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Air France, Airbus Guilty of Corporate Manslaughter In 2009 Air France 447 Crash (bbc.com) 43

Long-time Slashdot reader UnknowingFool shares this report from the BBC: Air France and Airbus have been found guilty of manslaughter over a 2009 plane crash which killed 228 people. The Paris Appeals Court found the airline and aircraft manufacturer "solely and entirely responsible" for the incident, in which flight AF447 from Rio de Janeiro to Paris crashed into the Atlantic Ocean. The passenger jet stalled during a storm and plunged into the water, killing all on board. A court had previously cleared the companies in April 2023, but they were found guilty on Thursday after an eight-week trial.

Both have repeatedly denied the charges and say they will appeal... The companies have been asked to pay the maximum fine — €225,000 ($261,720; £194,500) each — but some victims' families have criticised the amount as a token penalty...

In 2012, French investigators found a combination of technical failure involving ice in the plane's sensors and the pilots' inability to react to the aircraft stalling led to it plunging into the sea. The captain was on a break when the co-pilots became confused by faulty air-speed readings. They then mistakenly pointed the nose of the plane upwards when it stalled, instead of down. Investigators concluded the co-pilots did not have the training to deal with the situation. Pilot training has since been improved and the speed sensors replaced.

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Air France, Airbus Guilty of Corporate Manslaughter In 2009 Air France 447 Crash

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  • Irrespective of whether you agree with the findings of the court, a fine of 225k Euros is nothing for the crime of manslaughter. No one is going to face prison time, and the amount of money is rather small.

    • I'm surprised at appealing. That will likely cost more than the fine.
      Still, not wanting the precedent is a thing.

      • Re:Pathetic fines (Score:5, Insightful)

        by test321 ( 8891681 ) on Saturday May 23, 2026 @06:02PM (#66157562)

        Their problem isn't the legal cost (peanuts for them) and precedents are not very influential in Roman law systems. Their problem here is their corporate image. They're a reputable company in a highly regulated market and now they're guilty of manslaughter, and that's a *bad* thing. Like someone who wants to run for office and convicted of fraud or embezzlement.

        Technically they're not appealing, they're escalating to a supreme level, which will analyse only matters of law (and not facts). The high court might decide the law was not properly applied, or some procedure was not followed, an cass (annul) the sentencing, ordering a new trial.

        • by mjwx ( 966435 )

          Their problem isn't the legal cost (peanuts for them) and precedents are not very influential in Roman law systems. Their problem here is their corporate image. They're a reputable company in a highly regulated market and now they're guilty of manslaughter, and that's a *bad* thing. Like someone who wants to run for office and convicted of fraud or embezzlement.

          Technically they're not appealing, they're escalating to a supreme level, which will analyse only matters of law (and not facts). The high court might decide the law was not properly applied, or some procedure was not followed, an cass (annul) the sentencing, ordering a new trial.

          Hardly anyone really knows about this ruling. Any reputational damage to Airbus or Air France was done and over with years and years ago. With Airbus filling their order books almost as fast as they can open them they're not really that concerned and I suspect Air France isn't doing too badly either with 1.7B Euros profit last year. It was all so long ago that the events of AF447 have long since fled our collective memory and are only of interest to those of us with an interest in aviation.

          To me this see

    • Irrespective of whether you agree with the findings of the court, a fine of 225k Euros is nothing for the crime of manslaughter. No one is going to face prison time, and the amount of money is rather small.

      I came to say something similar, but while I was thinking about your comment some questions occurred to me. Can the victims' families sue the companies involved for whatever the French equivalent is of wrongful death? What would the chances be of winning such a suit? And, based on any relevant precedents, how high are the awards likely to be?

      My first reaction was surprise at how low the fine was. But depending on whether or not lawsuits can be filed and won, maybe the fine is appropriate. Maybe a higher fin

      • French law is not the same as American law. Most people here wouldn't even begin to know.

      • My first reaction was surprise at how low the fine was.

        The fine is defined as follows:
        * L221-6 Code pénal say involuntary manslaughter is a délit (misdemeanour) punished up to 3 years in jail and 45,000 € of fine. https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr... [legifrance.gouv.fr] (link to the version now superseded, but in force in 2009 when the misdemeanour was committed)
        * L221-7 (Code pénal) says corporations can be held responsible with penalty defined by L131-38 and L131-39
        * L131-38 (Code pénal) says fine for corporation is up to 5x the fine for an individual
        * L131

  • I can see that Air France apparently had a pilot who wanted to fly off into space and stalled the plane, and denied doing that until it was too late, but what was Airbus'es fault? The plane would have survived if the pilot had just let go of the controls...

    • by trelanexiph ( 605826 ) on Saturday May 23, 2026 @04:11PM (#66157480) Homepage

      Airbus has a flight laws system. That flight laws system which would have told the pilot they were in a stall failed because of ice accumulation during a thunderstorm.

      The pilot didn't know they were in the stall because the otherwise highly redundant system which should have warned him didn't work. Given what he could see, the aircraft was losing altitude, so he firewalled the throttles and pointed the nose up. If you don't know your wings aren't generating lift anymore, this isn't an unreasonable reaction.

      The captain re-entered the cockpit seconds before they hit the water and figured it out, but it was too late.

      • by AmiMoJo ( 196126 )

        As I recall one pilot held their stick back to keep the nose up the whole time, which doomed them. Airbus averages the inputs from the two pilots. Boeing produces a "dual inputs" warning.

        Because he held back the whole time, the other pilot's efforts to level the aircraft and gain speed were ineffective. As you say, it was noticed at the last minute, but too late.

        That always seemed like a very weird design choice to me. But also, the crew should have noticed sooner, and they should have made it clear who was

        • Both Airbus and Boeing average the inputs of both pilots. Airbus has the "dual input" audio warning, Boeing relies on force feedback instead. As has been shown time and time again, Airbus pilots tend to ignore the warning when stressed while Boeing pilots ignore the force feedback when stressed (or think that they yokes are jammed) to the point that they apply enough force to unlink the yokes, removing the force feedback.

        • by _merlin ( 160982 )

          Boeing has a mechanical linkage between the pilot's and first officer's controls. It's designed so that you can break it in an emergency by forcing the controls. The audible "dual inputs" warning is an Airbus thing where they use sidesticks with no mechanical linkage.

          • by AmiMoJo ( 196126 )

            You are right, they did get a dual input warning, but for some reason ignored it.

            • They ignored it because they had so many other alarms. This is a general problem of an ideal scenario to present all information, and the crew should figure out the exact problem and solve it. The real world creates information overload in a stressful situation and the crew cannot process the correct information. After AF447, there was more training in this exact scenario and emphasis on which alarms to prioritize.
      • by test321 ( 8891681 ) on Saturday May 23, 2026 @06:36PM (#66157602)

        I understood it differently https://bea.aero/en/investigat... [bea.aero]

        You say the stall was not identified, but the synthetic voice says "stall", I counted, 75 times between 2:10:10.4 and 2:14:21.5 (then it says "pull up" 4 time in 7 seconds before end of recording). You say the captain entered seconds before the crash, but he actually was back at 2:11:42.5, that's 2 minutes 45 seconds before crash.

        According to CVR, FDR, graph of parameters, all documented in the link above:

        At 2:10:03, autopilot disengages due to unreliable speed reading. At 2:10:07, one of the co-pilots puts the plane to climb. It was not discussed or voluntary, it could have been a stress reaction. Later as the plane lost altitude, the co-pilot indeed kept the plane to climb (erroneously, thinking it would help). Several "dual input" warning can be heard (six times), as the captain tries to level the plane, or even tries to get it go down (to recover speed and stop being stall), but the co-pilot stubbornly (out of stress) keeps the stick to climb, even when the captain gives clear order don't climb.

        Excerpt:
        2 h 12 min 59,6 SV : dual input
        2 h 13 min 22,9 SV : dual input
        2 h 13 min 39,7 Climb climb climb climb
        2 h 13 min 40,6 But I’ve been at maxi nose-up for a while SV : dual input
        2 h 13 min 42,7 (CAPTAIN) no no no don’t climb
        2 h 13 min 43,5 so go down SV : dual input

      • > The pilot didn't know they were in the stall

        Nonsense. The stall warning was blaring at them for much of the way down.

        Stall recognition and recovery is one of the most fundamental skills that pilots are taught, whether they are flying gliders, cessnas or airliners. A complete lack of basic airmanship led to the loss of this aircraft.

        • According to an extensive discussion of this I found elsewhere, for much of the accident sequence the plane was SO nose high that the stall horn turned off because static and dynamic pressure were equal.

          Whenever the nose went down a bit, the stall horn would come back on, producing exactly the wrong reaction----go back up.

          Unfortunately, the situation was unrecoverable for several minutes before impact according to simulations.
        • Aviation experts have raised concerns about the over reliance on computers by younger pilots. The pilot that was flying the plane (PF) had the least amount of experience but was also the youngest of the pilots. He would have spent the less amount of time manually flying a plane. The older pilots would have manually flown planes more over their careers as computer controls were not as sophisticated as they are now.
      • If you don't know your wings aren't generating lift anymore, this isn't an unreasonable reaction.

        If your wings aren't generating lift anymore then you're in a stall.

        So it is in fact an unreasonable reaction, because in a stall you push the nose down to gain airspeed, unless you don't have the altitude to do that.

      • No, the plane warned of stall many times. The problem was the plane issued many, many other alarms. It is surmised they were just overwhelmed by the number and failed to prioritize which alarm to correct.
      • The pilot didn't know they were in the stall because the otherwise highly redundant system which should have warned him didn't work. Given what he could see, the aircraft was losing altitude, so he firewalled the throttles and pointed the nose up. If you don't know your wings aren't generating lift anymore, this isn't an unreasonable reaction.

        This was one of the senseless crashes I've ever heard of. "But I've had the stick back the whole time!"
        There was nothing reasonable about the crews reaction to it. This is right up there with Eastern Air 401.

      • Airbus has a flight laws system. That flight laws system which would have told the pilot they were in a stall failed because of ice accumulation during a thunderstorm.

        The pilot didn't know they were in the stall because the otherwise highly redundant system which should have warned him didn't work.

        WRONG. The system was off, precisely because the sensor had faulty readings. Any pilot with a bit of Airbus training should have been able to read the state the autopilot was in (Direct Law), because there is an illuminated indicator for this. In an Airbus A340, a reversion from Normal Law to Direct Law is explicitly indicated to the crew on the FMA (Flight Mode Annunciator) at the top of each Primary Flight Display. In Direct Law, most protections are off and the stick commands are directly used for contro

    • The excerpt here says:

      ...a combination of technical failure involving ice in the plane's sensors and the pilots' inability to react...

      So your question seems to be answered, at least in principle. "What was Airbus' fault?" Sensor issues, apparently.

      Recall that faulty AOA (Angle Of Attack) sensors and/or related software have also been identified as an issue with previous Boeing crashes.

      • The pitot tubes were known by both Airbus and Air France to fail due to icing. Airbus issued recommendations to replace them on the Airbus 320 not the 330 which was the model AF447 used. The 330 used the same pitot tubes.
    • Airbus's fly-by-wire system meant that the position of the throttle lever indicated a falsehood as to the throttle setting.

      • There is no throttle on an Airbus. And the thrust lever position was not relevant in this accident. Basically, the pilots were so startled by a false warning coming out of nowhere that they, in panic, started doing random stuff instead of realising that the aircraft has been cruising with their current settings just fine for a while so the most sensible thing to do would be to calm down, leave the controls alone and take care of the ECAM warnings with the help of their quick reference handbook. Had they don

    • by Tailhook ( 98486 )

      but what was Airbus'es fault?

      This incident required the combination of an incompetent crew and a faulty design. Without both, that particular flight would have ended without incident.

      So the fault is shared, and the real criminals are in the boardrooms.

    • what was Airbus'es fault?

      (Just my opinion, I have not read the judgement) Airbus should have identified the lethal risk of keeping the old Pitot tubes that freeze in ice storms, and REQUIRED their replacement. Instead, as it was only recommended, Air France was only servicing the planes at slow pace.

    • The root cause of the crash was the pitot tubes icing during certain flight conditions that caused erratic speed readings. This lead to the conflicting warnings and alarms that led to the crash. Airbus was concerned enough to issue recommendations to replace that model of pitot tube for their Airbus 320 planes; however, AF447 was an Airbus 330 which used the same pitot tubes. Neither Airbus nor Air France felt it was a priority to replace the pitot tubes.
  • There was no excuse for having an insufficient pitot heat to prevent icing.

    They're not exotic components but don't work properly when blocked, be it by icing or (on the ground) by insects seeking a new home.

  • It's despicable that it's taken 17 years for the courts to reach this verdict. It must have been a masterclass in corporate lawyer's delay tactics.

    • Yeah, they could have suspended Air France and Airbus's business license for 17 years and given them parole by now.

      Corporations as immortal unpunishable sociopaths will seem like one of the craziest ideas in History.

  • Even I know you let the nose drop during a stall, and I've had ZERO flying lessons :(

    • A contributing factor was the plane was giving contradicting speed readings and alarms. And there were a lot of alarms. The flight was at night during a storm so the pilots had few visual clues about how fast they were moving. Yes the pilots should have heeded the stall warning over the other alarms, but it was not as simple as the crew just ignoring the only alarm. After this accident, the scenario of contradictory alarms was added to pilot training.
  • There were some management failures that preceded all this that nobody here has noted:
    1. The pitot tubes were known to ice up under extreme conditions. Airbus decided they ought to be replaced but didn't require this only suggested it, very much downplaying the urgency.
    2. Air France seeing that this was not a mandatory change decided not to replace the pitot tubes until the next major service of each plane. Several other airlines thought this could be a serious safety issue and replaced them as soon a

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