Ready or Not, Biometrics Finally in Stores 317
cancer4xmas writes: "It's very exciting to see USA Today's Technology front page saying, "Will that be cash, fingerprint or cellphone?" They're running a story on emerging biometric devices being the most fundamental change in personal finance since 1950, when the credit card was introduced. The concept is now being tested in some stores. Check out the full story." Now couple that tidbit with this morsel from wherley: "In a letter [scroll down a bit] to Bruce Schneier's Cryptogram newsletter, Ton van der Putte tells of a recent invitation from the BBC to comment on the addition of fingerprint biometrics to the British ID card. Using a digital camera and UV lamp he was able to make dummy fingerprints that fooled the readers - and in less time and less cost than similar experiments 10 years ago. He says: '...now the average do-it-yourselfer is able to achieve perfect results and requires only limited means and skills.'"
Free stuff! (Score:4, Insightful)
LOL (Score:5, Funny)
Well, quite a long while I would think. I would imagine that the teenage checkout person at the supermarket would scream bloody murder at the sight of you using a severed finger, getting blood all over the biometric scanner. I can see it now:
"Paper or plast-- AAAAHHHHHHHH!"
Not exactly the most effective scam to try.
Re:LOL (Score:3, Insightful)
umm
chop
slice
attach print to bottom of real finger
wa-la
Re:Free stuff! (Score:3, Insightful)
I agree, and the real point is, if someone is willing to go that far, certainly cash or a credit card suffer the same shortcomings... you can much more easily pick one's pocket than lop off their finger. And if someone goes as far as killing someone, I'm sure they'd think it much easier to just take the person's credit cards and cash than
Ouch (Score:5, Insightful)
Carjacker + knife + need for your finger = not a pretty scene.
That's kind of kept me off of Biometrics for awhile. Now where'd my tin foil hat go...
Re:Ouch (Score:5, Funny)
Re:Ouch (Score:2, Insightful)
Imagine the idendity thefts of dead people. Not a pretty site.
Re:Ouch (Score:2)
Re:Ouch (Score:3, Informative)
Systems only work
Re:Ouch (Score:5, Insightful)
These things are going to be so flakey. Even something as simple as a mag-stripe reader on a credit card sometimes takes 10 swipes to read on one reader, and just 1 on another.
not shops, ATMs (Score:2)
Re:Ouch (Score:5, Insightful)
I hope Joey Slowy, the illiterate and not-so-bright thief with the crack habit and the carving knife, is fully apprised of the safeguards in place to prevent him from using my severd thumb, before it occurs to him that my thumb is the answer to his temporary lack of his preferred illegal intoxicant.
Be so good as to travel to the local homeless encampment, interrupt his crack-induced reveries, and inform him so, will you?
I'm not sure... (Score:2)
Something tells me you're more likely to call the cops (via the ambulance) if you're suddenly found thumbless, whether or not you were in a shady area of town doing some things you ought not be doing.
Lots of crime goes unreported because people are stuck in the bind
But not if you re-print your own finger/thumb. (Score:4, Informative)
This is far easier than pretending a severed thumb is your own, and with the use of acetone based prints (from the gelatine master) it is virtually impossible for a layperson to determine that you have an overlayed print on your thumb.
Just your $0.02... :)
Q.
Re:Ouch (Score:2)
Attack of the Thumb Snatchers, coming soon to a B-movie theater near you!
Re:Ouch (Score:2, Funny)
Re:Ouch (Score:2)
Re:Ouch (Score:2)
Actually, while that is a worst case scenario, much more likely is someone dusting the car for the owner's thumbprint (after all...it seems impossible that the owner wouldn't have touched his own car) and then casting an image to fool the scanner (and then applying the cast to a current thumbprint, or just doing whatever it takes to mimic a thumbprint in the way the scanner requires.)
Re:Ouch (Score:3, Interesting)
I am guessing that the scanner looks for a temperature of 98 degrees or so, and if it doesn't get it then doesn't process.
Like I said, the problem is the intelligence of the average theif.
Think they will think of this before they cut off my thumb???
Noooooooooo.
In fact, I dare say the theifs may have to have a pocket full of thumbs before they realize that They are doing something wrong.
Re:Ouch (Score:3, Insightful)
God, please, stop... (Score:3, Insightful)
As someone working in biometrics and algorithm development, I would personally like to BEG the press to stop with the awful articles.
Almost every article says the same thing, makes awful assumptions, comments on the privacy issue, and generally screws the pooch.
Misconceptions and overhype can kill technologies for years....
Re:God, please, stop... (Score:2, Insightful)
Re:God, please, stop... (Score:3, Insightful)
Could you please tell me how I change my secret when its compromised? Yes, seriously.
Re:God, please, stop... (Score:5, Insightful)
Re:God, please, stop... (Score:3, Informative)
Too easily compromised (kinda hard to change your fingerprint) and very unreliable.
Fingerprints just are not unique enought and only work in small sample sets. For example, when a criminal investigation is being done the search is limited. When trying to do something like credit cards, you're talking about millions of people. It just won't work. Not solely using fingerprints. Not ever.
Please, don't stop! (Score:5, Informative)
Why stop with the steady stream of articles that point out the real shortcomings of biometrics? So you can keep your job? Sorry, but that's a pretty selfish reason that only works for you, your boss, and a handful of investors.
As Bruce Schneier pointed out years ago, biometrics are a double edged sword. Biometrics are hard to forge (I am deliberately ignoring the $0.50 gelatin trick that fools fingerprint readers since I assume someone will repair that particular shortcoming,) and look to the implementations of the systems for the weaknesses instead. Yes, they are hard to forge. But once the data is turned into bits, it's pathetically easy to copy. And you can't put the genie back in the bottle it once it's gone!
It comes down to "who do you trust?" Do you really trust the department store or the bank to not keep a copy of your biometric identification? What's to keep an unscrupulous merchant from intercepting a copy of your raw biometric data, and saving a copy?
I see signature capture pads all over the place these days. I categorically refuse to use them because I have no confidence that my signature won't be captured and replayed by the wrong person. You can't tell me that a "secure" system will prevent this, because I can't tell a secure system by looking at one. The promise of Open Source is no guarantee, either. Even if it had a picture of a penguin on the outside, a spiffy GNU-y logo, and OSF and SourceForge brand stickers on it, how do I know it's really "IdentifyMe_2.0" and not some hacked-up demo being run by Vinnie the Chiseler? People believe that when they walk into a Home Despot that Home Despot doesn't keep a permanent record of their signature. Of course they keep it; it's actually required by law to retain the audit copy for 36 months (42 in Illinois.)
There are also plenty of known cases [google.com] of fraudulent ATM machines that read your card, accept your PIN, spit out "TEMPORARILY UNABLE TO DISPENSE CASH", and report both your card and PIN to the machine's owner. How is a user supposed to be able to authenticate the biometric device is genuine; that it's not a sham, running a copy for a thief?
How will this change with fingerprinting, hand geometry, retinal scans, or whatever the biometric system of the week may be? It won't; it can't. And since the systems can never be trusted to not "steal" or retain copies of identification for future playback, the systems should never be used in the first place. Using them even one time will put your irreplaceable data in a system it may never escape from.
Biometrics are a technology that should not ever be mainstreamed. They might work fine for a secure military facility, but once they're out in the general populous for any length of time, the protections they represent are gone.
Fake Credit cards are easy too (Score:2)
M@
Re:Fake Credit cards are easy too (Score:4, Interesting)
You think that's bad... (Score:4, Insightful)
Preface: I am posting AC and not naming any names here.
In the mid-to-late 1990s, when the phrase "identity theft" had first entered the lexicon but before the media discovered how well they could capture audiences with its mere mention, I worked with a card issuer on a so-called "secure card" test program. The idea was twofold: merchants were getting complacent in terms of trying to verify that the person presenting the card was actually the cardholder, and credit card fraud was an increasing problem.
The proposed solution to both dilemmas was to issue cards with the cardholder's PHOTOGRAPH on the FRONT of the card. We'd indemnify cardholders against any fraudulent purchases (as opposed to beyond the first $50.. it was a novel idea back then) for any bogus transaction made with one of these photocards. Cashiers weren't bothering to check the back for a signature, but surely they'd see if the photo on the front matched the person making the purchase, right? LOL.
Existing cardholders were allowed to volunteer for the test program by responding to an insert in their bill. Along with the application, they had to send in a photocopy of their drivers' license, and a small color photograph of themselves which was easily identifiable as the same person in the drivers license photo. About 10,000 such cards were eventually issued, with surveys included and sent as a follow-up to see what the cardholders encountered. During the test period, here are a few interesting things we found.
1... Merchants weren't checking the photo, even though it was right there as a 1.5" x 1.5" image on the front left side of the card.
Many cardholders reported no problem giving their spouse the card to use, where the photo wasn't even the same sex as the person making the purchase.
There were a lot of folks surprised that cashiers didn't even notice the photograph.
There were a lot MORE folks surprised that cashiers noticed the photograph but paid it no attention. For example, female customer would use card issued to JOHN DOE with a picture of a man on the card, no questions asked by merchant.
2... Merchants who did check the photo were overly attentive.
People who had changed hairstyles, dyed their hair, grown or shaved facial hair since the photo had been taken, or even gained or lost weight were having their cards refused because the photo wasn't a "perfect" match.
If a card was not outright refused due to appearance changes, a store manager was often called by the cashier, or some other delay was introduced into the purchase, inconveniencing both the cardholder and the merchant.
3... Some of the merchant services reps around the country were issued temporary expense cards with someone else's name and photograph on them (intentionally, as part of the test).
These cards were set to return a "Call" response on transaction attempts, which tells the merchant they need to call the card issuer to get special instructions before accepting the card.
Many merchants ignored the response and ran the transaction through as a "Force" process without bothering to see if there was a problem with the card. In live circumstances this would have resulted in a chargeback to the merchant with no recourse.
Merchants who did call were instructed to check the ID of the customer against the name and photo on the card. In nearly half of these cases, the merchants wound up doing a Force anyway (another chargeback). The reps were told to try and explain it away - "Oh that's my boyfriend's card" etc - and it worked pretty well.
4... Though this obviously is not the party line... Credit cards are as good as cash but provide next to zero security. Ask yourself when was the last time you tried making a purchase on plastic a
Re:You think that's bad... (Score:2)
Voluntary good. Mandatory bad. (Score:5, Insightful)
One potential problem becomes what's "voluntary" soon becomes mandatory. We might as well learn from history. Two specific examples from US history:
(1) The Social Security Number was ~never~ supposed to be used as any kind of central identification number. Now, no one knows who I am without it. I would gladly dump my social security "promises of benefits" to not have a social security number.
(2) To get a driver's license in the state I moved to, I had to give a thumbprint. I've never had fingerprints taken before in my life.
Are we safer as a result? All I know is that now my identity can be more easily tracked by central governmental organizations and those with sufficent access privileges, despite my wishes.
Technology is a tool, not a solution. Just like a hammer, it can be used for much good, but it's easy for those in power to convert it into something pretty sinister. If it's all the same, I'll keep my ATM card. It's a lot easier to change my bank account number than my fingerprint or eyeball.
Re:Voluntary good. Mandatory bad. (Score:2)
Re:Voluntary good. Mandatory bad. (Score:2)
Re:i may be paranoid... but you are ignorant (Score:2)
I find it interesting that, for the most part, Slashdot is a non-religious community. Nothing wrong with that - Slashdot people are more modern-science oriented, so they are less inclinded to believe in an invisible Diety who created worlds and stuff. Yet, I also find many Slashdot people to be enormous conspiracy theorists. Interesting. On one hand, you choose not to believe in someth
Re:paranoid is better than ignorant (Score:2)
Instead of finding real reasons for events, conspiracy theorists decide that things they can't explain are caused by people that they can't see.
(PS - I was in a "secret society" at an ivy-league school as well - not Yale though. And trust me, it's not what you and the movies/theorists think. We had a few parties with another secret society and did nothing really. Oh wait, I mean we decided we w
Re:paranoid is better than ignorant (Score:2)
Electrified TinFoil Hat Time... (Score:3, Informative)
I had to give a thumbprint.
Where I live, bank branches are asking for thumbprints from non-account holders wanting to cash checks.
This, despite:
Yes, it's true that it cuts down costs of fraudulent checks that banks must bear. But it also increases risks to check cashers that their special identifier may be misused. What guarantee does the bank provide that the thumbprint won't be used for
Re:Which state wants fingerprints? (Score:3, Interesting)
And they don't do a damn thing (I maintain that it makes things worse, because people believe it's useful when its not, thereby increasing fraud.) In no state are they even remotely forensic quality.
Re:Which state wants fingerprints? (Score:3, Informative)
start implementing without relying fully relying (Score:2)
Re:start implementing without relying fully relyin (Score:4, Insightful)
Not a good argument. Listen, people can't fly, but let's jump off the nearest 10-story building, and we'll learn how to fly on the way down. I mean, the advantages of being able to fly must outweigh any conceivable drawbacks, no?
The flaw with your argument is that biometric identifiers, once compromised, cannot be changed. What happens if you get your fingerprints lifted? A finger transplant? No, at that point your only choice is to have some sort of fraud alert put on your fingerprint, and then you can no longer use it. So it's useless for you, forever. If you'd read the article you'd see that the authors complained that they discovered critical flaws in fingerprint readers ten years ago, including that they could be fooled using fake gelatin fingers, and they still haven't fixed that. You think Microsoft is bad, leaving IIS unpatched for three months? Try ten years... The only conclusion is that the readers can't be fixed.
Blind adoption of some shiny new technology without at least some foresight is too common, and really, really stupid. Electronic voting is another great example of this...
Cash, credit card or gelatine (Score:5, Funny)
Re:Cash, credit card or gelatine (Score:2)
Re:Cash, credit card or gelatine (Score:2)
(gelatin is made from boiled pig and other farm animals hooves.)
Re:Cash, credit card or gelatine (Score:2, Interesting)
If you're a cook, you probably already know that. But as I doubt you are, here's a small insight
When making chicken stock (chicken stock is THE fundamental ingredient to almost all food preparation), one selects parts like the neck,
Other ways to get past this system (Score:5, Funny)
I've thought about this for awhile, and I am thinking:
Why don't people just cut off their fingers and trade them as a commodity? Each finger is access to a different system...
For instance, if I work for a bank, but I want to get a vacation cheap, I just trade a finger with my buddy who works for some airline. He does what he wants with my bank, and I get the plane tickets I need to get away from this country.
The only problem is, if I want 10 things at once, how do I access the system without any fingers?
Maybe they should sell voice-recognition software with it.
Re:Other ways to get past this system (Score:2)
Unfortunately, even voice recognition [cnn.com] has flaws when dealing with the uneducated.
Oh geesh (Score:5, Funny)
Biometrics replace cards or signatures? (Score:4, Insightful)
Re:Biometrics replace cards or signatures? (Score:2)
Then again, it does say Reverend xpurple
You can see a scan of it, here [macphreak.org]
Re:Biometrics replace cards or signatures? (Score:2, Interesting)
Perhaps ~75% of those who bother to look a
Market driven vs. product driven (Score:3, Insightful)
This is the whole problem with market driven products as opposed to product driven products. Companies rush to produce a product and get it to market to capture some degree of market share even though their product may suck. We have endured years of this under the Microsoft paradigm in that Microsoft advertises years in advance what products they are going to produce, sets a time-line, and then by-god the products will ship by that date. Never mind the quality. I much prefer Apple's way of doing things in that they do not talk about what they are doing, and they then ship a product when it is done. Meanwhile the rest of the computer industry is busy copying Microsofts strategy and the quality of software for the most part is slipping down the tubes.
Products such as biometrics especially needs to be completely wrung out to determine if it can be faked. They did not, it can be, but what do you bet they take it to market anyway?
Re:Market driven vs. product driven (Score:2)
It does happen in agile teams and in the open source/free software tossed salad.
It is the future. Traditional 'oldschool' development is on the way out - except for a few syste
Let me guess... (Score:2, Funny)
technology issues in posted responses (Score:2, Interesting)
1) Mandatory tagging of criminals - There seems to be a fundamental difference between tagging someone as part of their sentence and tagging someone after their sentence has been served (eg, after release from prison). The latter seems a dangerous trend since it indicates that the punishment for certain crimes may change in an arbitrary fashion, even *after* a criminal has served their time and be
Money talks, bullshit walks.Vote with your dollars (Score:2)
If you shop in a store that uses biometric check-out equipment, refuse to use it and SAY SO. Tell the checker. They probably don't care, but if they hear it often enough, the meme will spread. Tell the person in line behind you. If you are not too lazy, tell the store manager that you refuse to use the equipment and that you will either stop shopping at this store or, at least, prefer to shop at stores that don't use this equipment.
Now is the time to speak up against Big Brother. It's easier to prevent thi
Re:Money talks, bullshit walks.Vote with your doll (Score:2)
Got one?
This is better than credit card *how*? (Score:2, Interesting)
So let's
Some ATM's already have this (Score:2, Informative)
Its kind of scary that a fingerprint is so easy to forge. It would be so simple to wipe out someone's life savings.
I would have expected banks to adopt this technology only after it has been widely proven to be secure. Instead they are the guinea pigs risking your money. Something's wrong with this picture.
I'm glad I
Biometrics' shortcomings (Score:5, Informative)
That was a pretty big problem.
We decided on using biometrics as a 3rd or 4th level of authentication (to verify that someone using all of the other levels of authentication are who they say they are to a reasonable level of accuracy).
Re:Biometrics' shortcomings (Score:2)
Spammers (Score:2)
Spammers? Give `em the finger!
Hardly anyone ever uses biometrics correctly (Score:5, Informative)
I don't know why all of these so-called "security experts" keep on advocating biometrics with little or no understanding of their real properties, much less how they should be properly used. Biometrics can be used as unique identifiers, but biometrics are not secrets. They can provide a unique identifier in an already trusted environment, but alone they cannot be used for authentication, which is what so many of these "experts" are ready to do. If I steal your fingerprint using any of the simple yet effective techniques (none of which require me to cut off your finger) described by Ton van der Putte, it can't be un-stolen, and nobody will be able to give you a "replacement" fingerprint.
A quote that iluustrates this naivete from the USA Today article: "Biometrics is one way to really identify the customer you're dealing with," he [Steve Vallance] says. What a foolish, naive statement. Alone, biometrics cannot really identify anybody.
I really can't do any better than point people out to an article in yet another issue of Crypto-Gram, which first came out five years ago: Biometrics: Truths and Fictions [schneier.com].
Re:Hardly anyone ever uses biometrics correctly (Score:5, Informative)
ATMs are secured this way. You've gotta have your card, know your pin, and look somewhat like you for the camera. (Looking wrong doesn't yet deny the transaction... but is a great tool when it comes to figuring out the "Whodunit?" that comes up when ATM fraud is discovered.)
In-store credit cards are slightly less secure. The card has to be present, and the person using the card has to perform the task of creating the proper signature that's on the card. (Again, a wrong signature might not always deny the transaction, but it creates a paper trail for later.) Some stores are advanced enough to also associate the security camera timecode to the transaction to create the visual trail as well, but that's not used as much as it could be as of yet.
Internet or phone card transactions are weaker because there's no demand that either a card or person been seen. That's why those transactions are also more expensive to get processed... they're more likely to result in a write-off from a scam transaction. They are less secure, and that's an admission of it. Still, smart e-merchants can protect themselves by performing some secondary security like only shipping to addresses related to the card.
Biometrics if used alone just the "somethng you are" test, but as we've seen it's going to be confused some of the time. Merging the fingerprint with a PIN number would at least get us to a two-test level of security... but the marketers of biometrics are insisting that their test alone is good enough. That's where they're seriously wrong, no test alone will ever be that good... that's why it's always best to double-check.
Re:Hardly anyone ever uses biometrics correctly (Score:2, Informative)
Re:Hardly anyone ever uses biometrics correctly (Score:4, Insightful)
Every security system known can be broken (including one time pads - if you human engineer a way into getting one of pads - which has been done in the past by secretly capturing one user of a pad, and forcing him to carry on the conversation while relaying the information to his captors).
But the harder a system is to break, the more it deters the use of false or stolen identities.
For example, to replace pictures with biometrics would be stupid. To add biometrics increases the difficulty of the forget. Etc.
A useful authentication system would be one where it takes a lot of work to forge a single identity, and that work would have to be repeated to forge another one. Biometrics in common with other systems have the promise of making such systems.
When I last worked with biometrics (a long time ago), the problem was that you could not get an acceptable false positive rate at the same time that you got an acceptable false negative rate. But when biometrics are combined with other systems, you can allow higher false positives (and hence fewer false negatves = rejections), because the other systems add security. And the whole thing becomes harder to break, making it less worthwhile to break unless you try to protect something way too valuable with it.
Unfortunately, security in computers has often been viewed as identical with cryptography. The result is that serious and smart cryptographers, like Bruce Schnier become "the experts" on security. But mathematics tends to bias people towards openness, provability and precision. Thus many security techniques which do in fact work with real human beings (such as keeping secrets, if you are smart about it) are often decried by them. In other words, Schnier and others make public pronouncements that are out of their true field of expertise.
If you want to find people who truly understand security, check with the military or banks. They have been dealing with security for millenia. They take a different attitude from cryptographers.
They understand that in most systems, security is a cost/risk tradeoff, not an absolute. Hence they use one or more techniques for a particular security need. A simple ID card might get you into a military base, while to get into some facilities requires the ID card, a special ID, the knowledge of safe door combinations, and perhaps personal recognition by another trusted individual. None of these techniques is perfect by itself, but the combination is remarkably formidable.
Thus biometrics represent a a technique that can be used to enhance security. Can it be defeated? Yes, by itself. How easy is it to defeat? It depends on a number of factors, but especially what other security measures are used along with the biometrics, and how their parameters are set.
Re:Hardly anyone ever uses biometrics correctly (Score:3, Informative)
In other words, Schnier and others make public pronouncements that are out of their true field of expertise.
Not that he needs me to defend him, but Schneier's field of expertise has changed hugely over the last few years. He started out as a cryptographer but gradually discovered all of the limitations of mathematics with respect to security. If you read his most recent stuff, you'll see that he fully understands the notions of defense in depth, holistic security, security as a cost/risk analysis, mult
Re:Hardly anyone ever uses biometrics correctly (Score:5, Insightful)
Well, you're absolutely correct, but you've veered a bit from the mark. It seems that the advocates of biometric identification are not interested in using biometrics to augment existing security procedures, but to replace these procedures, and they seem to be gushing that biometric "authentication" is a silver bullet, or something very close to it. Few banks, and no military or intelligence agency in their right mind would be so foolish as to believe that. If you've taken the time to even read the article I linked to, you'd see that Schneier isn't advocating that we not use biometrics at all, but that we not treat them as keys. They have their uses, especially when combined with real keys and other authentication schemes, but to use them alone for authentication isn't generally a good idea.
Granted, sole biometric identification is better than some present identification methods, and could replace them in those areas, where the risk is not high enough to justify the use of more expensive and complex procedures, but does it give sufficient security for many of the domains to which it is being applied? I think not. Biometrics raise the bar a bit, but not high enough to be used on their own for many of the applications to which people want to put them to use.
By the way, you're highly out of date about Schneier's present views on security. If you've taken the time to read his many writings over the years, you'll see how much his attitude towards security has changed since the days of Applied Cryptography, where he naively talks about "protecting ourselves with mathematics." His most famous maxim is now "Security is a process, not a product," and he keeps constantly talking about how security is all about risk management, not risk avoidance. Exactly what you're saying, isn't it? Have a look at Secrets and Lies and the Crypto-Gram archive sometime.
What's in it for the consumer? (Score:3, Insightful)
So, really, what's the incentive for a consumer to want to use their fingerprint rather than something hanging on their keychain or in their wallet. Yeah, the keychain or wallet can be stolen... but safety laws already exist to protect your accounts.
In short, the current system isn't that broken... this solution has privacy concerns attached. Seems like the answer to a question nobody's asking...
Buy now! Protect yourself! (Score:2)
Simple Solution (Score:3, Insightful)
Re:Simple Solution (Score:2)
Simpler still: use Authentec readers (Score:2)
Re:Simpler still: use Authentec readers (Score:2)
Re:Simple Solution (Score:2)
Why I feel safer each day. (Score:3, Funny)
Microsoft would run this service, and advertise it as 100% secure. I feel safer every day.
Oh yeah, and it would be an anti-felony, punishable by a $1000 reward, to use somebody else's biometrics to obtain money, goods, or services. (If that makes you feel unsafe, remember that listening to a CD that you didn't buy, such as if a friend plays a CD and you happen to be in the vicinity, will constitute piracy punishable by death. Feel better? Good.)
No more secure than passwords? (Score:2)
We evaluated many biometric products a while back (mostly fingerprint readers), and I was surprised to learn that most were nothing more than fancy ways to have the computer memorize passwords. So they really provided no additional security. This is especially true if you're using them in a distributed environment, and moreso if it's not 100% Windows. And even those that offered SDK's basically only provided ways to map fingerprints to passwords.
Basically most of them were just convienient shortcuts wh
Asian Women (Score:5, Interesting)
A better system might require several biometric techniques together to reach an identification.(hand shape and finger prints would go together nicely)
This article [idsmartech.com] mentions the Asian woman fingerprint problem about 3/4 of the way down, but doesn't mention a source for this claim.
Fingerprint twins... (Score:2)
H
Re:Fingerprint twins... (Score:3, Insightful)
For instance - How much less credit card fraud would there be if you had to verify not by signiature, but by fingerprint? Much harder to reproduce *quickly* by a purse snatcher / pickpocket.
Re:Fingerprint twins... (Score:2)
And what about a 4 digit PIN number? 1 in 1000 people will have the same code
Uh, you meant 1 in 10,000, right? That would be PINs 0000 to 9999.
Re:Fingerprint twins... (Score:2)
And you have a 1/100,000,000 chance that a van full of kevlar-wearing miltiamen with night-scope goggles and oodles of weaponry break down your door and take whatever they want without fingerprints, or make you do it for them as they hold your girlfriend with a grenade in her mouth.
More seriously, some biometrics are more unique than others...but most are pretty good. Things like facial thermal patterns (blood veins under the skin) or retinal patterns are supposed to be twin-proof. Also, did you realize
Stealing my finger doesn't bother me... (Score:5, Insightful)
When the credit card db gets hacked (and it's happened several times), you just have to cancel it and get issued a new card.
When the fingerprint db gets hacked, they can't issue me a new finger.
A fleshcolored, spit wetted, rubber sleeve over a finger, with a copy of someone elses finger would work quite well, and be undectable by the minimally interested checkout line clerk.
Theyre everywhere! (Score:5, Insightful)
Biometrics: Truths and Fictions (Score:4, Informative)
Biometrics are seductive: you are your key. Your voiceprint unlocks the door of your house. Your retinal scan lets you in the corporate offices. Your thumbprint logs you on to your computer. Unfortunately, the reality of biometrics isn't that simple.
Biometrics are the oldest form of identification. Dogs have distinctive barks. Cats spray. Humans recognise each other's faces. On the telephone, your voice identifies you as the person on the line. On a paper contract, your signature identifies you as the person who signed it. Your photograph identifies you as the person who owns a particular passport.
What makes biometrics useful for many of these applications is that they can be stored in a database. Alice's voice only works as a biometric identification on the telephone if you already know who she is; if she is a stranger, it doesn't help. It's the same with Alice's handwriting; you can recognize it only if you already know it. To solve this problem, banks keep signature cards on file. Alice signs her name on a card, and it is stored in the bank (the bank needs to maintain its secure perimeter in order for this to work right). When Alice signs a check, the bank verifies Alice's signature against the stored signature to ensure that the check is valid.
There are a bunch of different biometrics. I've mentioned handwriting, voiceprints, and face recognition. There are also hand geometry, fingerprints, retinal scans, DNA, typing patterns, signature geometry (not just the look of the signature, but the pen pressure, signature speed, etc.), and others. The technologies behind some of them are more reliable than others, and they'll all improve.
"Improve" means two different things. First, it means that the system will not incorrectly identify an impostor as Alice. The whole point of the biometric is to prove that Alice is Alice, so if an impostor can successfully fool the system it isn't working very well. This is called a false positive. Second, "improve" means that the system will not incorrectly identify Alice as an impostor. Again, the point of the biometric is to prove that Alice is Alice, and if Alice can't convince the system that she is her then it's not working very well, either. This is called a false negative. In general, you can tune a biometric system to err on the side of a false positive or a false negative.
Biometrics are great because they are really hard to forge: it's hard to put a false fingerprint on your finger, or make your retina look like someone else's. Some people can mimic others' voices, and Hollywood can make people's faces look like someone else, but these are specialized or expensive skills. When you see someone sign his name, you generally know it is him and not someone else.
Biometrics are lousy because they are so easy to forge: it's easy to steal a biometric after the measurement is taken. In all of the applications discussed above, the verifier needs to verify not only that the biometric is accurate but that it has been input correctly. Imagine a remote system that uses face recognition as a biometric. "In order to gain authorization, take a Polaroid picture of yourself and mail it in. We'll compare the picture with the one we have in file." What are the attacks here?
Easy. To masquerade as Alice, take a Polaroid picture of her when she's not looking. Then, at some later date, use it to fool the system. This attack works because while it is hard to make your face look like Alice's, it's easy to get a picture of Alice's face. And since the system does not verify that the picture is of your face, only that it matches the picture of Alice's face on file, we can fool it.
Similarly, we can fool a signature biometric using a photocopier or a fax machine. It's hard to forge the vice-president's signature on a letter giving you a promotion, but it's easy to cut his signature out of another letter, paste it on the letter giving you a promotion, and then p
What about... (Score:3, Insightful)
We already have a unbreakable system (Score:3, Insightful)
When I pay for something by debit, I enter a private PIN number to complete the transaction. If the pin is incorrect, the whole transaction needs to be repeated. After a certain number of attempts (usually no more than 3 or 4), a retailer will simply refuse to honor the card at that time (more often than not suggesting that perhaps the card may need to be replaced by the bank). ATM's are exactly the same way... after a certain number of failed attempts, the atm will simply keep the card and I have to wait for the bank to mail out a new one.
Now like it or not, systems which work by scanning fingerprints *CAN* be fooled consistently by a sufficiently technically minded individual. Systems which require a secretly selected (and well chosen) authentication number cannot be fooled by any means other than sheer lucky guessing (and you'll run out of tries long before your odds of guessing right even approach being something more than negligible). IMO, that's about as foolproof as we're ever going to get (unless or until it becomes technologically possible to read other people's thoughts).
Re:We already have a unbreakable system (Score:2)
Re:We already have a unbreakable system (Score:2)
If the ATM is out of order, the slot that accepts the card will be closed. Always. ATMs perform a self-diagnostic between each user, and will shut down if there are any problems detected that could conceivably interfere with any single transaction that the next user might wish to have. ATM's are hand-checked almost daily by security personel to ensure that the machines are appropriately stocked with money and run the ma
Re:We already have a unbreakable system (Score:2)
Also, suppose instead of "out of order", we have fake "out of CASH" machine. That would get YOU. for sure.
Biometrics for the Masses? (Score:2)
-kgj
Compromises are fatal (Score:3, Interesting)
If somebody, somehow, no matter how, gets your biometric information, what do you do?
That's right - switch to credit cards.
Why at all? (Score:3, Interesting)
It's my contention that no automated system will ever be as good as our old paper lady, may she rest in peace. She may have had a vulnerability, but either nobody dared exploit it, or they were just too amazed by her apparent superhuman powers to bother. Why can't we just go back to using human beings to do jobs human beings are good at and use machines for jobs machines are good at?
time to game the system..... (Score:3, Interesting)
He acquired his 15 seconds of internet fame [wired.com] by duplicating and sharing his frequent shopper's card via his personal web site. I can only imagine the junk mail he receives on account of that profile.
Speaking from experience (Score:2, Insightful)
Place a kid within 5 feet of a button and he/she will inevitably press it. Repeatedly.
Re:Not all created equal (Score:2)
A
Re:Not all created equal (Score:2)
If the eyeball reader either gets tricked, or worse, tricks itself by deciding that your eye today looks more like someone else's (a problem that will eventually worsen the larger the matching database gets...) there needs to be some backup chall
Re:Not all created equal (Score:5, Informative)
Now you know one reason identity theft is so easy, store clerks are letting people try PIN numbers willy-nilly until they get the right one. There should be a 'five times' law, after which they cut your card up.
Kiosks appear to be taylor made for fraud (Score:2, Interesting)
Of course, Home Depot has built in fraud protection; they have self checkout lanes that require each item purchased to be registered by weight after scanning. Of course my 4x8 plywood, 5 bags of mulch, and 10' PVC pipe are difficult to balance on the scale after scanning so a teller must assist me (and check my card/id in the process.)
I only hope that my
Re:technology issues in posted responses (Score:2)
Welcome to my foes list, asshat.