Flock's 'Creepy Cameras' Remain Major Threat to Privacy Despite Small Recent Changes, Warns ACLU (aclu.org) 35
While Flock announced changes for its AI-powered traffic cameras, "Several of the proposed changes Flock is touting are merely retreads of previous ," complains the American Civil Liberties Union. "Flock's latest announcement still appears more focused on addressing a perceived PR problem than the significant harms its products create... [T]his is hardly the step forward Flock wants us to think it is "
The ACLU continues to urge that default retention periods be shortened to 48 hours — not one week. And they warn Flock allows longer retention to any police department that asks for it, or when police officers activate "Evidence Mode" (the scope of which is not yet clear): Even if "Evidence Mode's" data retention hold only applies to hits returned on a given search, it would still retain significant amounts of location data on persons and vehicles who law enforcement do not suspect have engaged in any wrongdoing...
Flock claims that its changes will provide "more local control," meaning local police can decide what types of offenses other Flock customers can search their data for... This is not new. Flock has attempted this before, and the security measure failed because users were easily able to circumvent the system's requirement that police input the purpose of their search. For example, on June 12, 2025 Flock started claiming its new "Proactive Search Term Tool" would block any "impermissible" searches, such as abortion-related searches in states like Illinois that prohibit sharing reproductive healthcare data. But police officers quickly realized they could just input "investigation" or even "hehehe" as a search reason and it would be approved. Flock later switched from an open text box to a drop-down menu of reasons, but that just offered police a list of acceptable purposes they could choose from, whether it was accurate or not. Until Flock demonstrates they can develop a reliable, workable system to prevent improper searches, this promise of local control provides nothing more than a false sense of security...
While providing "Audit Assistance" to all departments makes sense, there is no evidence that the tool works consistently to address what the Washington Post observed is a growing pattern of police officers turning Flock into a personal stalking tool. While dozens of officers have recently been arrested, fired, or otherwise disciplined for misusing Flock for personal reasons, Flock claims these arrests are proof its auditing tool works. However, unless we know the number of officers misusing the system, we cannot conclude if Flock and its auditing tools are catching 95 percent of violators or 5 percent. Flock needs to have its auditing tool analyzed by an independent evaluator to determine its actual effectiveness. Until then, we don't know if the tool is a real security measure or just window dressing.
Perhaps the oddest part of Flock's announcement is its claims that "now every search will require" police to input a case code... While claiming that a "search without a reason is a search that shouldn't happen in the first place," Flock's announcement fails to note how easily users have circumvented "search reason" security measures in the past... This leaves the public wondering how making an ineffective voluntary security measure mandatory will improve its functionality.
Flock's "nearly $1 billion in venture capitalist funding has locked it into an operational model that seeks to trade our privacy for massive profits," concludes the ACLU's statement, as they promise to continue "The ACLU is fighting alongside communities to cancel local ALPR contracts and push lawmakers to protect our rights from this surveillance nightmare..."
The ACLU continues to urge that default retention periods be shortened to 48 hours — not one week. And they warn Flock allows longer retention to any police department that asks for it, or when police officers activate "Evidence Mode" (the scope of which is not yet clear): Even if "Evidence Mode's" data retention hold only applies to hits returned on a given search, it would still retain significant amounts of location data on persons and vehicles who law enforcement do not suspect have engaged in any wrongdoing...
Flock claims that its changes will provide "more local control," meaning local police can decide what types of offenses other Flock customers can search their data for... This is not new. Flock has attempted this before, and the security measure failed because users were easily able to circumvent the system's requirement that police input the purpose of their search. For example, on June 12, 2025 Flock started claiming its new "Proactive Search Term Tool" would block any "impermissible" searches, such as abortion-related searches in states like Illinois that prohibit sharing reproductive healthcare data. But police officers quickly realized they could just input "investigation" or even "hehehe" as a search reason and it would be approved. Flock later switched from an open text box to a drop-down menu of reasons, but that just offered police a list of acceptable purposes they could choose from, whether it was accurate or not. Until Flock demonstrates they can develop a reliable, workable system to prevent improper searches, this promise of local control provides nothing more than a false sense of security...
While providing "Audit Assistance" to all departments makes sense, there is no evidence that the tool works consistently to address what the Washington Post observed is a growing pattern of police officers turning Flock into a personal stalking tool. While dozens of officers have recently been arrested, fired, or otherwise disciplined for misusing Flock for personal reasons, Flock claims these arrests are proof its auditing tool works. However, unless we know the number of officers misusing the system, we cannot conclude if Flock and its auditing tools are catching 95 percent of violators or 5 percent. Flock needs to have its auditing tool analyzed by an independent evaluator to determine its actual effectiveness. Until then, we don't know if the tool is a real security measure or just window dressing.
Perhaps the oddest part of Flock's announcement is its claims that "now every search will require" police to input a case code... While claiming that a "search without a reason is a search that shouldn't happen in the first place," Flock's announcement fails to note how easily users have circumvented "search reason" security measures in the past... This leaves the public wondering how making an ineffective voluntary security measure mandatory will improve its functionality.
Flock's "nearly $1 billion in venture capitalist funding has locked it into an operational model that seeks to trade our privacy for massive profits," concludes the ACLU's statement, as they promise to continue "The ACLU is fighting alongside communities to cancel local ALPR contracts and push lawmakers to protect our rights from this surveillance nightmare..."
Here's an idea (Score:5, Interesting)
Require a warrant to use them.
Don't have the control console in the police department, have it in the courthouse and have an officer of the court present to supervise its use
Re: (Score:2)
Re: Here's an idea (Score:2)
Zuckerfuck was never actually in favor of free speech. He was just in favor of making money. Remember that he called everyone who trusted him with their info for Facebook "dumb fucks". Those are not the words of a defender of users' speech.
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Flock later switched from an open text box to a drop-down menu of reasons,
Like maybe a case number?
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Privacy in public? (Score:2, Flamebait)
Sorry, drive a bicycle with a facemask.
Re:Privacy in public? (Score:5, Insightful)
Things are a bit different now.
How about I employ a small army of people to identify and write down every car and pedestrian. They also log cell, wifi, and bluetooth broadcasts. The observers are also able to identify details like bumper stickers or other unique features.
At the end of the day all the logs are entered to a database that allows access for the right price.
This goes beyond your normal cctv system.
How long do you suppose it is until insurance companies start combing this data? They can tell if you're speeding. They can tell if you buy fast food or alcohol or recreational cannabis.
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They can tell if you're speeding. They can tell if you buy fast food or alcohol or recreational cannabis.
They can tell if you've been bad or good
so be good for goodness sake!
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This is what warrants are for. If police get to use this information without warrants, that's not OK. With warrants (i.e., the officer has to convince a judge that he has probable cause to believe that you are a suspect), it seems OK.
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Agree, FISA warrants don't count as Constitutional warrants, and should be overturned.
However, the fact that a judge in Texas might be more willing to grant warrants than he should be, doesn't invalidate the warrant process itself. Whatever the rule is, there will be some judges who are more enthusiastic, or more reluctant, to cooperate. There are even judges who are outright corrupt and on the take. These facts do not invalidate the warrant process.
Re: Privacy in public? (Score:2)
Yes, of course the fact that there is little to no objectivity in the warrant process does in fact invalidate that process.
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How do warrants work against a private company? Flock is not law enforcement. They sell to anyone who pays.
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Warrants work just fine "against" private companies.
A warrant doesn't prevent someone, including police, from getting information. It prevents them from using it in court as evidence against you.
Police can stake out a house where they believe suspicious activity is happening, without a warrant. They can't go inside and seize property in that suspicious house, without one. This is the non-digital version of Flock cameras. Flock cameras are the stakeout part of the operation, not the entering and seizing part
Re: Privacy in public? (Score:2)
"A warrant doesn't prevent someone, including police, from getting information. It prevents them from using it in court as evidence against you."
Only in a fantasy land where parallel construction does not exist.
Re: (Score:2)
By calling the practice "parallel construction" you are implying that a police stakeout is somehow illegal or unconstitutional. It is not. This practice has long been reaffirmed as legal and appropriate tactics by police. A stakeout is just as much an "invasion of privacy" as license plate readers. Which is to say, it's *not* an invasion of privacy.
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By calling the practice "parallel construction" you are implying that a police stakeout is somehow illegal or unconstitutional.
It might seem like that if you are completely lost in this conversation, with absolutely no idea what the actual issues are. It must be another day whose name ends in Y already!
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So you still can't bring yourself to address the topic at hand, and revert to insults. Definitely no substance there. If you had some substance, you'd offer it.
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So you still can't bring yourself to address the topic at hand
What's the matter, kid, you got wax in your ears? I addressed it, you ignored what I said, go back and address what I said and quit crying about how I'm not playing stupid games for no prizes with your clown ass.
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Ha! Time to go check my Flock account!
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"How about I employ a small army of people to identify and write down every car and pedestrian. "
You mean like a private investigator firm?
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The problem is being able to access data from all observer locations with a single warrant. Normally with ordinary security cameras, you would need to show strong probable cause for each specific address whose cameras you want to search, and as you go farther from the scene of the crime, probable cause also drops until you collect more information. Then you get another warrant and the cycle repeats.
It ought to be the same with Flock cameras.
You mean flock just phoned in the response?!?!?!? (Score:2)
Offloaded and Saved (Score:5, Interesting)
Re: Offloaded and Saved (Score:2)
I remember when we found out for sure that the TLAs were logging all of the USPS addressing data that USPS swore up and down was simply being deleted after using it for routing. It was about a week after my local postmaster told me they didn't do that...
Flock off (Score:2)
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Atten..hut ... Present ... Chargers! (Score:3)
Get those sawzall batteries topped off boys. The only good Flock is a dead Flock.
Be Careful with Laser Pointers (Score:1)
Questions (Score:2)
Are police punished for entering speculative case numbers? Otherwise, Flock data could be saved for millions of fake cases.
Does Flock punish customers (Ie. whole cities) who assign large numbers of photos (Eg. 100) to one case number? Otherwise, a city could mark every photo as evidence in a real investigation
There is no incentive for Flock spending money to literally pol
Flock is nothing (Score:2)
Folks should visit the UK and find out what a real CCTV society looks like.
License Plate Readers (Score:1)