Military GPS Jamming is Interfering with the Navigation Systems of Commercial Ships (cnn.com) 61
"Within 24 hours of the first US-Israeli strikes on Iran, ships in the region's waters found their navigation systems had gone haywire," reports CNN, "erroneously indicating that the vessels were at airports, a nuclear power plant and on Iranian land.
"The location confusion was a result of widespread jamming and spoofing of signals from global positioning satellite systems." Used by all sides in conflict zones to disrupt the paths of drones and missiles, the process involves militaries and affiliated groups intentionally broadcasting high-intensity radio signals in the same frequency bands used by navigation tools. Jamming results in the disruption of a vehicle's satellite-based positioning while spoofing leads to navigation systems reporting a false location. Though commercial vessels are not the target, the electronic interference disrupted the navigation systems of more than 1,100 commercial ships in UAE, Qatari, Omani and Iranian waters on February 28, according to a report from Windward, a shipping intelligence firm. Jamming and spoofing also slowed marine traffic moving through the Strait of Hormuz, a congested shipping lane that handles roughly 20% of the world's oil and gas exports and where precise navigation is essential, Windward's data showed.... Daily incidents have more than doubled, rising from 350 when the conflict began to 672 by March 2, the firm reported.
As use of this warfare tactic grows, experts worry the impacts could reach far beyond battlespaces.... In June 2025, electronic interference with navigation systems was thought to be a factor in the collision between two oil tankers, Adalynn and Front Eagle, off the coast of the UAE... The number of global positioning system signal loss events affecting aircraft increased by 220% between 2021 and 2024, according to data from the International Air Transport Association. Last year, IATA said that the aviation industry must act to stay ahead of the threat.
Cockpits are seeing their navigation displays "literally drift away from reality," said a commercial pilot, who didn't want to be identified because he was not permitted to speak publicly. He said that he and his colleagues have experienced map shifts, where the aircraft location appears to move up to 1 mile away from the actual flight path, false altitude information that leads to phantom "pull up" commands, and systems suggesting an aircraft was on a taxiway, a path that connects runways with various airport facilities, when taking off. These incidents force pilots to rely on manual actions that increase workload, often during the most exhausting points of long-haul flights, he said.
"Alternative navigational tools that don't rely on GPS, but instead harness quantum technology, are also in development," the article points out, "but remain a long way off operational use."
"The location confusion was a result of widespread jamming and spoofing of signals from global positioning satellite systems." Used by all sides in conflict zones to disrupt the paths of drones and missiles, the process involves militaries and affiliated groups intentionally broadcasting high-intensity radio signals in the same frequency bands used by navigation tools. Jamming results in the disruption of a vehicle's satellite-based positioning while spoofing leads to navigation systems reporting a false location. Though commercial vessels are not the target, the electronic interference disrupted the navigation systems of more than 1,100 commercial ships in UAE, Qatari, Omani and Iranian waters on February 28, according to a report from Windward, a shipping intelligence firm. Jamming and spoofing also slowed marine traffic moving through the Strait of Hormuz, a congested shipping lane that handles roughly 20% of the world's oil and gas exports and where precise navigation is essential, Windward's data showed.... Daily incidents have more than doubled, rising from 350 when the conflict began to 672 by March 2, the firm reported.
As use of this warfare tactic grows, experts worry the impacts could reach far beyond battlespaces.... In June 2025, electronic interference with navigation systems was thought to be a factor in the collision between two oil tankers, Adalynn and Front Eagle, off the coast of the UAE... The number of global positioning system signal loss events affecting aircraft increased by 220% between 2021 and 2024, according to data from the International Air Transport Association. Last year, IATA said that the aviation industry must act to stay ahead of the threat.
Cockpits are seeing their navigation displays "literally drift away from reality," said a commercial pilot, who didn't want to be identified because he was not permitted to speak publicly. He said that he and his colleagues have experienced map shifts, where the aircraft location appears to move up to 1 mile away from the actual flight path, false altitude information that leads to phantom "pull up" commands, and systems suggesting an aircraft was on a taxiway, a path that connects runways with various airport facilities, when taking off. These incidents force pilots to rely on manual actions that increase workload, often during the most exhausting points of long-haul flights, he said.
"Alternative navigational tools that don't rely on GPS, but instead harness quantum technology, are also in development," the article points out, "but remain a long way off operational use."
Ah (Score:2)
So THAT'S why I saw skydive dubai parachuting plane heading towards iran airspace earlier...I thought a seal team was about to take over iran...
Alternative nav tools that don't rely on GPS? (Score:5, Insightful)
Like the ones used for hundreds of years prior to GPS?
Maybe a critical need shouldn't rely on a system that's a single point of failure. Especially in a region prone to combat.
Every pilot taught to use non-GPS methods (Score:5, Interesting)
Like the ones used for hundreds of years prior to GPS? Maybe a critical need shouldn't rely on a system that's a single point of failure. Especially in a region prone to combat.
During ground school for a private pilot's license in the mid 1990s, a fellow student asked why we need to learn all these legacy navigation systems and techniques now that we have GPS. The first thing the instructor mentioned was the military turning off GPS.
I'd like to think that modern Boeing and Airbus jets are at least as well equipped at a Cessna 152 and have options too. And their pilots also trained for alternative technologies.
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In cusco's rush to tell us his anti-western propaganda. He completely forgot Russia is the biggest cause of GPS spoofing. [google.com]
cusco's only job is to destabilize the West and promote evil.
cusco's propaganda claims about Iran...
By the way, most if not all of the "massacres" are inventions of the US propaganda industry. [slashdot.org]
Everyone knows about the massacres of the Supreme leader of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, killing upwards of 15,000 unarmed protesters and random civilians. Credible estimates put the nu
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Re:Every pilot taught to use non-GPS methods (Score:5, Insightful)
Actually the military CANNOT turn off GPS. GPS is provided worldwide by a constellation of about 30 satellites in precisely calculated orbits. If you turn off the GPS constellation then it is turned off everywhere. Too many users worldwide rely on GPS for it to be turned off for a regional conflict. Every plane over the US, every ship in the Pacific and Atlantic oceans, every remote traveler in Alaska, Canada, Australia, South America, Africa, etc. would suddenly have no navigation tool.
Instead, it is much easier to just jam the signal where its loss helps prevent military targeting. The GPS signal at ground level is so weak, -160 dBW (-130 dBm), that it only takes a few milliwatts of radiated power to overwhelm the GPS signal for some distance. The higher power the jammer radiates, the larger the jammed area. During a regional conflict, the adversary might want to jam GPS signals for hundreds of miles.
The problem with jamming is it is obvious. When a GPS receiver says "Loss of signal" the pilot or missile can immediately switch to a backup method. What is worse is "spoofing" the signal to broadcast incorrect GPS signals that trick receivers into calculating an incorrect location or altitude. Many examples recently have been published of planes, drones, and other devices being told they are too high and they descend into the ground thinking they were correcting for altitude errors. Losing GPS is frustrating, not trusting it when it looks normal is worse. Is an unexpected increase it altitude because you entered a thermal zone and were lifted higher or did you just encounter a spoofing signal?
Inertial navigation is a problem if you don't have a way to correct for the drift angle. Imagine a boat on a river heading directly east to reach the dock on the other side. You know if you travel directly east for 10 minutes the map says you should reach the dock, however the river current is pushing you south during those 10 minutes. After 9 minutes you expect you should be almost at the dock when in reality you are miles downstream and your INS system might not know it. Moving in a fluid environment like water or air requires frequent external location verification to compensate for drift. There are ways to do this but most of them require additional signals that are probably also being jammed.
I'm sure other posts will correct some of my oversimplifications, but this is a TL;DR overview of why GPS cannot just be turned off and why INS isn't the quick replacement.
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Re:Every pilot taught to use non-GPS methods (Score:4, Funny)
In June 2025, electronic interference with navigation systems was thought to be a factor in the collision between two oil tankers, Adalynn and Front Eagle, off the coast of the UAE
The tanker Front Eagle is of course the sister ship of the well-known tanker Front Felloff, which nearly sank near Western Australia in 1991.
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In June 2025, electronic interference with navigation systems was thought to be a factor in the collision between two oil tankers, Adalynn and Front Eagle, off the coast of the UAE
The tanker Front Eagle is of course the sister ship of the well-known tanker Front Felloff, which nearly sank near Western Australia in 1991.
Wasn't a watch set? No eyeballs on the wea looking for nearby ships?
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In June 2025, electronic interference with navigation systems was thought to be a factor in the collision between two oil tankers, Adalynn and Front Eagle, off the coast of the UAE
The tanker Front Eagle is of course the sister ship of the well-known tanker Front Felloff, which nearly sank near Western Australia in 1991.
Wasn't a watch set? No eyeballs on the wea looking for nearby ships?
It wasn't hit by a ship, it was hit by a wave. Chance in a million! It's not very typical, I'd like to make that point.
Loran (Score:5, Informative)
A ship radio navigation system that had been around in various forms since WW2 and very resistent to jamming. But naturally it was dismantled because GPS, who would ever need anything else, right?
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Re:Loran (Score:4, Interesting)
In the Great Lakes all the straits and navigable river inlets have radar reflectors which allow pilots to triangulate their locations, some are lit so even in the case of all electronics puking at night navigation is still possible. No idea if Hormuz is so equipped, but it would make sense.
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Those old methods are better than nothing, but there's a reason why things like lighthouses were so vitally important back then.
For GNSS systems, GPS isn't the only option now. It's getting harder to jam GPS, Galileo, Compass, and GLONAS all at the same time.
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Sextants can provide reasonably accurate latitude, weather permitting. Longitude, which requires accurate time, not so much. Yes, literally "hundreds of years" ago, barely. The book Longitude [wikipedia.org] is an interesting read.
I believe the US Navy still requires officers to have knowledge of the sextant.
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Like the ones used for hundreds of years prior to GPS.
100s of years prior to GPS we didn't have ships so close to each other in a heavy trafficked critical canal that a sneeze of a pilot could upset world trade.
100s of years prior to GPS we didn't have planes landing at airport in such a way that we had to develop new fields of science to calculate how wake of one affects the other.
Tools used 100s of years prior to GPS still exist. They just aren't very useful in many critical situations in 2026.
GPS receivers could be highly resistant (Score:4, Interesting)
With sky facing, horizon shielding phased arrays they would almost certainly be able to be resistant against any non targeted jamming. Unless it originates from the sky (which it won't) the jamming signal has to fringe around the shielding AND overwhelm the phased array mixers. But military likes to keep the good stuff for itself.
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Unless it originates from the sky (which it won't)
What makes you think that? Both the US and Russia have airborne EWS systems that can spoof or jam GPS. Speaking of spoofing, that's the most common issue these days, not just straight-up signal jamming. Spoofing is much harder to deal with since the signals look legitimate.
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The US will be a bit more polite in using it and US enemies trying to use it in the sky would be anti-radiation missile bait.
Spoofing doesn't do much when you know the location in the sky of your signal sources. Now you don't simply have to be in the sky, you have to overlap the satellites.
Re:GPS receivers could be highly resistant (Score:4, Informative)
The one which doesn't make sense if you include it is the one you shouldn't include.
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Spoofing doesn't do much when you know the location in the sky of your signal sources.
That is great but that is not how GPS works. Well... actually no you're not understanding how location impacts you here, in fact that's exactly how spoofing works. It relies on the fact that you know where in the sky your signal sources originate. You can't differentiate signals based on location without some very VERY high end RF gear.
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High end phased arrays are composed of cheap semiconductors. Export controlled, not inherently expensive if manufactured in volume.
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I'll add an appeal to authority of Brad Parkinson who has made approximately the same points as I do. Despite age and his font choice, still one of the highest authorities to appeal to for GPS.
https://archive.gps.gov/govern... [gps.gov]
Any reports of effects on automobiles? (Score:4, Interesting)
I would love to know if this is having much effect on automobiles. Notably on cars with semi autonomous driving.
Do we know how those vehicles are handling this? It seems the later Teslas make good use of their cameras, but what happens when they think they're far from where they really are?
Was it Honda that tried an inertial navigation system?
Could Tesla and others use camera input to override the bad signals?
And do expect systems to use normal broadcast signals to verify position. Hard to coordinate jamming all radio and TV signals.
Rotate the street signs 90 degrees (Score:2)
Could Tesla and others use camera input to override the bad signals?
The defending military will just rotate the street signs 90 degrees. No really, its been done. :-)
Re: Any reports of effects on automobiles? (Score:2)
No. If your satnav says your in the middle of a field and your not then use a map and your eyes.
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When I was in the Navy (Score:5, Funny)
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I think good radar and sonar would enable you to get through the Straits of Hormuz.
Of course you have to still worry about the mines and kamikazi frogmen with limpet mines on their backs.
Those empty tankers are stuck there for the duration.
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All we needed was a hold full of grog and a sextant.
What no hard tack? No compass? No chronometer? Man the US Navy sure spoiled its sailors by also providing these. :-)
There are solutions (Score:4, Interesting)
There are solutions to both detect spoofing - like the free Galileo OSNMA [gsc-europa.eu] - and work around it - like using Starlink and/or OneWeb signals [techxplore.com].
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Looks like OneWeb was designed to get penguins and polar bears online.
(I checked and can't find anything about it being purpose-built for polar bases)
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They did say in 2021 [archive.org] "that complement our own geostationary offerings".
Since geostationary satellites are above the equator, it makes sense that OneWeb initially intended to cover the high latitudes.
Need a low-grade GPS (Score:2)
Glonass was not affected (Score:3)
I bet the Galileo system was working too as the EU first has to hold 6 weeks of meetings whether they can jam it or not.
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Nice joke, but it's not the USA, Europe or Russia who have cause the issue here. It's the locals on the ground. And GLONASS and Galileo both have additional security systems in place to make simple rough spoofing attacks fail.
Interial navigation (Score:2)
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It is. Due to an INS having a long initialization time and high maintenance costs, mainly in military use. Civilian crafts have largely moved away from having INS on board. It's a substantial extra cost in maintenance and time, which has been very hard to justify.
Modern optical INS systems promise to eliminate those drawbacks, which would likely mean they return to civilian craft again. But those are not commercially available yet.
Maybe we shoulda kept that LORAN thing? (Score:2)
LORAN: Harder to jam due to low frequency, accuracy good enough for ships and non-precision approaches. They shut down because GPS supplanted it. Maybe Starlink could help?
https://www.technologyreview.c... [technologyreview.com]
Apparently their constellation information can be used in "other" ways. 20/30/40/50 GHZ are much hard to jam due to the nature of microwaves, tiny beam widths, and the active tracking means even if you could jam it, your success in jamming would depend on being between the ship and satellites. Unlikel
Inertial Navigation Systems (INS) solve that. (Score:3)
Some civilian and of course military vessels have INS
but not all. It should be mandatory rather than optional.
Plenty of room in the BoM cost of a cargo ship (Score:2)
In other words.... (Score:2)
It's doing exactly what is what designed to do. Weird.
This is Job security for map and compass experts (Score:2)