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Boeing's 737 Max: Carrying Passengers Again In December? (sfgate.com) 85

"Boeing's much-maligned 737 Max jet could be cleared to fly again in just a few weeks," reports SFGate, adding that one U.S. airline plans to carry passengers "as early as December." Although the Federal Aviation Administration has not disclosed a public timeline for the Max's return to service, approval to lift the grounding could come as early as mid-November, according to Reuters. Boeing executives said they expect to gain FAA recertification before the end of the year. The company will also need to get approval from the European Union Aviation Safety Agency and Transport Canada, which are conducting their own respective reviews...

American Airlines said it plans to operate one daily Boeing 737 Max roundtrip from Dec. 29 through Jan. 4 between its Miami hub and New York's LaGuardia Airport. If it takes off, American will be the first US carrier to bring back the Max...

Other U.S. airlines operating the Max are taking a wait-and-see approach before assigning the fleet type to flights.

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Boeing's 737 Max: Carrying Passengers Again In December?

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  • by Anonymous Coward

    No need to murder another bunch of innocents.

    • Re: (Score:2, Interesting)

      by bobbied ( 2522392 )

      It will be OKed in Europe too with some "to be done in the future" changes required in a new software load coming in a few months. My guess is that if the FAA lifts the grounding order, Europe won't be very far behind.

      The regulators have all gone through this aircraft with a fine-toothed comb, it will be one of the safest aircraft in the sky. I'll be happy to fly it and bring the family along to prove I'm convinced they have addressed the problem.

      • by Anonymous Coward
        Not going to any more funerals, thanks greedy boeing.
      • by gweihir ( 88907 ) on Saturday November 07, 2020 @02:56PM (#60696460)

        The really interesting thing is will people fly with it? The online-booking sites I use tell you the aircraft type before you book...

        • The really interesting thing is will people fly with it? The online-booking sites I use tell you the aircraft type before you book...

          Ah, yes, but how many passengers will care? You are correct, this will be an interesting question and I think by the time the general public is back into flying a few years from now, few will remember all this and I'm guessing most of the booking sites won't be showing anything about 737 MAX on them. The aircraft will be quietly rebranded.

      • "I'll be happy to fly it and bring the family along to prove I'm convinced they have addressed the problem."

        I think I'll drive...

        • Almost posted something similar earlier:

          If it's a Boeing, I'll be going

          ...

          for a drive.
        • "I'll be happy to fly it and bring the family along to prove I'm convinced they have addressed the problem."

          I think I'll drive...

          And you will have a MUCH higher chance of being in a fatal accident. Automobiles have a MUCH higher death rate per passenger mile than any commercial aircraft.

          • Yeah, well, driving's way more fun, U see more, experience the country more, and I've not had a problem with the getting killed thing, not even close. And I don't have to get in a big metal tube with 100 other people and catch their germs, either. Public transport of all flavors sucks for that.

  • by fod_dzug ( 6598790 ) on Saturday November 07, 2020 @10:44AM (#60695260)
    I'll choose planes that actually fly. Customer privilege.
    • I'll choose planes that actually fly. Customer privilege.

      The 737 Max will be airworthy. Everybody is in CYA mode, Boeing, the FAA, Other National Authorities, and even the Airlines. The pilots will be heavily trained, the aircraft will be well maintained and ANY possible fault will be rigorously corrected because nobody wants to be holding the liability bag. This aircraft will be the most scrutinized system flying and likely the safest thing in the sky.

      Of course, if you are uncomfortable, feel free to wait for the next flight. The inconvenience will be your c

      • by Anubis IV ( 1279820 ) on Saturday November 07, 2020 @11:24AM (#60695368)

        The pilots will be heavily trained,

        If so, doesn’t that defeat the whole point of the MAX? It was sold to airlines on the basis that the flawed MCAS at the center of this whole ordeal would obviate the need for them to train and certify their 737 pilots on this variant. If that’s no longer the case and heavy retraining will be necessary, the MAX suddenly becomes a LOT less appealing to airlines.

        • by bobby ( 109046 ) on Saturday November 07, 2020 @12:44PM (#60695826)

          If so, doesn’t that defeat the whole point of the MAX?

          Not quite. It was the point of MCAS.

          The real point of the MAX was better efficiency using bigger engines (to compete with Airbus). To put bigger engines on the 737 they had to mount them somewhat forward and higher, which changed the handling dynamic (more thrust pitch-up) and would have required (probably minimal) additional pilot training. Boeing thought they could get away with an automated hidden compensation system called MCAS.

          However, MCAS, when given bad info (AOA sensor problems), went berserk and killed people. Previous to the 2 crashes were many reports of the MAX going berserk, but due to the secrecy of MCAS, and the frenetic nature of air travel, and the general nature of human assessment and communication, the problem wasn't fully understood and cataloged until months later with a 2nd crash.

          I don't understand the philosophy nor legality of hiding something from the pilots. Machines break. If the humans don't know MCAS even exists, how can they compensate? The hiding of MCAS removed the possibility that the pilots might have been able to save the plane.

          • by Aviation Pete ( 252403 ) on Saturday November 07, 2020 @01:34PM (#60696090)

            and would have required (probably minimal) additional pilot training.

            Wrong. The new engine creates an unstable pitch behavior at higher angles of attack that are expressly against the letter and spirit of the certification regulations. Proof [ecfr.gov]

            MCAS was meant to hide this unstable behavior. Of course this was stupid, and using a single sensor for something as aggressive as this new MCAS was criminally, grossly negligent.

            • Not so much unstable as "different." To avoid having to make this a different classification requiring different training, they put in MCAS to try to avoid any different behavior at all. Didn't work out as well as they might have liked, shall we say?
              • There were some suggestions that it might have had a substantial pitch stability issue near stall (malignant pitch up feedback from engine nacelle airflow), but I never took note of anything that confirmed this. Seems like the controls just got unacceptably light during high AoA, slow flight, violating some number of FAR requirements. This seems to be supported by the sneaky shift from a minor stab position tweak (to correct some minor difference in handling) to an AoA-driven free for all.
            • MCAS was meant to hide this unstable behavior. Of course this was stupid, and using a single sensor for something as aggressive as this new MCAS was criminally, grossly negligent.

              I'd call it more compensating for an undesirable behavior rather than masking it. That's hardly stupid, unless you want to call a yaw damper [wikipedia.org] stupid and invalidate about 60 years of aircraft design.

              There are lots of automated systems in any modern transport jet that are there to compensate for undesirable tendencies in certain flight conditions. The stupid thing Boeing did here was the way they implemented MCAS, relying on the single point of failure you mentioned, making it far too easy to fail, as well as

            • MCAS was meant to hide this unstable behavior.

              Correction: MCAS was meant to pull the wool over regulators' eyes.

            • by bobby ( 109046 )

              Hey Aviation Pete, is bold necessary? Gotta shout? I'm not sure how you proved me Wrong.

              When I posted that I was thinking, "someone is going to blast me, yet in agreement with me".

              How is what you wrote different from what I wrote? As far as I can tell and read, you agreed with me, just used some different words.

              Do you come here just to pick fights and get into flamewars?

          • The system wasn't hidden. It was part of the pilot training package. The issue is a very much chicken and egg dilemma. The documentation was part of training, but the system existed so that training would not be required and as such pilots were not obligated to read about it or learn about it.

            What was "hidden" (omitted is probably a better word) was some of the details about exactly how to disable it. But the MCAS itself was part of the documentation available.

            • Readily available documentation, you say?(something something) Beware of the Leopard.
            • by thegreatbob ( 693104 ) on Saturday November 07, 2020 @04:18PM (#60696872) Journal
              It was actually mentioned in an FCOM I read, dated 2016 iirc, in which it appears as a glossary term along the lines of:

              MCAS - Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System

              ... and that's it; no other mentions.
            • by bobby ( 109046 )

              This is just getting into ridiculous semantics and pedantry. I'm sorry if you didn't like my wording, "hidden", but IMHO, who gives a *^&% if they mention MCAS, but oops, kind of neglect to tell pilots where the OFF switch is? Isn't that functionally the same as "hidden"? Can you show me in a 737MAX cockpit where the MCAS ON / OFF switch is? Or an entry in a pilot's training manual, or 737MAX flight manual?

              Sorry, I'm a bit annoyed- please explain why you're defending Boeing on this.

              • This is just getting into ridiculous semantics and pedantry. I'm sorry if you didn't like my wording, "hidden", but IMHO, who gives a *^&% if they mention MCAS, but oops, kind of neglect to tell pilots where the OFF switch is? Isn't that functionally the same as "hidden"? Can you show me in a 737MAX cockpit where the MCAS ON / OFF switch is? Or an entry in a pilot's training manual, or 737MAX flight manual?

                Sorry, I'm a bit annoyed- please explain why you're defending Boeing on this.

                There is NO off switch for the MCAS, but there is an off switch for ALL systems that mess with the stab trim including the autopilot and a whole mass of pilot actions that cause automatic trim systems to kick in. All you folks who start yammering on about how the MCAS was somehow novel or unusual are just making noise based on the press reports, and have little understanding of how modern aircraft systems are designed and used.

                I'm not defending Boeing's engineering here, but I'm also not going to blindly

                • by bobby ( 109046 )

                  None of us are "yammering" (and you're kind of one to talk).

                  The only OFF switch I know if is to turn off electric trim, and direct verbiage from pilots and test pilots is that if you turn off electric trim, you might be in very very big trouble in some situations, especially where you can't crank the manual trim fast enough to keep the plane from crashing, which the "black box" data showed happened in several MAX plane flight "anomalies".

                  Before I go on, could you please defend your position? You say you're

                  • Boeing made a mistake. I'm saying that this wasn't due to negligence or malfeasance but a process problem. The software safety/Risk management engineering processes missed some stuff, specifically this MCAS issue. So Boing has liability here, and they've already admitted to it. They will be paying out billions in civil courts over the years to come.

                    The FAA ALSO made a mistake on this. They approved and oversaw the process that Boing was using to self certify.

                    You see, I'm not excusing Boeing or the FAA,

          • The real point of the MAX was better efficiency using bigger engines (to compete with Airbus). To put bigger engines on the 737 they had to mount them somewhat forward and higher, which changed the handling dynamic (more thrust pitch-up) and would have required (probably minimal) additional pilot training.

            Or they needed to redesign the wings around the engines, which would have required additional recertification and training.

            I don't understand the philosophy nor legality of hiding something from the pilots.

            $

          • Not an issue of thrust pitch up. Issue of aerodynamic changes with the engine nacelles (size, position, other facets of their design). Based on the information I've seen thus far, it has something to do with airflow around the upper portion of the engine intakes at high angles of attack.

            This seems to be brought up in every thread about MAX, usually accompanied by erroneous claims of CoG changes being the cause - it may seem logical, but note that the thrust centerline has not changed much... the engines ar
        • I would venture they need to be heavily trained, but, along with any 'Do you feel lucky, punk?' passengers also heavily armoured!
          • I would venture they need to be heavily trained, but, along with any 'Do you feel lucky, punk?' passengers also heavily armoured!

            You make it sound like this is some serious problem to deal with. Dealing with an MCAS failure isn't rocket science, it takes about 5 seconds and is not an unfamiliar process for pilots. The "Training" they need is in identifying the problem fast enough and knowing how to adjust the trim should the problem present itself. They also need to know what NOT to do, like don't turn the stab-trim back to ON...

            The problem was they didn't have the training to identify the issue, not that they didn't know how to f

      • An airplane designed in the 1960s cannot be the safest thing in the sky - it lacks a strong fuselage, envelope protection and a lot of other things that have become mandatory for newly designed aircraft since then but were allowed to be grandfathered for older designs.
        It is the by far oldest airliner design out there that is still in regular passenger duty. Even the last passenger Tu-154 has been retired a few days ago.

        • I'll make the argument that some of these older aircraft may be stronger than you're giving them credit for - never heard of a 737 of any vintage breaking up from simple maneuvering loads (Copa 201 entered a dive and broke up at supersonic speeds), only from hitting the ground/structures or other aircraft. There is also the example of Aloha 243 [wikipedia.org] which was able to land safely despite a substantial loss of fuselage structure. This leads to further concerns about the construction/inspection/repair techniques in
          • https://www.nytimes.com/2020/0... [nytimes.com]
            https://www.aviation-accidents... [aviation-accidents.net]
            https://www.aviation-accidents... [aviation-accidents.net]

            This breaking into three parts after a runway overrun is a common occurence for the 737 - far more often than for the A320 - that can crash land and stay relatively intact, like the one in Russia a couple of months ago. Also the pickle fork cracks many 737NG had.
            Modern standards for the airframe strength require the fuselage to withstand an AFAIR 20% stronger impact than the old standards valid in the 1960s.

            • Agreed, they're definitely not as sturdy as the newer birds - I just don't see them as being fragile, especially when taken in the context of their time. This then brings us back to MAX, and how it would theoretically handle the same types of impacts - especially the 10 stretch.
            • Also, the Istanbul accident (Pegasus 737-800) might be a bit exceptional - took quite a drop down a steep hill before striking an apparently very sturdy wall. But yes, have seen many shots of overruns with the characteristic nose/empennage separation. My guess would be that the central part wing torsion box and its surrounding fuselage structure is necessarily stiff due to limitations of the techniques used to build it, causing concentration of stress fore and aft during abnormal accelerations. I'm not an e
          • Actually, found a couple more, SilkAir 185 [wikipedia.org] and Adam Air 574 [wikipedia.org] which also broke up in high speed dives. Similar to the Copa flight, though the causes varied, and include among other factors, possible PCU failure/rudder hard-over (Silk Air), instrument failure (Copa), pilot error (Adam Air).
      • Here are nearly an hours' worth of reasons not to fly on the 737 MAX, and, there's not a single mention of MCAS or software. This was published in 2014, and discusses issues in the physical manufacturing process and Boeing leadership's decisionmaking.

        https://www.youtube.com/watch?... [youtube.com]

        I'm hesitant to fly on any of their planes, since these kinds of problems will affect other models at some point. I haven't flown in years, so I feel perfectly content waiting another day or two to take a different flight. I al

      • The 737 Max is museum worthy.

    • by Strider- ( 39683 ) on Saturday November 07, 2020 @12:18PM (#60695668)

      The 737-Max flies just fine, it's just that it flies *differently* than the 737-800 and previous generations. Boeing tried to hide this through software and a poorly executed MCAS. They did this to try and make it so the pilots didn't need to take additional training to fly the new type, making it more attractive to the airlines. Turns out that was a mistake. With adequate training to the pilots on how to properly handle the aircraft, it's perfectly safe.

      • A plane that can easily stall is not a plane that flies well to me. Again, if you don't mind risking your life to save a few few bucks, there will be more room for me on the planes that don't need a hack to stay airborne. I admire your sacrifice, but don't expect me to do the same.
        • by ceoyoyo ( 59147 )

          The max doesn't stall any more easily than any other airliner. If you're super worried about pitch-up-with-throttle behaviour, you'll have to fly on a plane with high mounted engines. Today that basically limits you to a regional jets, or some museum piece McDonnell-Douglas jets still flying in a few places. But at least you'll have pitch-down-with-throttle behaviour!

      • With adequate training to the pilots on how to properly handle the aircraft, it's perfectly safe.

        No, it isn't. Sorry to rain on your parade, but the 737MAX is unstable in pitch at higher angle of attack. This is expressly forbidden [ecfr.gov], exactly because it makes this airplane unsafe. To hide this behind a piece of software controlled by a single sensor doesn't make this any better. Not telling the pilots about it is just the icing on the cake. Boeing management should be put behind bars for this.

        The best remedy would be a larger horizontal tail. But that requires a strengthened rear fuselage and will cos

        • by bobby ( 109046 )

          You must have mis-read my previous post. We're in complete agreement; you must just not understand my wording- even though you might think you do, you do not, based on your disputing me previously.

          ...the 737MAX is unstable in pitch at higher angle of attack.

          Please define and explain "unstable" in this context. Or maybe define and explain "stable".

          • Stable tends towards level flight, unstable tends away from it.

            The 737 MAX is a bad design at best. It represents an ideal example of why self-certification is unacceptable.

    • I'll choose planes that actually fly.

      Those tend to be the problematic ones, thank you very much.

  • by Misagon ( 1135 ) on Saturday November 07, 2020 @10:46AM (#60695264)

    Hell no!

  • The question was never about "If it takes off". The concern was always more about if it was going to land.

    • The question was never about "If it takes off". The concern was always more about if it was going to land.

      Oh, if it gets off the ground, it's going to land... The questions are if you will walk away from the aircraft and will it be useable again when it's all over.

    • What goes up, usually comes down again. That is not the problem. The problem is how much they will have to pay the passengers to fly in it.
    • by UnknowingFool ( 672806 ) on Saturday November 07, 2020 @11:28AM (#60695382)
      Technically, the planes always landed. Just not in a controlled manner. The highly technical term, I think, is "crashed".
    • by gweihir ( 88907 )

      The question was never about "If it takes off". The concern was always more about if it was going to land.

      Even that is not a concern. The question is _how_ it will land and how many of the passengers survive that landing.

  • by Anonymous Coward

    Is there any, given that we're all still waiting for a COVID-19 vaccine before travel can regain any normality at all?

    • Is there any, given that we're all still waiting for a COVID-19 vaccine before travel can regain any normality at all?

      You have a point, but the economics of the 737 Max will get it into the air long before COVID-19 is history. The reasons for the 737 Max still exist and the airlines will be moving back to the 737 Max for the same reasons they purchased these aircraft, money. They are not going to let some expensive assets just rot on the ground, they will fly them.

    • COVID-19 is old and busted. COVID-20 is the new hotness.
  • by nospam007 ( 722110 ) * on Saturday November 07, 2020 @10:48AM (#60695274)

    We'll see what the passengers think about his.

    • Got to get the message out about recognition, if the public are to get to know when to refuse boarding. How about 'double winglets and frilly exhausts'? Anyone think of a catchy rhyme?
    • If it's Boeing, I'm not going.
    • We'll see what the passengers think about his.

      Really?

      1} In my experience, most travel doesn't rigidly specify what model aircraft you're going to be on until you're on it. Airlines can switch if required.
      2} In my experience, most people on an aircraft only know what it is while the attendants are reading the "this blah-blah-blah has fifteen emergency exits located nowhere near you" material before takeoff.

      This is going to be forgotten and ignored, fast.

      • It is entirely possible to choose an airline that only flies Airbus single isle aircraft, so they physically won't be able to switch to the 737 MAX.

        • by OzPeter ( 195038 )

          It is entirely possible to choose an airline that only flies Airbus single isle aircraft, so they physically won't be able to switch to the 737 MAX.

          But that supposes said airline services the airports and routes that you desire. That is not always the case.

          But worst case scenario is that your Airbus only airline suffers a scheduling issue that can easily be solved by leasing an aircraft from another airline, and a 737 Max could be the cheapest option.

        • Keep in mind too that it's also entirely possible to be on the ground, minding your own business and still be killed by a 737 MAX.

  • Not this passenger (Score:5, Insightful)

    by haunebu ( 16326 ) on Saturday November 07, 2020 @10:49AM (#60695280) Homepage

    No, thank you!

    • by OzPeter ( 195038 )

      No, thank you!

      Then (assuming post covid flying conditions) you'll hav not very vigilant about what airlines you fly with and what routes you fly on. And even then you'll need to look out the window when you're at gate just to verify that the airline didn't substitute the plane you thought you were flying on for a 737 Max due to scheduling or mechanical issues. At which point you'll either have to fly on a Max or suck up the fees for not getting on the flight.

      (Note that I'm also with you on this, I'm just pointing out

  • by ytene ( 4376651 ) on Saturday November 07, 2020 @10:53AM (#60695288)
    n/t
  • I would travel in one, after all the boeing and faa executives fly on it with their immediate family members for a whole year.

    Also, its nice that boeing has a shill in these comments.

  • do we need them? (Score:4, Insightful)

    by Papaspud ( 2562773 ) on Saturday November 07, 2020 @11:13AM (#60695340)
    seems like they have plenty enough aircraft to go around for the air traffic right now- what is the hurry?
  • Why is Boeing risking a confidence crisis for the whole aviation ? Max should have gone a complete certification process under a new decicated type. Only this would have make people feel comfortable flying it. I will wait couple of years before flying on bord of a Max, and thanks to Covid, not flying is now an option. If I need to fly anyway I will avoid any company that has any active Max : #KISS Sad that Boeing is imposing such a burden on all of us, simply because they are not able to redo things from
  • As is evident from comments here, many will be reluctant to fly on a MAX, if they know it's a MAX, and Boeing doesn't re-brand it, or the airlines don't try to hide it.
    Sometimes, air frames, in passenger service, do not recover from catastrophic but correctable design issues. DH Comet and Lockheed L-188 Electra never did, although both soldiered on in military service (Electra still does, as P3), and the Electra is also still used in cargo service.

  • Is this to catch those COVID missed?

  • All air travel not necessary to survival (which isn't much) is recreational therefore needless. Business can be conducted remotely and really important business flights can be done by private charter. Socialization is more convenient via internet.

    COVID proved the world gets on fine with drastically reduced passenger travel (and drastically reduced pollution vs burning millions of tons of jet fuel). That's progress coerced by events.

  • But let's not cancel it or redesign it, or fix any of the fundamental design flaws. That would cost too much. We built too many to redesign it now. Let's just patch over some of the rough spots and put it in the air! I know our own engineers came out to say it was a fundamentally flawed design, but what do they know? The accounting department says we can't not fly it, so we're flying it.

Truly simple systems... require infinite testing. -- Norman Augustine

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