DNSSEC May Cause Problems On May 5 132
An anonymous reader notes the coming milestone of May 5, at 17:00 UTC — at this time DNSSEC will be rolled out across all 13 root servers. Some Internet users, especially those inside corporations and behind smaller ISPs, may experience intermittent problems. The reason is that some older networking equipment is preconfigured to block any reply to a DNS request that exceeds 512 bytes in size. DNSSEC replies are typically four times as large. "DNSSEC is in fact already rolled out across most of the world's 13 root servers. ... But to date ... it would only have resulted in a slight lag in the loading of a web page for those with outdated network equipment. The beauty of DNS is that should a request made to one root server not receive a response, the DNS resolver on a user's machine simply makes the same request along the line of the 13 root servers until it gets a satisfactory response. But on May 5, once all 13 root servers are live with the DNSSEC signatures, responses from all 13 root servers won't make it back inside the corporate LAN on some older systems. ... The problem may take several days to surface and be inconsistent from one user's PC to the next. A user at one machine who hasn't switched on his PC for two or three days will have no access to the Internet. A user who left his machine on the night before will have some pages — and responses from DNS servers — cached on his machine, and will still have connectivity." The article links a test site you can use ahead of time to check for any problems.
Jeez, And the day after (Score:4, Funny)
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Be happy (Score:2, Funny)
Now you will have an excuse to replace all that crappy old networking equipment "because it does not work with the new secure internet".
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Now you will have an excuse to replace all that crappy old networking equipment "because it does not work with the new secure internet".
I still support 7-bit ASCII, you insensitive clod!
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Now you will have an excuse to replace all that crappy old networking equipment "because it does not work with the new secure internet".
I still support 7-bit ASCII, you insensitive clod!
7 bit ASCII?!??!?! Geez .. get off my lawn .. its Baudot or nothing!!
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You have Baudot?
You lucky bastard, all I've got is ones and zeroes.
Re:Be happy (Score:5, Funny)
You have Baudot?
You lucky bastard, all I've got is ones and zeroes.
Um .. Baudot *is* ones and zeroes.
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Ones and zeroes?! Ones and zeroes?!
I'm making do with a stick and a hoop here, you jammy git!
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You have ones? You lucky bastard, all I've got is a zero! Yes, only one!
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You have ones? You lucky bastard, all I've got is a zero! Yes, only one!
Then you have one!
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I still have to punch holes in punch card (yes 1) in ebcdic. I have to glue the card back together for each line.
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And how did you count that?
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Makes for great compression though. :)
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I still support 7-bit ASCII, you insensitive clod!
7-bit ASCII? Versus what? ASCII is and was only 7-bit.
(And don't try to use http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extended_ASCII [wikipedia.org] to claim otherwise. Read the first paragraph.)
Re:Be happy (Score:4, Informative)
To use a car analogy, what the GP did was like someone saying "I have a red convertible." Well no duh it's red, that's the only colour they make convertibles! Don't even try to say that non-red cars can be convertibles, everyone knows that all true convertibles are red [wikipedia.org]. There is nothing particularly wrong with pointing out that his convertible is red though, it's just more descriptive for people 'not in the know'.
No way (Score:1)
No way, I'll just download a firmware update .. ..
Oh wait
Re:Huh? (Score:5, Informative)
It's not about blocking, it's about limit. DNS requests/replies are by nature very short - there's not much data to be transferred. So you can reliably believe if someone is transferring more than a kilobyte of data per packet on DNS port, they are performing some kind of DoS. You just restrict maximum packet size and everything is dandy. Then a new version of the protocol comes that has more overhead and suddenly valid requests are longer than 1K. Oops.
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DNS uses UDP by default. If the response is too big for UDP, then it switches to TCP. The limit for UDP packets used to be 512 bytes but extensions allow the size to be much larger. Old firewalls think that 512-bytes is the limit of DNS over UDP and block any longer packets.
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Most DNS is UDP, not TCP.
Already, the test nameserver... (Score:4, Informative)
is slashdotted.
So what do I do? (Score:5, Interesting)
I ran the command on the test page and the results are
>>dig +short rs.dns-oarc.net txt
rst.x476.rs.dns-oarc.net.
rst.x485.x476.rs.dns-oarc.net.
rst.x490.x485.x476.rs.dns-oarc.net.
"68.87.73.244 DNS reply size limit is at least 490"
"68.87.73.244 lacks EDNS, defaults to 512"
"Tested at 2010-04-30 13:42:26 UTC"
According to the test page this seems to mean that Comcast doesn't support EDSL (at the moment). So the big question is:
What can I do - aside from praying that Comcast will get their shit together by next week?
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And BTW moving off Comcast is not an option.
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This might be the blind leading the blind, but I just tested my (also Comcast) DNS and had the same error, so I switched my router's primary DNS to http://code.google.com/speed/public-dns/
Re:So what do I do? (Score:5, Informative)
Read Chris Griffin's of Comcast's response in the DSLReports thread on this topic: http://www.dslreports.com/shownews/No-DNSSEC-Upgrades-Wont-Break-The-Internet-Next-Week-108154
In short, they don't expect anything to happen on May 5. If you like, and are on Comcast, you can also join the DNSSec trial (I use it at home) by changing to the DNSSec test servers.
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I've been using Comcast's DNSSEC test servers for months, without any difficulty. They're leading the pack on implementing DNSSEC. In fact, they're advocating its adoption, even though that means giving up their Comcast Domain Helper service.
See their DNSSEC Trial FAQs [comcast.net].
(I had opted out of using Domain Helper anyway, as it's the DNS equivalent of "Clippy" -- help I don't want.)
Mod parent up, this is just FUD (Score:3, Informative)
Oh, and kudos to kdawson for continuing the streak of truly shitacular articles. Well done!
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Fear, uncertainty, and doubt (FUD)
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No seriously!
Re:So what do I do? (Score:4, Informative)
While Microsoft did included an nslookup command with Windows, it is quite basic compared to the dig utility. Go download dig [members.shaw.ca] for Win32.
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Re:So what do I do? - Windows specific (Score:2)
To re-enable: dnscmd /Config /EnableEDnsProbes 1
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They don't support the DNSSEC-extension (and also not EDNS), they do think DNSCurve is a good idea though.
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I ran the command on the test page and the results are
>>dig +short rs.dns-oarc.net txt rst.x476.rs.dns-oarc.net. rst.x485.x476.rs.dns-oarc.net. rst.x490.x485.x476.rs.dns-oarc.net. "68.87.73.244 DNS reply size limit is at least 490" "68.87.73.244 lacks EDNS, defaults to 512" "Tested at 2010-04-30 13:42:26 UTC"
According to the test page this seems to mean that Comcast doesn't support EDSL (at the moment). So the big question is: What can I do - aside from praying that Comcast will get their shit together by next week?
You can run your own DNS server and use Comcast only as the pipe. Caching DNS servers are particularly easy to run compared to things like mail servers or web servers as they require little or no maintainence once you get them going.
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Caching DNS servers also have the advantage that you are immune if your ISP messes with DNS or violates the DNS RFCs (such as by returning something other than NXDOMAIN for a non-existent domain)
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Nothing is automatic in DNS, you can implement it anyway you like.
Re:So what do I do? (Score:4, Funny)
C:\Documents and Settings\root\Desktop>dig +short rs.dns-oarc.net txt
'dig' is not recognized as an internal or external command,
operable program or batch file.
What does that mean?
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Your internet is full.
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You're using some version of Windows. dig is a command-line tool on Linux and Unix. Maybe you can find a port of it to Windows, but it's apparently not available by default.
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That you need an operating system to do that. Neither the Quake console or the Windows command line will do.
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Upgrade or die (Score:4, Interesting)
Odd results? (Score:4, Interesting)
At work, using my ISP's DNS, I'm getting a timeout.
At home, using Google's DNS, I'm getting a blank string back.
Those 2 aren't even covered by the linked page. Any idea what they mean?
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Any idea what they mean?
I forsee a large sneakernet in your future.
DNS server slashdotted (Score:3, Informative)
dig +short rs.dns-oarc.net txt now returns absolutely nothing.. on IPv4. The IPv6 one still works.
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rst.x476.rs.dns-oarc.net.
rst.x485.x476.rs.dns-oarc.net.
rst.x490.x485.x476.rs.dns-oarc.net.
"68.87.73.244 DNS reply size limit is at least 490"
"68.87.73.244 lacks EDNS, defaults to 512"
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Not strange. It's cause comcast is shit and they're giving you their own response so they can redirect you to their pages for non existent hosts.
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The IPv6 one is dead now too. A +trace run ends here:
Both the v4 and v6 IP for ns00.rs.dns-oarc.net. are dead, so the whole thing just dies after that.
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Get dig for windows: http://members.shaw.ca/nicholas.fong/dig/ [members.shaw.ca]
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Thanks.
I am getting nothing but timeout errors, both here and on the Linux box at home. Oh well, try again later.
What about djbdns? (Score:4, Insightful)
This is with a stock dnscache from djbdns-1.05:
[muks@misha ~]$ dig +short rs.dns-oarc.net txt
rst.x476.rs.dns-oarc.net.
rst.x485.x476.rs.dns-oarc.net.
rst.x490.x485.x476.rs.dns-oarc.net.
"178.63.21.2 DNS reply size limit is at least 490"
"178.63.21.2 lacks EDNS, defaults to 512"
"Tested at 2010-04-30 13:41:05 UTC"
This seems to say dnscache lacks EDNS. Can anyone with more knowledge of DNS comment whether djbdns is affected?
DJBDNS does not request DNSSEC (Score:2)
DJBDNS doesn't request DNSSEC data, so it will see the same thing it always has.
In fact, it doesn't do EDNS at all, so it can't accept any DNS response (regardless of the reason) over 512B in size.
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djbdns is a collection of programs. The 512B limit doesn't apply to all of them. The resolver dnscache would be the program of concern in this context, and it can both request and serve requests over 512B on TCP in the default build. I am currently using other resolvers for IPv6 reasons, but I don't expect dnscache to have a problem with DNSSEC on the root servers.
Re:What about djbdns? (Score:4, Informative)
djbdns does lack EDNS, which means you're already screwed if you don't want to fall back to TCP for large responses, e.g., that contain IPv6 glue. Djbdns is no longer maintained by the author and doesn't support EDNS or DNSSEC (regardless of whether Bernstein thinks it is a good idea -- larger answers and DNSSEC _are_ being deployed). It's long past time to put djbdns out of our misery. If for religious reasons you don't like BIND there is unbound (http://unbound.net/) that fully supports the DNS.
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djbdns does lack EDNS, which means you're already screwed if you don't want to fall back to TCP for large responses, e.g., that contain IPv6 glue.
Don't be silly. dnscache and axfr-dns fully support large responses via TCP. That's ancient stuff that's been a part of DNS long before Bernstein released a byte of code.
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dnscache even uses EDNS, have a look at it's root priming query, it asks for EDNS.
idiot article (Score:2, Funny)
Not everyone runs Windows^Wa DNS cache, you insensitive clod!
Things only break in some circumstances... (Score:4, Informative)
This story is a bit sensationalist.
DNS resolution will break if the resolving server claims to support EDNS0 AND requests DNSSEC validation but isn't able to receive large UDP responses. Servers which don't support EDNS0 will fail the tests but will still work perfectly come May 5th
Netalyzr includes tests for this... (Score:5, Informative)
Netalyzr [berkeley.edu] also checks for this, both for the client and for the DNS resolver, and reports specifically the DNS resolver's status.
The resolver side tests include actual DNS MTU, advertised MTU, EDNS and DNSSEC requseting, whether the resolver can failover to using TCP, and other related issues.
Overall, the "512B" thing is largely a myth, a few resolvers have this problem but most don't. Rather, the big problem is lack of support for fragmented responses, which won't affect deployment from the root but will affect things when zones start getting signed.
For the end system connection, however, the "512B" or "No EDNS" is a bit more common, but still fragmentation is overall a larger issue.
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CISCO PIX devices running 6.3 and prior with DNS inspect on will have this issue. Most people by now have turned it off because plenty of other DNS queries already execed that limit.
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I recall way back when windows 2003 server (I believe) started shipping, it caused a lot of problems, because its DNS server requested EDNS0 by default. That meant that sites that had crafted their DNS replies to be *exactly* 512 bytes (I know Yahoo was one) replied with 512 bytes *plus* an acknowledgement of the EDNS0 flag, which pushed it over 512. Older PIX firewalls would drop this, and there was no way to get around it. Shortly, there was a version that came out where you could change the inspection
Is DNSSEC going to kill djbdns? (Score:2)
I realize that tinydns and dnscache will work just as they always have so long as the other servers still continue to support non-DNSSEC requests.
Is it likely that at some point the root servers or common resolvers will be DNSSEC only?
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What will kill DJBDNS is when PCI and other standards groups start to require DNSSEC in order to do business. Then companies will be forced to switch to a less secure DNS server just to speak a slightly more secure protocol.
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Even better the software needs to ask for extensions for EDNS and DNSSEC otherwise an authoritive nameserver doesn't even return a larger response.
That's okay (Score:5, Funny)
What does DNSSEC mean for ISPs that mess wtih DNS? (Score:5, Interesting)
Does DNSSEC mean that an ISP with a caching DNS server that returns an IP address other than the correct IP address cant do it anymore (i.e. clients that support DNSSEC will respond with an error)?
Does DNSSEC do anything about NXDOMAIN fiddling? (are there any proposals out there that would allow users to get around ISPs that point NXDOMAIN at ad-laden ISP search pages or is using a non-ISP caching DNS server the only option here?)
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DNS clients that request Authenticated Data will be able to detect that the response is not authentic. So it depends on how the DNS client handles that situation.
Possibly the ISP could fake there being no DNS servers supporting DNSSEC available and convince the client to accept the un-signed version. I suspect that turning on DNSSEC on all the root servers is specifically designed to stop this though.
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Nothing at all, because you would need a DNS-client which asks for DNSSEC-extension information and actually check it, which most don't.
Will my car still start? (Score:1)
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Cinco de Mayo is now a geek holiday (Score:2)
...to celebrate the day DNSSEC went live :P
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DNSSEC will not go live in May. On that date, DNSSEC will be deployed on all root DNS servers, but with deliberately unvalidatable signatures. This is to test exactly for the kinds of problems described in the article before people start relying on DNSSEC. If all goes well, the properly signed root zone is scheduled for July.
I'm doubtful... (Score:2)
I can't really believe the entities behind the root DNS servers would haphazardly throw the switch without some sort of contingency for the DNS requests that aren't DNSSEC-based.
*adds playboy.com to /etc/hosts, just in case...*
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If your DNS server or stub resolver doesn't request DNSSEC data (by setting the "DO" bit in the request) then the response will be exactly the same as it was before the introduction of DNSSEC. Nothing will break.
The changes will not in general DNS lookups between home PCs and their ISPs.
The people at greatest risk are those (enterprises?) that run their own full DNS servers but whose:
Cisco PIX is affected (Score:4, Informative)
If you have an old PIX or old firmware (6.3(2) or older) then you will be affected. And if you do, you should just go ahead and upgrade to an ASA at this point. ;)
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What do you mean, how can i test if im affected, i have a pix whit 6.3 fw.
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Cisco PIX Firewall Version 6.3(5) (It's a 505)
CentOS release 5.4 (Final)
Bind version: 9.3.6-P1-RedHat-9.3.6-4.P1.el5_4.2
ISP: Comcast
Using google public DNS
[bitwise@localhost ~]$ dig +short rs.dns-oarc.net txt
rst.x1247.rs.dns-oarc.net.
rst.x1257.x1247.rs.dns-oarc.net.
rst.x1228.x1257.x1247.rs.dns-oarc.net.
"xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx DNS reply size limit is at least 1257"
"xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx sent EDNS buffer size 1280"
"Tested at 2010-04-30 18:11:21 UTC"
In my PIX config there is
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And then what...? Upgrade the ASA to a 10 year-old PC running OpenBSD to get some decent features, vastly better ease of use, and support? I seem to be missing step 2 here...
Simple solution ... (Score:4, Funny)
Grab a copy of the DNS namespace and load it into /etc/hosts.
Nothing will happen (Score:1)
.SE has had DNSSEC deployed for almost five years now. We should have found most bug by now...
This only affects BIND and Unbound users (Score:1)
It is generally not made clear that problems are only to be expected for those users behind DNS resolvers that ask 'DNSSEC OK=1' questions by default.
Such 'do=1' default behaviour was enabled in BIND, most likely in an effort to 'make the world safe for DNSSEC'. Even though no further DNSSEC processing is performed by default.
Other implementations, like PowerDNS & DJBDNS, do not wantonly ask 'DNSSEC OK=1' questions. This means that for these (and other) resolvers, on May 5th nothing will happen.
The 'tes
So what ? (Score:1)
The root will use DNSSEC ? So what ? It does not change a thing for anybody not wanting to take advantage of it.
_ one has to explicitely ask for the DNSSEC information to get it (it's a flag). Otherwise it's just a few more unused, somewhat heavy, records on the root zone files.
_ there are not a lot of TLDs using DNSSEC. Granted there is at least one (.se) and probably some are ready to unroll it too but it will not be done in a day.
When more TLDs, registrars and registrants will be DNSSEC compliant and w
Sorry, complete reply using +bufsize=1024 in dig (Score:1)
disone# dig +bufsize=1024 rs.dns-oarc.net txt
; > DiG 9.6.1-P1 > +bufsize=1024 rs.dns-oarc.net txt ;; global options: +cmd ;; Got answer: ;; ->>HEADER- opcode: QUERY, status: SERVFAIL, id: 1322 ;; flags: qr rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 1, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 1 ;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION: ;; QUESTION SECTION: ;rs.dns-oarc.net. IN TXT ;; ANSWER SECTION: ;; Query time: 1031 ms
; EDNS: version: 0, flags:; udp: 4096
rs.dns-oarc.net. 49 IN CNAME rst.x476.rs.dns-oarc.net.