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Boeing Knew About Flaws in UPS Plane That Crashed in Louisville, NTSB Says (nytimes.com) 57

Posted by msmash from the PSA dept.
The National Transportation Safety Board said in a report this week that a UPS cargo plane that crashed in Louisville, Ky., last year, killing 15, had a structural flaw that the manufacturer Boeing had previously concluded would not affect flight safety. The New York Times: The N.T.S.B. has said that cracks in the assembly holding the left-side engine in place may have contributed to the November crash, though it has not officially cited a cause. The part had fractured in similar fashion on at least four other occasions, on three different airplanes, according to the report, which cited a service letter that Boeing issued in 2011 regarding the apparent flaw.

In the service letter, which manufacturers issue to flag safety concerns or other problems to aircraft owners, Boeing said that fractures "would not result in a safety of flight condition," N.T.S.B. investigators wrote. The plane that crashed was an MD-11F jet, made by McDonnell Douglas, a company that Boeing acquired in the 1990s. It was taking off from Louisville and bound for Hawaii on Nov. 4 when a fire ignited on its left engine shortly after takeoff.

The plane crashed into several buildings, including a petroleum recycling facility, on the outskirts of the Louisville Muhammad Ali International Airport. The three crew members on board and 11 people on the ground were killed in the crash; a 12th person on the ground died of injuries sustained during the episode.
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Boeing Knew About Flaws in UPS Plane That Crashed in Louisville, NTSB Says More

Boeing Knew About Flaws in UPS Plane That Crashed in Louisville, NTSB Says

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  • Boeing has fallen so much

    • Re:Boeing has fallen so much (Score:5, Interesting)

      by caseih ( 160668 ) on Thursday January 15, 2026 @06:48PM (#65927794)

      This can all be definitely laid at the feet of Jack Welsh whose philosophy of greed has been a cancer on American businesses for years, long after he died. He infected McDonnell Douglas, and after the cancer killed them, Boeing bought the leftovers, only the the cancer wasn't dead and it infected them too, leading the MAX disaster and the subsequent problems they've been having ever since.

      While I can't blame Jack Welsh for the design of the MD11 pylons, his influence later in the company's life prevented them from ever addressing the root (no pun intended) causes of this disaster that go back to the very beginning of MD's tri-engine planes.

      Early after the disaster someone on slashdot first suggested that the problem that doomed this aircraft went all the way back to 1978 and had never been addressed. At the time we didn't have the evidence as to what happened, so I and others disagreed with him. However now we know he was right.

      • Re:Boeing has fallen so much (Score:5, Interesting)

        by Richard_at_work ( 517087 ) on Thursday January 15, 2026 @07:24PM (#65927884)

        This is the same company that rushed to roll out their brand new premier product, the 787 Dreamliner, on the 8th July 2007, solely to meet the 7/8/7 date...

        This roll out ended up being an aircraft that used off the shelf fasteners (ie non-flight-grade) across the airframe, replaced panels and doors with wooden mock ups, and had zero interior installed. Ultimately it set the program back by a couple of years....

        Why did they have to use off the shelf fasteners? Because the company forgot to order enough for the first couple of 787s being built at the time, so they decided to go ahead with temporary fasteners instead - Boeing had to go and replace every one of those fasteners with aviation grade ones before first flight, and they then screwed that up by not correctly drilling the countersink hole, which resulted in cracking developing.

        The first few 787s were intended to be delivered to customers, but were so custom and overweight that Boeing had to write them down instead.

        The 787 program was supposed to be the most successful program in aviation history - instead, with more than 1,100 delivered, Boeing still has more than $10Billion in outstanding debt associated with the design and development of the aircraft and the delivery of the first 600 or 700 aircraft (called "deferred production costs").

        Boeing fucked up so badly on the 787 that Airbus, who had in turn fucked up on their initial counter to it, the A330-800 and then the A350 (non-XWB), managed to not only bring the initial delivery between them down from 8 years to 3 years and 3 months, but Airbus actually managed to achieve full profitability on the A350XWB program 7 years ago after less than 1,000 deliveries. Boeing is still paying down its initial debt after more than 20 years, while Airbus is enjoying a profitable income from its product.

        The catalog of fuck ups from Boeing over the past 25 years is immense.

      • This can all be definitely laid at the feet of Jack Welsh whose philosophy of greed has been a cancer on American businesses for years, long after he died. He infected McDonnell Douglas, and after the cancer killed them, Boeing bought the leftovers, only the the cancer wasn't dead and it infected them too, leading the MAX disaster and the subsequent problems they've been having ever since.

        It's amazing how someone as lauded and almost canonized as Jack Welch is now presented as an example of what not to do. He was the scourge of private equity but from within. Of course, private equity still exists, and vulture capitalism still makes some people rich, even as it devastates companies and communities.

      • Thanks for the history lesson. I wasn't aware that Neutron Jack had fucked up any companies beyond GE.

        I do remember when he was the darling of the executive set and was touted as the CEO to emulate. That says as much about corporate America - and corporations in general - as it does about Welsh.

      • Re: (Score:2)

        by bobby ( 109046 )

        I don't think it was me, but I remember that discussion a bit. I also remember reading in several places that the MD-11 was an evolution of the DC-10, which was the plane that had the engine mount (pylon) problem, engine breaking away, total hydraulic loss, uncontrollable plane, 273 fatalities.

        https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_Airlines_Flight_191

        They didn't blame the pylon design, but rather improper engine removal / installation that damaged the pylon. I would have liked to see that pylon being a bit

  • and so did UPS and the FAA (Score:5, Insightful)

    by rta ( 559125 ) on Thursday January 15, 2026 @05:41PM (#65927580)

    The headline is mostly click bait. more fair would be "industry and regulators knew about..."

    These kind of inspection items exist all over the industry (and other industries including cars). Right now it's looking like UPS inspections missed the cracks at least once and possibly twice.

    The modeling of this kind of tail risk and precise categorization is hard to judge for accuracy ...

    anyway to me seems unfortunate but nothing like the MCAS facepalm. (as an interested layperson not in aerospace or specifically risk mgmt)

    • Re: (Score:2)

      by dgatwood ( 11270 )

      Right now it's looking like UPS inspections missed the cracks at least once and possibly twice.

      And by that, you mean that they did the inspection (which just requires looking at the part to see if there are visibly obvious cracks, and would not necessarily detect internal fracturing), and did not detect the cracks even though they were there (but may not have started at the surface, and may not have been visible).

      This strongly points towards inspections not being a viable alternative to actually fixing a design flaw, or at least not adequate for this one. Regulators should have demanded that Boeing

      • Re: (Score:2)

        by r1348 ( 2567295 )

        Also, nobody wants to spend millions to redesign and retrofit parts for old crusty MD-11. If they go that route, they'll all get scrapped.

        • Re:and so did UPS and the FAA (Score:4, Interesting)

          by CommunityMember ( 6662188 ) on Thursday January 15, 2026 @08:15PM (#65927966)

          Also, nobody wants to spend millions to redesign and retrofit parts for old crusty MD-11. If they go that route, they'll all get scrapped.

          There is already a re-designed part (available in 2011, and recommended by Boeing), but the newer design was not considered to be mandatory, so the older part continued to be flown. If the MD-11s are to fly again the replacement is more likely to be mandated (although I supposed the existing parts could be required undergo more intensive NDT inspections; it is not clear which would be cheaper for the aircraft owners over the remaining life of the aircraft). It should perhaps be noted that FedEX and UPS both intended to retire their MD-11Fs over the next few years anyway, so bringing the retirement dates forward may still up being the most cost effective solution (depending on how quickly they can get more 767-300Fs (and/or 767-300BCFs)).

          • They wont be able to get brand new 767 freighters any time soon, not unless the ICAO grants the FAA its waiver to allow new 767s to fly internationally after the emissions restriction cut off date.... And thats unlikely to happen.

            Boeing doesnt currently have a product to replace the 767 freighter either - the 787F never came to light, and the 777X-F is significantly larger, and also significantly delayed....

            • The cargo airlines could use A340 P2F conversions - A340 are very cheap nowadays and are superior to the MD11 in every way. The only potential problem is the wingspan of the A340, it might be too large for the MD11 stands and will definitely be too large for the 767 stands.

          • Re: (Score:2)

            by r1348 ( 2567295 )

            In 2011 the MD-11 was still flying passengers, now they're all converted to cargo, where margins are razor-thin.

      • Regulators should have demanded that Boeing redesign the part to prevent the failure. One would hope they will now.

        There is a bit of a nuance here that's best captured by industry coverage with a less click-baity headline ("Boeing Warned Of MD-11 Part-Failure Risk In 2011, NTSB Finds") [aviationweek.com]:

        Boeing’s [2011] letter instructed operators to inspect the bearing as part of routine, repetitive pylon mount inspections, normally every 60 months. It also updated the MD-11 maintenance manual to reflect the new inspections. Boeing also recommended installing a different bearing that does not include a groove. But it does not caution against using an airworthy grooved bearing to replace an unserviceable one of the same design.

      • Given how long it would take to get these parts removed from a plane (remove the engine) and then hauled over for inspection (can't go far without hot replacements on standby), an AI shouldn't be needed to interpret the results. A human can do it just fine at these rates.

        Unless of course your goal is to just shove AI hallucinations and their absurd resource requirements into critical safety areas of national interest. In which case go right ahead....in some other country.

      • The inspection didn't require them to remove the part to look for cracks - they were to look at the bearing in place and verify that the two halves hadn't separated, by confirming that the outer edge of the bearing was still in line with the housing.

        The explanation seems to be that the failing of this bearing doesn't mean that the engine will fall off, because all the parts are retained, with the inner race inside the circular lugs. But it will make space, which means the mount will rattle, and if that is c

    • Re:and so did UPS and the FAA (Score:5, Interesting)

      by plstubblefield ( 999355 ) on Thursday January 15, 2026 @06:05PM (#65927656)

      I concur fully! This clickbait headline takes advantage of the current plethora of failures that have plagued Boeing products following years of poor upper management.

      Look at the Wikipedia article on past Boeing leadership [wikipedia.org], specifically the entries covering the two decades from 1996 to 2015. If you start following links, you'll begin to see the root causes of many of the later disasters. And contrary to what you might hear from the mainstream media, the company has been turning itself around under the leadership of the CEOs hired in 2020 and 2024 respectively, who have prioritized ridding the company of the irresponsible practices and poor management that came to dominate during the "bad years."

      Disclaimer: I am a retiree who did work for Boeing for a number of years, but as a mathematician and software engineer in R&D, not on production systems.

    • Especially given that the plane was nearly 35 years old at the time of crash. That is a really long time for commercial aircraft and at some point the risk has to shift more to maintenance than the manufacturer.

      • Re: (Score:2)

        by 0123456 ( 636235 )

        In part it depends on whether the cracks actually caused the crash and whether the NYT story is true. If Boeing really said the cracks wouldn't be a hazard to flight safety and it turns out they caused a crash, then they may be in trouble.

        • Re: (Score:2)

          by rta ( 559125 )

          In part it depends on whether the cracks actually caused the crash and whether the NYT story is true. If Boeing really said the cracks wouldn't be a hazard to flight safety and it turns out they caused a crash, then they may be in trouble.

          first sentence is def a key point. could well be a "died with" vs "died of" situation as far as the specific cracking in that circular or this bearing in general.

          • I was reading this and thought, "well, yeah. It's not like cracks in the mounting pylon is going to cause the engine to catch fire." So I looked around and apparently the engine fell off and caught fire. So, that's looking more like a "died of" situation.

            Died of vs died with being reference to a COVID era conspiracy theory that death counts during the global pandemic were inflated for nefarious purposes, which is stupid beyond expression in multiple dimensions.

            • Re: (Score:2)

              by rta ( 559125 )

              Died of vs died with being reference to a COVID era conspiracy theory that death counts during the global pandemic were inflated for nefarious purposes, which is stupid beyond expression in multiple dimensions.

              Well, i'm sorry you think it's stupid, but when investigating or diagnosing an issue, be it in machines, code or people just because something is wrong or out of the ordinary, it doesn't mean it automatically is the cause of the failure that's being investigated. That's fairly straight forward.

              As to the phrase, It predates COVID. I don't know it's origin, but I first heard 10+ years ago with regard to prostate cancer screening and treatment. It is often slow growing and so it is is monitored but not tre

  • the manufacturer Boeing had previously concluded would not affect flight safety

    The eternal optimism of business decisions.

    • No, it's not that simple.

      Every hardware and software product ever created, has flaws. These flaws vary greatly in severity, and in the likelihood of causing a catastrophe. If we insisted on no tolerance for flaws, we would have no products, period.

      Further, every manufacturer or software firm, knows about flaws in their systems. They have them cataloged in systems like Jira and other tools. Any complex product will have thousands of known flaws.

      So this is really about a matter of degree. Was the particular f

      • Well it actually is very simple. The problem which should be obvious is having risk assessment done by those who stand to profit generally without facing the ultimate risk themselves. Execution as a penalty for such offenses would cause those risk assessors to do their job a little differently.

        • That's a very different accusation than "eternal optimism." Now you are accusing them of outright fraud. No one is accusing them of fraud in the risk assessment (except maybe you). If we applied your penalty--execution--no plane would fly, ever, because sooner or later, one of them would crash, and there goes your head.

  • Than this. Why are the murderous cretins at Boing protected against the consequences of their actions?

    • No, it's not so clear.

      Every product has flaws. Which ones are severe enough, and have a high enough probability of causing a catastrophe, to keep the product (in this case, a plane) idled for repairs? In hindsight, it's easy to see. Without hindsight, not so much.

      • Re: (Score:2)

        by gweihir ( 88907 )

        That is where engineering risk management and the state-of-the-art comes in. With it, things like this are pretty easy to see in advance. But that is expensive and it impacts profist.

        And hence Boeing can rely on clueless people saying "it was not easy to see" and can continue to do shoddy engineering unpunished.

        • The point is, they did do engineering risk management, and noted that

          a structural flaw that the manufacturer Boeing had previously concluded would not affect flight safety

          It's easy to see their error in hindsight, not so easy in foresight.

          • Re: (Score:2)

            by gweihir ( 88907 )

            You need to do engineering risk management competently. The incompetent one they do is mandated by regulation.

            • There is no allegation, including in the article or by the NTSB, that Boeing did not do the risk management incompetently. If *you* want to assert otherwise, you need some evidence. The fact that a crash occurred, is not evidence, by itself, of a faulty or incompetent risk management process. Frankly, I doubt you are any kind of expert who could credibly assess the risk management process and its competence.

              • Re: (Score:2)

                by gweihir ( 88907 )

                Actually, the fact that the crash occurred _is_ evidence, no matter how much you dislike that. Competent risk management deals with all known issues and solves them. (This is obviously simplified.) Now, if this had been an unknown issue, sure, these happen from time to time and nobody is really at fault. But for a known issue to be mishandled? That is incompetence, nothing else.

                Seriously, stop embarrassing yourself further. You obviously have no clue how these things work.

                • No, the event of a crash is not sufficient evidence to prove negligence or incompetence. Risk management is part art and part science. Tradeoffs must be made. There is no such thing as zero risk. To prove negligence, Boeing would have had to not just misjudge the risk, but *intentionally* misjudged or understated the risk.

                  Not every known risk must be mitigated. Insisting on this would not be possible. You take a risk every time you walk outside, but you walk outside anyway, because you judge the risk to be

  • False. Boeing did not know about flaws in that plane. What Boeing did "know" was that a part in that plane had a failure mode that required checking on with some frequency. It seems that the frequency was inadequate.

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