'About a Dozen' Whistleblowers Reported Boeing 737 Max Problems to the FAA After Fatal Crash (cnn.com) 131
UPDATE (4/28/19): Friday CNN reported that four different Boeing employees called the whistleblower hotline at America's Federal Aviation Administration after a fatal crash in March. But by Saturday the Wall Street Journal was reporting that "about a dozen" current and former Boeing employees and FAA staff members were alleging safety issues at Boeing.
Here's CNN's report on those first four whistleblowers from Boeing: A source familiar with the matter says the hotline submissions involve current and former Boeing employees describing issues related to the angle of attack sensor -- a vane that measures the plane's angle in the air -- and the anti-stall system called MCAS, which is unique to Boeing's newest plane.... The FAA tells CNN it received the four hotline submissions on April 5, and it may be opening up an entirely new investigative angle into what went wrong in the crashes of two Boeing 737 Max commercial airliners -- Lion Air flight 620 in October and Ethiopian Air flight 302 in March.
Among the complaints is a previously unreported issue involving damage to the wiring of the angle of attack sensor by a foreign object, according to the source. Boeing has reportedly had previous issues with foreign object debris in its manufacturing process; The New York Times reported metal shavings were found near wiring of Boeing 787 Dreamliner planes, and the Air Force stopped deliveries of the Boeing KC-46 tanker after foreign object debris was found in some of the planes coming off the production line.
Other reports by the whistleblowers involve concerns about the MCAS control cut-out switches, which disengage the MCAS software, according to the source.
CNN reminds readers that all of Boeing's 737 Max planes worldwide are still grounded
Here's CNN's report on those first four whistleblowers from Boeing: A source familiar with the matter says the hotline submissions involve current and former Boeing employees describing issues related to the angle of attack sensor -- a vane that measures the plane's angle in the air -- and the anti-stall system called MCAS, which is unique to Boeing's newest plane.... The FAA tells CNN it received the four hotline submissions on April 5, and it may be opening up an entirely new investigative angle into what went wrong in the crashes of two Boeing 737 Max commercial airliners -- Lion Air flight 620 in October and Ethiopian Air flight 302 in March.
Among the complaints is a previously unreported issue involving damage to the wiring of the angle of attack sensor by a foreign object, according to the source. Boeing has reportedly had previous issues with foreign object debris in its manufacturing process; The New York Times reported metal shavings were found near wiring of Boeing 787 Dreamliner planes, and the Air Force stopped deliveries of the Boeing KC-46 tanker after foreign object debris was found in some of the planes coming off the production line.
Other reports by the whistleblowers involve concerns about the MCAS control cut-out switches, which disengage the MCAS software, according to the source.
CNN reminds readers that all of Boeing's 737 Max planes worldwide are still grounded
I guess they didn't listen to that moron C6gunner (Score:1)
"Everything's fine, it's all in your heads" - Moron.
Re: I guess they didn't listen to that moron C6gu (Score:2)
Nice to see my fan club is still going strong.
Comment removed (Score:5, Informative)
Valid link: (Score:3)
Re: (Score:2)
That particular article looks like a union propaganda puff piece the way it singles out non-union Charleston, despite very similar issues in Puget Sound. Several of the sources clearly show a union bias.
That isn’t to say there isnt a problem, it just isnt unique to Charleston (or Boeing).
Re: (Score:2)
Yeah because did you not know Unions not corporations control the New York times, you so fucking funny, how many Boeing shares do you own.
The interesting part in the story, CNN emphatically reminding viewers that all 737 Max planes are grounded. Most people are not that smart, hence they remeber Boeing planes are aluminium death tubes but they don't remeber which model. So they get to the counter, is it a Boeing plane, I don't want to fly on a Boeing plane, Airbus, I want to fly Airbus, you bet. Some of co
Comment removed (Score:5, Informative)
Shouldn't that happen *before* the crash? (Score:3, Insightful)
Wouldn't the time to blow the whistle on the problems be BEFORE the crashes?
After them, everyone knows there is a big problem and there is already huge attention on finding the causes.
If you know about the problems in advance, that's the time to blow the whistle. This seems like someone who calls the police after a murder to say, "Hey, I knew before the murder that there would be a murder!" Uh, ok there bud. You should have told us that before the deed. It's a little late now!
Re: (Score:1)
Re:Shouldn't that happen *before* the crash? (Score:5, Insightful)
Or perhaps they were just not being heard until the crashes focused a big spotlight on safety problems with Boeing.
Re: Shouldn't that happen *before* the crash? (Score:2)
That's dumb. Whistleblowers don't depend on media spotlights. Either they reported beforehand, or they didn't. If they did, there should be some record of it.
Re: (Score:2)
They only now have a chance of that. Before, they'd have been politically persecuted for interfering with the profitability of a big campaign donor.
Re: (Score:2)
On the positive side: We have four potential Slashdot editors ready to hire.
this is some damning evidence against boeing (Score:5, Interesting)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?... [youtube.com]
Two sensors, two MCACS (Score:5, Insightful)
I thought it was interesting when I learned the 737 actually does have two of the sensors, one on each side of the plane, and two MCAS systems. What I had previously read on Slashdot seemed to indicate it had only one.
The problem is, there is the captain's MCAS, connected to the captain's side sensor, and the co-pilots MCAS, attached to the sensor on the co-pilot side. The two aren't cross-referenced.
An experienced pilot and aeronautical software engineer wrote that earlier automated systems warn the pilot and later gently push the controls. The pilot can normally override such systems by simply pulling or pushing a bit harder on the controls. The MCAS, in contrast, forced the nose down even as the pilot pull back hard on the stick, trying to overcome the problem caused by the automated system.
That makes sense to me. Even on my RC aircraft, I designed the systems to gently nudge the plane toward stable flight. If I pull up hard, I want the plane to pull up. Maybe there is an obstacle in the way, maybe the automated system is simply wrong, but if the pilot is fighting hard against the automated system, the pilot should win.
Re: (Score:2)
The FAA initial report on the Lion Air crash mentions it, and these two articles are more interesting, especially the first:
https://spectrum.ieee.org/aero... [ieee.org]
https://embeddedartistry.com/b... [embeddedartistry.com]
Re: Two sensors, two MCACS (Score:2)
The first link requires a subscription. The second one says nothing about having two MCAS. There also aren't any "earlier systems" analogous to MCAS on the 737. You seem confused.
One if those people, eh? (Score:2)
> The first link requires a subscription.
No, it requires a free registration, which you should already have of you are involved in any kind of engineering at all. If you're not familiar with IEEE Spectrum, you are probably either:
A) missing out on a LOT of good stuff that is relevant to your job and your hobbies.
Or
B) Not someone who should be so sure of himself about aeronautical engineering
If option A is the case, also check out xkcd.com and maybe BOFH. :)
> The second one says nothing about having
Re:One if those people, eh? (Score:5, Informative)
As I mentioned, I would highly recommend you check out IEEE Spectrum if you like Slashdot. Spectrum is what you'd get if you removed the politics and morons from Slashdot, and added professional editors. Anyway, in case you decide not to register, here's a snippet for you:
-- ...
There are two sets of angle-of-attack sensors and two sets of pitot tubes, one set on either side of the fuselage. Normal usage is to have the set on the pilotâ(TM)s side feed the instruments on the pilotâ(TM)s side and the set on the copilotâ(TM)s side feed the instruments on the copilotâ(TM)s side. That gives a state of natural redundancy in instrumentation that can be easily cross-checked by either pilot. If the copilot thinks his airspeed indicator is acting up, he can look over to the pilotâ(TM)s airspeed indicator and see if it agrees. If not, both pilot and copilot engage in a bit of triage to determine which instrument is profane and which is sacred.
On the 737, Boeing not only included the requisite redundancy in instrumentation and sensors, it also included redundant flight computersâ"one on the pilotâ(TM)s side, the other on the copilotâ(TM)s side. The flight computers do a lot of things, but their main job is to fly the plane when commanded to do so and to make sure the human pilots donâ(TM)t do anything wrong when theyâ(TM)re flying it. The latter is called âoeenvelope protection.â [in this case, avoiding an apparent stall by pushing the nose down]
--
Here's an AMP copy so you don't even have to register:
https://www.google.com/amp/s/s... [google.com]
Re: One if those people, eh? (Score:2)
That article talks about redundant sensors and flight computers. Wtf does it have to do with your claim about "two MCAS"?
Maybe instead of lecturing me about not subscribing to your favourite website, you could try actually presenting some evidence? Like, instead of quoting 3 paragraphs which don't talk about MCAS, try quoting 3 paragraphs which do?
Also your AMP link doesn't work.
MCAS is a software rule in that computer (Score:2)
> That article talks about redundant sensors and flight computers. Wtf does it have to do with your claim about "two MCAS"?
MCAS is a software rule in the computer.
If you're familiar with CSS or SQL, you can have a rough analogy. It would be like a css stanza (block delimited by curly braces), or a section in the sql WHERE clause.
If you're instead familiar with structured programming, MCAS would be kinda like a subroutine - except it is a rule in the flight control computer that is declarative, like CSS,
Re: MCAS is a software rule in that computer (Score:2)
Is it? Where are you getting that from?
You obviously don't have much experience with aircraft since you seem surprised that there were two flight computers. This is standard and everyone in the industry knows that there are two; we also know that there are many other boxes which handle data processing and control various systems. The Flight Computers do a lot of stuff, but they don't do everything.
So, with that out of the way, what information do you have access to which indicates that MCAS is just softw
Re: (Score:2)
> I would love to see the relevant documentation.
If you've now decided you'll believe the documentation, the documentation update for the MCAS rule is all over the web.
Earlier today it seemed you were quite sure that whatever thought happened through your head, your first guess, was much more reliable than the manufacturer's documentation of the system. It seems to me you're going to believe your guess no matter what, you'd rather remain ignorant than learn anything, so I'm done with you. Have a nice d
If you're going to believe manufacturer documentat (Score:2)
> If it's the former I would love to see the relevant documentation.
If you've now decided that manufacturer documentation just might be more reliable than a random thought that happened to pop into your head for no reason, here's manufacturer doc. Pretty clearly states that the Flight Control Computer will send it nose down when the AoA sensor sticks.
http://www.b737.org.uk/images/... [b737.org.uk]
Funny thing - did you ever have ANY reason at all to think that the MCAS rule runs on separate hardware from the rest of t
Re: MCAS is a software rule in that computer (Score:3)
If you've now decided you'll believe the documentation, the documentation update for the MCAS rule is all over the web.
Again, you keep pretending to cite stuff, yet none of it supports you. Of course I've seen the updates on the software rewrites. Those updates say nothing about whether MCAS runs on the flight computers, or whether it's a separate system. You're still just making assumptions.
Earlier today it seemed you were quite sure that whatever thought happened through your head, your first guess, was much more reliable than the manufacturer's documentation of the system.
You haven't provided any documentation. You haven't even provided a link to an article where some random nobody agrees with you. All you've done is link to articles talking about stuff I already know, which has nothing to do with t
Re: (Score:3)
My understanding is it's a single MCAS system, fed by two different AoA sensors. However in a completely f*cked up concept of "redundancy", only one AoA sensor is used by MCAS at any one time. This was highlighted by the big fuss about the live data from both AoA sensors being displayed on the pilot's HUD only being included as a paid-for extra. In what twisted reality should it be down to the pilot to notice a discrepancy between the two outputs & identify a fault?!
if $var1 != $var2 { ALERT!!!!! }
What
Re:Two sensors, two MCACS (Score:4, Interesting)
I am so glad to be hired to work at Boeing. My first assignment is an easy one - write a module that checks the angle of attack and trims the nose down if the angle is too high.
while (on()) {
if (AoA_1 > MAX_AOA) trim(DOWN,5);
sleep(10);
}
Hmm... I showed my code to the manager and he liked it, but told me that there are two angle of attack sensors on the airplane and I should use both of them I don't know why two sensors are used, but maybe if you check it too often it wears out faster or something. I'll just make it so that every time the system comes on it switches between sensors. This way the wear should be spread out evenly. I told the manager that my code now uses both sensors. The manager didn't even look at the code, said everything was fine and that it will be going into production.
Re: (Score:2)
It's not how they should be developed, but it maybe similar to how this one was.
Otherwise there is no explanation for
1. Not using the second sensor that was already there, so it would not even cost any more for the hardware. Those sensors are used for autopilot and they are used properly (autopilot disconnects when the values from both sensors do not match).
2. Deciding to swap which sensor is in use at the time, instead of just picking one and using that all the time. This added more complexity to maintenan
Re: (Score:3)
The stupid runs deeper. There is no way to turn off just MCAS. The only option offered is to turn off ALL electrical trim and use the manual controls, BUT under some conditions a reasonably fit pilot may not be strong enough to adjust the trim without the electrical assist.
So the MCAS puts the plane way out of trim and leaves the pilot no practical way to adjust it back.
All they had to do is sample both sensors and if they disagree, disengage MCAS (and only MCAS) and alert the pilot.
I can only imagine the l
Re: (Score:2)
You should still be able to trim the aircraft, you just need to do what is referred to as the “roller coaster” to lighten up the loads on the stabilizer and then adjust the trim wheels.
It is just a little dangerous doing that at low altitude.
Both accidents should have been immediate return to base, and not try to continue flying, but that is Monday Morning QB’ing.
Re: (Score:2)
This is really nothing new for Boeing
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wik... [wikipedia.org]
Re: (Score:2)
These articles, one by someone who designs these types of systems, and the FAA report, say the pilot and co-pilot have separate systems, which do not cross-reference each other's sensor. When the captain is flying the plane, the captain-side computer, reading the captain-side sensor, controls the trim. When the co-pilot is flying the plane (or thinks he is), the co-pilot's computer reads the sensor on the co-pilot's side.
If a human pilot sees an instrument saying the plane is severely nose up, while the vie
Re: Two sensors, two MCACS (Score:2)
No, they don't. Stop lying. The articles talk about two different flight computers. They say nothing about redundant MCAS
Re: (Score:2)
What I had previously read on Slashdot seemed to indicate it had only one.
You read wrong. From the very beginning discussions on Slashdot have included the problem that if you have 2 analogue sense you never know which one is right.
It was even mentioned in TFS of a story [slashdot.org] here.
The pilot can normally override such systems by simply pulling or pushing a bit harder on the controls.
Which would be a dumb feature in this specific case. The fundamental reason for the MCAS is the assumption that the pilot doesn't know what he's doing when he's reefing back on a stick while the stall warning is on.
If I pull up hard, I want the plane to pull up. Maybe there is an obstacle in the way
You just killed everyone.
maybe the automated system is simply wrong
Maybe the pilot is wrong. We have a long history of planes falling ou
Re: (Score:2)
There are experts who will agree with you that the automated system shouldn't let the pilots override the software.
There are experts who will vehemently disagree with you, pointing out that the pilots have much more information than the automated system does.
> > If I pull up hard, I want the plane to pull up. Maybe there is an obstacle in the way
> You just killed everyone.
I'm pretty sure it was MCAS overriding the pilots that killed everyone.
A standard stall warning will turn on the stall warning l
Re: (Score:2)
MCAS Purpose (Score:3)
It seems akin to a voice recording reminding an automobile driver who's at a stop light 'to make sure the intersection is clear before proceeding' or that 'the accelerator pedal is the one on the right'.
Re: (Score:2)
The root problem is that they did not increase the size of the horizontal stabilizer when they went to the new engine configuration. That would have been the "right" solution but too costly.
The "solution" they came up with involved software control over the trim system. The trim system has more authority over pitch than the elevator controls. When the software failed and the cutoffs failed the pilots no longer had any control over the airplane's pitch.
The equivalent failure in a small plane this wo
Re: (Score:3)
Re: MCAS Purpose (Score:1)
The root problem is that they did not increase the size of the horizontal stabilizer when they went to the new engine configuration. That would have been the "right" solution but too costly.
This is pure bullshit. Increasing the size of the horizontal stabiliser would make no sense whatsoever.
Re: (Score:2)
Re: (Score:2)
Re: (Score:3)
Great comment except that the edge case isn't extreme, it is a typical condition at takeoff.
Re: MCAS Purpose (Score:2)
No, it's not; the system is disabled at takeoff until the flaps are brought up.
Re: (Score:2)
Dumbass, the edge case in question is the aerodynamic stall, not the control system.
Re: MCAS Purpose (Score:1)
You think stalls happen all the time at takeoff, and you're calling me a dumbass?
You're something special.
Re: (Score:2)
Never flown an airplane, hmm? Got a big mouth though.
Re: MCAS Purpose (Score:2)
I for one would absolutely love to see you fly something, and stall on takeoff. Just make sure it's a one seater, and let people know ahead of time so they can clear a path on the ground.
I'll start writing your eulogy. Good luck!
Re: (Score:2)
Confirmed 1) Never flown anything 2) Big mouth.
Re: (Score:2)
It was braindamaged c6gunner blathering about stalling on takeoff, not me. Quote: "the edge case in question is the aerodynamic stall, not the control system". The other edge case we have here is, waste of internet bandwidth. Bye guys, try to employ your typing time for something productive.
Re: (Score:2)
The edge case near-stall, with is the default condition at takeoff.
Re: (Score:2)
The edge case is near-stall, which is the default condition at takeoff. Thanks for wasting more internet bandwidth.
Re: MCAS Purpose (Score:2)
If you're near stall at takeoff you should probably lay off the stick there, Maverick. You're flying an airliner, not a fighter jet.
Might want to start by familiarising yourself with the difference between Vx and Vy.
Re: (Score:2)
I totally get that you are incapable of understanding that takeoff is normally near stall. Fortunately not everyone is brain damaged like you.
Re: MCAS Purpose (Score:2)
I totally get that you're stuck on stupid, but fortunately you're funny.
Re: (Score:2)
And in normal operation, the flaps are brought up before the plane completes it's climb.
Re: MCAS Purpose (Score:2)
Correct, but takeoff and climb are two different things.
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wik... [wikipedia.org]
Of course you shouldn't be approaching a stall during the climb-out, either, but you DEFINITELY don't want to be doing it on takeoff.
Re: (Score:2)
True enough. Stalling is rarely the right thing.
Re: (Score:2, Interesting)
MCAS is actually a regulatory hack mandated by the altered aerodynamics from the new engine placement.
For any commercial aircraft, if you are the pilot, regulations require that the control system should require an increasing amount of pressure to increase Angle of Attack up until stall. In layman's terms, the plane should not go into stall willingly.
With the 737 MAX without MCAS, once you hit a high AoA, the engines nacelles generate extra lift, which makes the plane want to pitch up even further, decreasi
Re: (Score:2)
Re: MCAS Purpose (Score:2)
This means, once you hit that tipping point, you'd actually need to reverse the controls to fight the plane's tendency to pitch itself into a stall.
No, you don't have to reverse anything, you just have to ease off the yoke.
That characteristic is illegal for an airliner
This literally made me laugh out loud. Please quote the law which this is supposedly violating. I'll wait.
I can't believe there are enough abject morons on Slashdot to mod this bullshit up.
Re:MCAS Purpose (Score:5, Informative)
I don't understand the MCAS. The concept of stalling is straight of out "Piloting 101", no? I'm not a pilot and even I know about pointing the nose down to get speed, etc. Isn't its purpose just about the first or second thing that the pilot should know like the back of his hand - why, then, is this being automated? If the pilot gives the engines too much power (thus pushing the 737 Max upward), shouldn't he realize immediately that the plane is heading toward a stall condition, or is this not apparent? I'd like to hear from a pilot.
737 pilot here. MCAS is not there to help the pilot recover from a stall, its primary purpose is to change the way the airplane handles during a stall to more closely match the way the older generation airplanes handle. When you take an older gen airplane, like a 737-800, into a stall, you can pretty much just let go of the yoke and the nose is going to fall down quite nicely on its own. The stall recovery maneuver we train isn't quite that simple, of course, but this is just for purposes of illustration.
The problem with the Max has to do with its engines. They are a larger diameter. In order to avoid having the bottom of the cowl too close to the ground, which would create lots of problems during takeoff and landing, Boeing moved the engine a little more forward on the mounting. That allowed them to mount the engine a little higher because the back of the engine cowl slopes downward toward the rear of the motor. They incidentally also made the nose gear a little longer, and that helped get the front of the engine cowl a little more up off the ground.
During flight testing, they discovered that this new engine configuration caused an unexpected problem. The engine cowl is curved from front to back: it curves just like a wing does. Sticking the thing farther out and farther up meant that the cowl was actually generating a little bit of lift just like the wing does. The center of lift that the cowl generates is enough forward of the airplane's center of gravity that during a stall, the lift off the cowl has enough force to make the nose of the airplane go up, which is certainly not a desired characteristic during a stall: you want what I described with the older generation airplanes: if you just let go of the yoke, the airplane's nose should naturally fall.
In order to mitigate this problem, Boeing came up with MCAS: if this system determines the airplane is beyond the critical angle of attack, and thusly is in a full-on stall (not just approaching a stall, but really fully stalled), it activates, rapidly moving the horizontal stabilizer on the tail to a airplane-nose-down trim. If you were standing out on the ramp when someone was trimming the airplane like this, you'd see the entire horizontal stabilizer changing its angle upwards. That has the aerodynamic effect of causing that small wing on the tail to generate more lift, which means the tail flies upward, which means the nose points downward.
This isn't an attempt to fly the airplane for the pilot, it's to make the airplane handle the same basic way the older generation airplanes handle: MCAS trims the nose down so that if you just let go of the yoke, the nose will drop, just the way all the other airplanes do. That preserves the type rating for all 737 pilots to be able to fly all the different variants of the type: one thing the FAA demands if Boeing wants an airplane certified with a common type rating is that all the variants have to handle the same basic way. And for all I know about the certification process, it's quite likely the FAA wouldn't certify a transport category airplane in the first place with a known handling characteristic of being so dynamically unstable during a stall that the nose pitches up rather than down: the Feds are pretty conservative when it comes to stuff like that, and so MCAS might have been needed even if Boeing were to have abandoned the quest for a common type.
It seems akin to a voice recording reminding an a
Re: (Score:2)
Do you have an explanation as to why they tied the electric override to autopilot/mcas? This seems to be the root cause, the pilots simply couldn't overcome the forces to trim manually. And for whatever reason the MAX ties electric control to auto/mcas. Previous 737s didn't do this and as the physical labeling on the controls reflect this change it was obviously done for a reason.
Re:MCAS Purpose (Score:5, Informative)
Do you have an explanation as to why they tied the electric override to autopilot/mcas? This seems to be the root cause, the pilots simply couldn't overcome the forces to trim manually. And for whatever reason the MAX ties electric control to auto/mcas. Previous 737s didn't do this and as the physical labeling on the controls reflect this change it was obviously done for a reason.
I'm not entirely sure what you mean by this. The stab trim motor uses electric power to spin the wheel and move the stab trim. The autopilot and a couple other stability systems move that wheel frequently throughout the flight on all 737s. Aside from using the handles on the wheel and manually spinning it, there is no other way to move the stabilizer. MCAS is just an additional system on the Max that has an input into the stab trim motor. As it was originally designed, when MCAS activates, it moves the stab trim a certain number of units nose down and will stop. If the pilot then uses the switches on the yoke to move the stab trim the other way, in other words, trimming back to nose-up, the software governing MCAS resets its initial index to the point that it originally moved the trim to. Let's say MCAS activates when the trim is currently set at 6 units. It activates, spinning the wheel nose down to 3 units. The pilot uses the switches on the yoke to spin the trim back to 6 units. MCAS still senses a stall, so a couple seconds after the pilot releases the yoke switches, MCAS activates again. But this time, its little brain is now set to consider 3 units as its starting point, so it spins the wheel back to 3 units and then goes beyond, and now gets all the way to the stops. Why Boeing programmed it this way, you'd have to ask them. I've read that the software update removes this index-resetting so it won't be as likely to wind up trimming the nose fully nose down. Depending on the airspeed, the airplane can be flown like this, but it's really difficult. You'd have the yoke all the way back just to maintain altitude, and it would take a lot of strength to do it. Because of the aerodynamic force you're putting on the stabilizer like this, it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to use the handle on the trim wheel to manually spin that wheel back to nose up. Assuming you have enough altitude to play with, the proper thing to do, once you've disabled the electric trim motor, is accept a little altitude loss, relax the back-pressure on the yoke and let the nose fall, control the airspeed so you don't get too much aerodynamic force on the stabilizer, and now you'd be able to manually spin the wheel with the handle. You might have to do two or three up and down maneuvers like this to get the stab trim spun back to nose-up enough to really regain complete control over the airplane. This would be the case on any 737, including the Max, regardless of what system put the airplane into that full-nose-down trim.
Re: (Score:2)
My limited understanding is that older 737 you could disable auto pilot and still have powered trim control. The two switches are labeled electric and auto, so you can still have electric assist with auto either on or off.
The max has relabled them something like primary and back up, and the behavior is now if electric is on autopilot and mcas is forced active which in my thinking is why they couldn't adjust trim because mcas continue to incorrectly correct their trim adjustments. Basically it's impossible t
Re: MCAS Purpose (Score:2)
My limited understanding is that older 737 you could disable auto pilot and still have powered trim control. The two switches are labeled electric and auto, so you can still have electric assist with auto either on or off.
And you still can. MCAS is not autopilot. You can disable autopilot any time you want. You can't disable MCAS without also disabling all electrical trim control.
Well, actually, that's not true either ... you can disable MCAS through a rather dumb hack, by lowering your flaps. But that's dumb. The main point is MCAS isn't autopilot, and you shouldn't treat it as such.
Re: MCAS Purpose (Score:2)
My limited understanding is that older 737 you could disable auto pilot and still have powered trim control. The two switches are labeled electric and auto, so you can still have electric assist with auto either on or off.
I see. Yes, those switches are relabeled on the Max, but that wasn't really because of MCAS. There are two kinds of stab trim on the 737, a slow trim that the autopilot uses, and a fast trim that the yoke switches activate. MCAS uses the fast trim function.
On the older 737s, the stab trim cutout switch labeled Autopilot would shut off the slow trim function, and the switch labeled Main Electric just shut the whole thing off. But here's the thing: a runaway stab trim is a serious emergency (for reasons that
Re: (Score:2)
My understanding ia the MCAS can drive the stab trim farther than that of the pilot, which is part of the problem.
Re: (Score:2)
Re: (Score:2)
Nice overview, however I note that you could not bring yourself to criticize this Frankenstein's monster of a design, or suggest that the whole archaic airframe ought to be retired to the dustbin of history before it kills yet more people.
Re:MCAS Purpose (Score:4, Interesting)
Re: (Score:3)
True, reports of Slashdot's demise may be premature.
SWA Boeing FAA (Score:2)
South West Airlines has 750 737s and will not buy or operate any other type of aircraft. Boeing does not want to lose this kind of customer (see also Ryanair and other budget short-range carriers). Boeing's customers demanded a more fuel-efficient 737 and the result was the large-fan engined MAX with its compromised aerodynamics.
There is a better safer aircraft that fits the market niche the 737 carved out, the Airbus 320neo family but it's not a Boeing 737 so companies like SWA won't change over to it unle
Re: (Score:2)
South West Airlines has 750 737s and will not buy or operate any other type of aircraft.
Right, and I for one will be now be flying on any orther airline but Southwest whenever possible.
Re: (Score:2)
You Boeing camp followers aren't doing a whole lot to improve the company's tarnished reputation
Re: (Score:2)
Are you are certain it is “in a stall” vs “approaching a stall?” Boeing has repeatedly stated it is not a stall prevention system.
Re: (Score:2)
If the pilot gives the engines too much power (thus pushing the 737 Max upward), shouldn't he realize immediately that the plane is heading toward a stall condition, or is this not apparent?
I am not a pilot, but from what I read and heard, the problem was that without MCAS, the plane would handle differently compared to the older models. This would require a different type rating for the pilots (additional training for that model, just like going from Boeing 737 to Airbus A320), which would cost money for the airlines.
MCAS made the new model handle just like the previous one, so the pilots only had to do a short theory test (basically read a list of the differences and then pass a test, notabl
Re: (Score:2)
Basically safety regulations require linear force changes on the yoke when the plane is approaching a stall. Without MCAS, the controls lighten up slightly, which could mislead the pilot. Apparently this is a bigger issue when banked in a turn than level flight.
However, I haven’t seen anything specifically stating the windows where it is needed for compliance; the windows and modes appear to be too loose, especially with the high AoA sensor failure rate.
Split Boeing Defense & Commercial (Score:1)
Boeing is getting Billions for defense work that takes priority over their commercial aviation business. The easy defense money has lowered the standards of the commercial segment.
Boeing needs to be split into AT LEAST two independent business groups because the current situation endangers the safety of the flying public.
Wrong name (Score:2)
The actual whistle-blowing is usually taking place _before_ the pressure tank blows up, not afterward.
This would be better named "I could have told you so"s.
Re: (Score:2)
'This would be better named "I could have told you so"s.'
Or just "witness for the prosecution".
So are we ever going to stop voting for folks (Score:3)
Bernie Sanders seems to be the only viable candidate who's stuck with his guns (Warren's only polling in single digits, I think she's basically done after the first debate...). And don't get me started on the GOP. I don't know of a single example of a prominent GOP politician who even pretends to refuse corporate PAC money.
This crap will keep happening so long as we keep voting for folks who are obviously on the take [opensecrets.org].
Re: A flawed strategy from Boeing management (Score:2)
As was said in IEEE, fitting larger engines on an a/c that could not afford it was a bad idea from the start.
Yep, that's a bad idea. Not sure what it has to do with the 737 MAX though.