NSA Security Guide for Mac OS X 250
An anonymous reader writes "The National Security Agency has just released a Security Configuration Guide for Apple Mac OS X (pdf). The guide mostly contains common sense configuration information that applies to many Unix systems. It also includes specific discussion for Apple's unique features such as Keychain and FileVault. It should be useful to most Mac OS X users and will be particularly useful for US Government organisations that use Mac OS X and for commercial IT Departments that are supporting Mac OS X. A range of other NSA Security Configuration guides for other operating systems, applications, and IT kit are also available."
Re:Lack of safety in numbers (Score:4, Informative)
File Vault (Score:5, Informative)
Has anyone seen this before?
Re:File Vault (Score:5, Informative)
Your milage may vary.
Re:File Vault (Score:2, Informative)
Comment removed (Score:5, Informative)
Re:File Vault (Score:4, Informative)
I've used this hint [macosxhints.com] for over six months now without problem.
On the other hand, it's trivial to get the user's password from swap, unless Apple fixed this hole already, so there's not much point to File Vault right now.
Re:Screwed up (Score:3, Informative)
Re:is there a reason why the NSA won't (Score:2, Informative)
What about users of other OSes? (Score:2, Informative)
In fact, where I live (Hong Kong), the government had a radio show where there would be a quick tip about securing your machine. Obviously, the focus was on Windoze, but anything that elevates the awareness of the general public to computer security is a good thing.
Re:is there a reason why the NSA won't (Score:3, Informative)
http://www.nsa.gov/selinux/
If you read the source and documentation, it's quite clear what they did. Producing a "boiler-plate" security document for all Linux distributions would be futile -- there are too many variables involved.
A commercial product such as OSX is quite a bit more linear, and this easier to release a straightforward guide.
-psy
Re:What about... (Score:2, Informative)
Another excellent OS X security guide (Score:5, Informative)
Re:Keychain Access Gripe (Score:3, Informative)
Keychain itself deisgned to be portable (Score:5, Informative)
Your Keychain, in ~/Library/Keychains, is perfectly portable, and designed to be moved from computer to computer, or stored on a device for storing such tokens, such as a USB flash drive.
Further, that certificates are even in your keychain at all implies that you should have access to the original source certificate files, which clearly remain portable.
And finally, rumor has it [appleinsider.com] that Tiger will include much more advanced features for managing, importing, and exporting certificates and CAs.
Re:What about users of other OSes? (Score:2, Informative)
Re:File Vault (Score:3, Informative)
No more FileVault for me. And this was Tiger (yes I know, its not even beta software but I like to test).
It's a little more complex than that (Score:3, Informative)
Yes, the nature of this architecture means that there can be zero disk corruption or you won't be able to mount it. So in a normal disk corruption setting, you would lose a few files or somthing. Having your user dir as an encrypted volume forces a sort of checksum on all the data and if even a single byte is incorrect, then the whole thing fails to mount.
It's actually a very secure method of storing your user data. Performance-wise, I've noticed that you can't use iMovie to import video files to your home dir if you're using file vault. The overhead on writing to the encrypted file system is too much for my 1.3gz powerbook. The video import is all kinds of choppy. Importing to the regular hard drive is fine, though.
Re:Guide for Linux? (Score:3, Informative)
MacOSX attacks... (Score:5, Informative)
The biggest problem for malware writers in MacOS X is that it's hard to remotely attack the box.
Mac OS 9 and its ilk were pretty much impossible to compromise remotely, because, well, they were designed as single-user OSs with no network services (no network daemons) installed by default.
Mac OS X isn't quite like that, but it's close. The downside is all those bsd-level things probably have holes of one sort or another. Has anyone actually checked the robustness of Apple's X-11 implementation?
OTOH, it's must easier to get the user to click and download something. The "prompt for your admin password" thing is great, but everyone does it without thinking these days, giving any installer root access.
Once that happens, you can install anything, anywhere, and given the structure of MacOS X you can hide your stuff in places a normal user won't be able to find. The "Opener" guys (see www.macintouch.com) should have edited the rc scripts, not stuck their stuff in
Luckily, the web/email based attacks haven't worked so far (unlike on Windows), so you really do need to get someone to run an app. These days that isn't as hard as it used to be.
Apple could protect against that by doing a system restore/diff after every installer run. It would be useful after-the-fact, and most users may not understand any of it, but it would be nice to have. Or (assuming the metadata stuff works in tiger) you could stash metadata info on the installed files somewhere, then search across your filesystem for matching stuff?
Ideally (and this is what MS tried) each publisher would sign all their files, and that sig would be part of the file metadata. So you could list, see, and search across it. Malware would bypass that, though, but you never know.
Re:Counterintuitive... (Score:4, Informative)
If you would have said privacy, you could possibly have had a point. But security? No way.
Re:Mirror anyone? (Score:3, Informative)
http://mirrordot.org/stories/111603fdae3
It's too bad these won't last (Score:2, Informative)
Re:What about... (Score:5, Informative)
It is my understanding that on OS X, the authorization dialog pops up because a request to a protected reqource/API has been made, as opposed to an application being able to just randomly tell the OS to pop up an authorization dialog.
The dialog itself always displays the name (and if available icon) of the application making the request, as well as the name of the right being requested. As this is put together only by the OS, you can't substitute one right name when you really want to do something different. And getting one right doesn't automatically permit a process to use any other right on the system -- each right needs authorization.
It's actually quite a good system, and has been very well thought out. It does, of course, rely on some vigilence by the end user -- if they're entering their password anytime it's being requested without quickly checking to see what is making the request and why, obviously they're going to get into trouble.
Then again, if I e-mail a bunch of Linux admins and ask them for their passwords, and they send them to me, you wind up with the same end result.
Yaz.
Password length related... (Score:3, Informative)
I've had both problems happen (the bad and the recoverable), the bad one has not happened since I updated to 10.3.1. For the recoverable with a re-login one, near as I can tell this comes from some legacy 8 character password weirdness. As this post [macosxhints.com] indicates, if you have upgraded your computer from jaguar to panther you will only need 8 characters of your password to be correct to log in. What I have noticed is that is FileVault does not have the 8 char limit and needs *all* of the characters in your password to be correct. This causes some weirdness if you have a 12 character password and have a typo in the 10th character: you will be logged in but not see any of your data. The really stupid thing is there is no error message displayed*.
Having said that, I haven't had the problem crop up in a while so they might have fixed it.
*Sort of: if you do not have FileVault on, your keychain will choke and ask for your password again.
Re:What about... (Score:3, Informative)
On MacOSX, running as an administrator is not the same as running as "root". On MacOSX, running as an "administrator" is more-or-less equivalent to having "sudo" privileges on a Unix box: entering your password in a security box permits you to do certain administrator-type operations for a limited period.
Re:Guide for Linux? (Score:1, Informative)