/IP become useless at 10-15% packet loss.

          Why would tunnelling over UDP help? The data's still not getting through and as you're operating with TCP the client will be missing ACKs and retransmitting, even though it's then carried over UDP.

          • I suppose it becomes a statistical problem at that point?

            Every packet is duplicated X times based on how much loss is being seen?

            The trick would be to just get the packets to the other side of the block and have the destination (proxy I guess?) do the same kind of duplication so that you are guaranteed to get a response.

            I don't know, that's just my layman's view of it.

        • by sjames ( 1099 )

          TCP always goes over IP. Tunneling over UDP is just the same thing with one more layer of headers.

    • For better or worse, Russian signal jamming is the best there is. It's a core part of their military doctrine, and for good reason, as the Nato doctrine is built on total informational and situational awareness, and it basically cannot function without it on any level.

      Noise is something that exists on the receiver. Either they are jamming the sats with their own in orbit, or the terminals on ground with mobile or even stationary gear. While the sats would probably be Russian, these could easily land a hand

      • For better or worse, Russian signal jamming is the best there is.

        Better? Can you imagine a scenario where Russian signal jamming is done for the better?

        • Re: (Score:2, Informative)

          by korgitser ( 1809018 )

          For russians, done for Russian national interest - better. For americans, done against US national interest - worse. Nobody has the high ground on the international stage, everyone is just out to look after their own interests, so what is good or bad depends on which country you identify with.

          • Being "national interest" does not make it automatically "good". Iran is jamming for "their national interest" as well. Russia is using the same equipment to attack foreign countries. Sometimes it might be difficult to identify whether there is a right and wrong, like when there are two factions in war and both are involved in bad actions. However in many other cases it's not difficult to distinguish. We only have to agree that in the general case killing people is wrong in the general case, a principle tha

            • What advances the national interests of a country is good for that country. If that comes at the expense of another country, it is bad for that country.

              Well can simplify and say that on the international stage, 'good' is whatever is good for whoever is doing it. The highest authority on what is good, unless we go into religion, is probably a UN security council veto, and these are 100% based on national interest. So if that good involves killing, well it sucks, but it is what it is. When I start killing peo

        • Re: (Score:2, Insightful)

          by znrt ( 2424692 )

          blocking cia/mi6/mossad violent destabilization of a friendly and strategically critical country would be one, if you're not usrael or a vassal, that is.

      • If they're jamming the satellites, wouldn't that affect other countries too? Wouldn't jamming a foreign country be considered an act of war?
        • Depends on their abilities for sure, that is, the range and density of the fleet. But certainly more difficult to geofence, yes.

          Satellites also have a limited power budget, which makes the whole proposal rather interesting technically, and my take is, unlikely. But while the traditional capabilities of their jamming tech is well known, the newer stuff is obviously secret and there are known gaps in our knowledge of it. So you never know.

          Considering the neighbours and relations with them Iran has, both good

        • by gweihir ( 88907 )

          Can and must be limited to what is the current satellites over their country or the power needed goes through the roof. Also, since Starlink is a civilian service, it might be cause for a lawsuit (good luck...), but it is in no way an "act of war".

        • Other countries are affected. Russian GPS jamming has been disrupting flights in the Baltic, Med and Black Sea areas: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/art... [bbc.co.uk]

        • by unrtst ( 777550 )

          If they're jamming the satellites, wouldn't that affect other countries too? Wouldn't jamming a foreign country be considered an act of war?

          We're not on a flat earth. Each starlink satellite covers an area approximately 460km in diameter. Jamming the satellite would only impact those within its cone of influence. FYI, Iran's total area is about 1.65 million square km. Unless you're very close to the border, it won't be impacting other countries (assuming they're directly jamming specific satellites).

      • "Either they are jamming the sats with their own in orbit, or the terminals on ground with mobile or even stationary gear."

        The comment to which you replied concerns whether it is at all possible to jam the terminals on the ground.
        Do try and keep up.
      • by gweihir ( 88907 )

        For better or worse, Russian signal jamming is the best there is. It's a core part of their military doctrine, and for good reason, as the Nato doctrine is built on total informational and situational awareness, and it basically cannot function without it on any level.

        Hahahaha, yes. No idea why the idiots bought those weapon systems. Probably made more money for the sellers, even if mostly worthless against the Russians. As Ukraine found out and is working around now. (Another reason why Ukraine must win: We critically need their battlefield knowledge and experience.)

      • by AleRunner ( 4556245 ) on Wednesday January 14, 2026 @07:33AM (#65923330)

        For better or worse, Russian signal jamming is the best there is.

        And yet, we have seen in Ukraine that Russia continues to be struck by radio controlled systems whilst in both Israel, Iran and Venezeula we have seen that American / Israeli / NATO electronic warfare systems were able to totally disable Russian air defense, command and communication systems. Maduro had the very latest kit, delivered by plane mere months before the attack and yet ended up completely defenseless.

        Whilst Russian jamming does have some advantages in power, your statement is simply wrong. Several serious problems have been identified

        * Russian jamming tends to fail to actively track signals allowing enemies with more flexible transmission to avoid it
        * Russian jamming lacks effective deconfliction; not only does this mean it disturbs their own signals, it also means they have to switch it off at times and so lose protection
        * Russian jamming tends to rely on singular large powerful transmitters for wide areas and so is unable to adapt to local situations and frequency requirements.

        Incidentally, the India / Pakistan air fight provided some suggestion that Chinese systems may be superior to Russian ones as well.

        • Whatever is going on in Venezuela, and I don't know what kind or of which origin the communication links there are, the capabilities of US to jam signals there does not say a word about the capabilities of Russia to jam signals anywhere else. But if you want to do some failure analysis on Venezuela, until we have a clearer picture of how the Maduro capture was pulled off, my first bet is on the incompetence and general panic of the Venezuelan Army, with a side note of possible sell out. To put it in a more

          • Whatever is going on in Venezuela, and I don't know what kind or of which origin the communication links there are, the capabilities of US to jam signals there does not say a word about the capabilities of Russia to jam signals anywhere else.

            Nobody said that the US capabilities say anything. The Russian capabilities in Venezuela were the most advanced Russian MANPADS and S300 long range air defense systems, which together with the shorter range ones were all active there. What was missing was the S400/500 which is supposed to add ballistic missile and stealth defense to the S300, none of which applies to a raid which used huge Chinook non-stealth helicopters and walked all over the entire range of defenses.

            Now as to actively tracking signals in order to jam flexible transmissions I don't know what you mean by that. One does not jam transmitters.

            When you are talking about radio commu

      • by boxless ( 35756 )

        Best there is? I doubt it. They have never had the best of anything. When told they have the best, we usually find out later it wasn’t true. It’s happened that way so many times, I’m inclined to think that’s the case here.

        What they do have is determination, and a willingness to sacrifice bodies during conflicts of all sizes. Which is no small thing for all concerned.

        • Oh they absolutely can have the best. Not always, and usually, not at scale. But within a population of 150 million you can always find a few minds to be the best at anything, if you give them the support required. Where Russia is usually bottlenecked is in their ability to mass produce the inventions of these minds. But when the push comes to shove, they have the ability to put the thumb down on a priority area and make it happen, the wider bardak notwithstanding.
          • within a population of 150 million you can always find a few minds to be the best at anything, if you give them the support required

            Russia cannot do that. The Soviet Union could, because it had the resources of other nations, notably including Ukraine — which was critical to the Soviet space program, and tank production, and food production...

            Look at the T-14 Armata tank. It's supposed to be Russia's glory, but the AMS is worthless against top-attack ATGMs. It also depends on foreign components so they can't actually build them even if they couldn't be defeated by man-portable weapons like Javelin missiles.

            Without the Soviet Union

            • Multiple problems with this argument.

              Tanks get destroyed by powerful purpose built weapons. News at 11. But which tanks are doing better in Ukraine? US tanks, or Russian ones? Russian ones are doing better. Ukrainians rarely even dare to show up on the front line in an Abrams. So by definition Russian tanks are better.

              Second, in WWII a single German tank could take on four Soviet tanks and expect to come out on top. Better in every battlefield measurable way. But the soviet tanks were cheap, simple, and ple

              • "Third, If you say Russian tanks were not being able to be destroyed by Javelins, the supposed US anti-tank infantry wonder weapon, I say this speaks very highly of Russian tanks indeed."

                That's literally the opposite of what I said. Guess your handlers don't provide translation assistance.

                • I'll give you that misread, I'm tired and have a lot on my hands right now.

                  How about the rest of it though...

                  Where I come from, and the US used to come from a similar place, is the idea that to best your opponent you have to understand him and know him well. You need to be able to admit the strengths of the enemy. Without any of this you are at best shooting in dark. To bring in the classics:

                  “If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.” Sun Tzu, The Art of War

                  A big part of the current twilight of the US Empire is a complete disregard for knowing anything about the enemy. Jum

      • For better or worse, Russian signal jamming is the best there is.

        It's the biggest and greatest ever. Donald is that you?

    • How would a jammer work and what would the range be ?

      From the article:

      Starlink receivers use GPS to locate and enable connections to satellites. “Since its 12-day war with Israel last June," The Times says, “Iran has been disrupting GPS signals.” That means shutdowns are localized, and has resulted in a patchwork quilt of Starlink connectivity, including near blackouts in some high-profile areas.

      Presumably they saturate the airwaves with bogus GPS data which makes the receiver think it's somewhere that it's not. The receiver then "looks" to the wrong place in the sky when it's trying to send/receive packets.

      Seems like this would be easily defeated in software, by allowing the user to hard-code their GPS coordinates if they know their precise location by other means.

      • From the summary:
                ""While it's not clear how Starlink's service was being disrupted in Iran," The Times says, "some specialists say it could be the result of jamming of Starlink terminals that would overpower their ability to receive signals from the satellites.""

        That suggests not GPS jamming but with signal noise.
        My question was whether that signal noise would actually reach a Starlink terminal pointed at the sky, and over what range it could work.
    • by Kisai ( 213879 ) on Wednesday January 14, 2026 @06:26AM (#65923250)

      This is an easy answer. It's not the starlink satellites being disrupted, it's the receivers. Jam the 14-14.5 GHz frequency, and no more uplink.

      And it's also super easy to disrupt any wireless signal, you just make louder noise on the same frequency. If you overpower the 4 watts of transmission power with 10 watts of noise, then the satellites will only see noise, but why stop there, hit it 50 watts so that nothing reaches it.

      That's why they can't cut it off entirely, because satellite constellations move. So to jam constantly would require ground based devices to track the satellites and constantly hit them simultaneously with enough power to overpower the error rate.

      Realistically, the only guaranteed way to cut off a countries internet is to prevent receivers from working. Good luck when that is a standard feature of smartphones. In a land war, that's just not going to be a thing, because people can find the source of the jamming equally as easily and destroy it.

      • by Entrope ( 68843 ) on Wednesday January 14, 2026 @07:49AM (#65923348) Homepage

        on the same frequency. If you overpower the 4 watts of transmission power with 10 watts of noise, then the satellites will only see noise, but why stop there, hit it 50 watts so that nothing reaches it.

        The first part isn't necessarily true: it depends on the waveform. A GPS satellite normally broadcasts with something like (depending on how you measure it) 20 W per channel. From a given user position and for L1, there are often a dozen other GPS satellites, and eight to ten Galileo satellites, broadcasting at basically the same power on the same frequency. Fewer GPS satellites broadcast on L5 but it's also crowded; other GNSSes don't broadcast at L2. A receiver can still track all of those satellites with low bit error rates, even though the signal-to-interference-plus-noise power ratio (SINR) is worse than your 4 W : 50 W. (The compromise is that the bit rate you get as throughout is really low compared to the bandwidth: for GPS L1 C/A, 50 bits per second via a 2+ MHz signal.)

        But yes, jammers often go for brute power. The risk is that this makes them very easy to find, so anti-radiation missiles and similar weapons can home in on the jammers.

        • by coofercat ( 719737 ) on Wednesday January 14, 2026 @10:12AM (#65923562) Homepage Journal

          GPS signals work on the 'edges' of the signal, not the strength of it. That is, you "listen" to some noise at a particular frequency in the required band, but just at the moment you're expecting it to do so, there's a "high to low" edge in the noise. You wait a bit more at a different frequency, and then there's another... and another... gradually, you gain 'signal lock' which is essentially your listening expectation matching up with the signal sent by the satellite. You need a pretty accurate clock to be able to listen in the right places in the radio band at the right times. Every satellite uses a different pattern of frequency hops and edge directions, so you need to know which one you're trying to listen to as well.

          Jamming such a signal isn't easy - you actually need to send an edge just before the real one arrives, in the right place in the frequency band. The receiver needs to "think" your edge is the real one, and it then bases its timing and therefore location off it, rather than the real edge that came from space. You obviously need to do that continuously and reasonably correctly to convince the receiver of your bogus location.

          All that said, 'spamming' edges may cause a receiver not to get signal lock because (say) every second real edge isn't found properly. It's still not just a matter of "blatting" a load of noise across the spectrum though - you need to think about how the receivers are actually listening and 'tune in' to that to do it successfully.

          All this is thanks to Spread Spectrum modulation. for which you can thank Hedy Lamarr, an actress and Austrian immigrant to the United States.

          • by Entrope ( 68843 ) on Wednesday January 14, 2026 @11:08AM (#65923732) Homepage

            You're not even wrong, to borrow a phrase from Wolfgang Pauli.

            GPS and other GNSS signals don't use frequency hopping at all -- it would make it harder to acquire a signal and make ranging much less accurate. Except for GLONASS's legacy FDMA transmissions, they use direct-sequence spread spectrum with phase shift keying modulation (or variations on it), which is somewhat different from the spread spectrum technique that Hedy Lamarr co-invented. There are a lot of techniques for jamming GPS, which work different ways and require different transmitter power levels and sophistication. And a "bogus location" would imply spoofing, which GNSS people distinguish from jamming for a lot of reasons.

    • by gweihir ( 88907 )

      Just put out a lot of RF noise. Very simple, very cheap, exceptionally "dirty", but if you are a totalitarian regime, you may not care. Starling signals are very weak. Just significantly raising the noise-floor will kill them.

      The one problem is the directional antenna. If you are willing to accept a lot of collateral RF damage, you can just crank up the jamming power. If not, you may have to get to a place somewhat were the antenna points. But remember, there is a lot of high towers in the cities there, and

    • by TGK ( 262438 )

      It can't be that fruitless. Green Bank West Virginia, which houses the National Radio Observatory, has all kinds of restrictions on what kinds of devices and equipment are allowed within some distance of the NRO since they interfere with the signals.

      I will concede that the radio sources the NRO is looking for are rather weaker and more distant than broadcasting satellites in low earth orbit.

    • The other question that arises - how is the Iranian regime, namely IRGC/Basij, communicating w/ each other in different cities? If they have a kill switch, what do the IRGC people have, so that someone in Mashhad will know what someone in Tehran is telling him? Or are they all just doing their own thing in every city?

      • They get all their orders from god.

        Which, given he doesn't exist, will lead to the usual religious nutter's answer to people cleverer than them: Kill them all :-(
    • "How would a jammer work "
      Send $1 billion to Elon Musk.

      • Elon Musk's network is estimated to be more than 700 billion dollars now if you include the value of SpaceX.

        I don't think that Elon would brother replying to Iran's e-mail for less than 10 billion, and they probably don't have it.

    • Antennas aren't perfect. A directional antenna is more sensitive in one direction than in others, but does not provide perfect isolation. So a jammer radiating into the antenna from the side can still work.

      For Starlink this gets more complicated because they use a phased array, the antenna elements of that array cannot be directional, so the jamming signal comes in at close to full strength and has to be separated from the satellite signal by the processor.

  • But Starlink receivers use GPS to locate and enable connections to satellites. âoeSince its 12-day war with Israel last June," The Times says, âoeIran has been disrupting GPS signals.â That means shutdowns are localized, and has resulted in a patchwork quilt of Starlink connectivity, including near blackouts in some high-profile areas.

    GPS is way easier to jam, if that's required (or if it needs some alternative manual configuration most users won't know about) then it sounds very plausible th

    • by gweihir ( 88907 )

      Interesting. From my experience, even with high-gain GPS antennas, GPS is pretty weak and easy to impact. My experiments (part of a war-walk) were 15 years ago though.

  • The cost won't matter here when the MAGA party deploys the same; after all Musk will likely let them do it here for free. The lesson to learn is how are the Iranians communicating without it? Is the cell network (as much as they have one) down as well? People are still getting information around and out, but how?

    I've been looking for better handheld radios for communicating with my family in exactly this situation. The best option for long-range portable radio uses the cell networks, and I wouldn't count on them to stay up here if someone declares an emergency. We should be thinking of what our plans will be when our government is weaponized against us. Don't fool yourself into thinking you can make an effective weaponized stand yourself.
    • by ArchieBunker ( 132337 ) on Wednesday January 14, 2026 @09:17AM (#65923442)

      I'm waiting for something similar in the USA. You call the president a bad name and he cries to Verizon or AT&T to cancel your service.

      • I'm not waiting. Americans will never rise up, they seem too comfortable to me.
      • Re: (Score:2, Interesting)

        You call the president a bad name and he cries to Verizon or AT&T to cancel your service.

        Why would he be that precise? We've seen the carpet bombing approach that ICE is using and the complete lack of concern for collateral damage. He'll eventually be ready to just shut down all the networks in all the blue states, while tapping all the lines in all the red ones.

        That's one thing that scares me more than anything. If the MAGA party successfully starts the civil war that they are itching for, the first thing they'll attack is the communication networks. My evacuation plan with my family

    • by stabiesoft ( 733417 ) on Wednesday January 14, 2026 @09:50AM (#65923502) Homepage
      I think it is clear who runs things. Donald slapped musk once and he has pretty much fallen in line. If musk was ordered to shutdown starlink in US, he would do so immediately. If he was ordered to shut it down only over blue states, he'd do that. Donnie could and would jail him if he did not. ICE has pretty much shown us what the don is capable of within the US.
    • Their entire internet is down, meaning their cell network has to be down as well. As well as terrestrial. Only question is - how are the regime figures communicating w/ their counterparts around the country?

  • For a country of Iran's size, its economy and public services can ill-afford this type of mass disruption - This is a "soft" Doomsday Device, except it is not soft at all.
  • The USAF and Navy have the Wild Weasel mission to destroy radar sites. My $0.02 is they have similar capability to take out jammers.

  • "This 'kill switch' approach comes at a staggering price, draining $1.56 million from Iran's economy every single hour the internet is down." He added: "Iranian authorities have proven they are prepared to weaponize connectivity, even at a tremendous domestic cost. We are looking at losses already exceeding $130 million. If the 2019 shutdown is any indicator, the regime could maintain this digital siege for days, prioritizing control over their own economic stability."

    Who is paying for this? Right now, the Iranian rial is worth 0.00, in whatever currency one looks. I checked yesterday, and forget dollars, euros or pounds: even when compared to currencies where one needs a wheelbarrow full of notes to buy groceries, like Uzbekistan, 1 rial is 0.01 som (actually, 83 rials will buy you a som). Essentially, nobody, not even Russia, would be stupid enough to take rials. So what are they being paid with?

    Once this revolution happens, one of the things the Iranians should

    • Once this revolution happens, one of the things the Iranians should do is have decentralized internet all over the country, so that in future, a single kill switch can't kill it all

      Yes, we all need this everywhere. We should be building mesh networks instead of depending on the government-tapped telco connections.

  • You can disrupt GPS to slow down establishing a connection. You can slow down the link with lots of local ground-generated RF noise. You can fly drones or planes that discover terminals and jam them. There's no such thing as an unjamable radio. However, with 10-20 starlink satellites "visible" in the sky at any given time and the average time overhead being less than 10 minutes, a terminal should be able to find a clear line of sight intermittently.

    A skilled jamming operation would use drones to discove

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