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EU Software Transportation

European Regulators Prepare For MAX To Return To Service In 2021 (theregister.com) 40

Posted by BeauHD from the what-to-expect dept.
thegreatbob writes: Looks like the main additions over the FAA's requirements are some additional pilot training requirements. The actual EASA statement can be found here. Confirms what the available information had been pointing to: the plane flies tolerably without its Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS), but does not meet certification criteria. [The MCAS was a software system installed on the Max by Boeing to compensate for the Max having larger engines than its predecessors in the 737 family of airliners. Those larger engines changed the way the aeroplane responded to its controls, requiring a software system to keep it within certifiable limits.] The EU Aviation Safety Agency made the announcement after confirming the airliner will return to European skies in January 2021.

Patrick Ky, chief of EASA, said in a statement: "EASA's review of the 737 MAX began with the MCAS but went far beyond. We took a decision early on to review the entire flight control system and gradually broadened our assessment to include all aspects of design which could influence how the flight controls operated. This led, for example, to a deeper study of the wiring installation, which resulted in a change that is now also mandated in the Proposed Airworthiness Directive."

Ky added: "We also pushed the aircraft to its limits during flight tests, assessed the behavior of the aircraft in failure scenarios, and could confirm that the aircraft is stable and has no tendency to pitch-up even without the MCAS." A spokesperson for EASA clarified that the Max's MCAS "is necessary to meet the safety regulation and obtain the necessary safety margins. However, when it is lost (failed and inoperative), an averagely skilled and trained crew is still able to safely fly and land the airplane."
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European Regulators Prepare For MAX To Return To Service In 2021 More

European Regulators Prepare For MAX To Return To Service In 2021

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  • Bracketed text (Score:3)

    by thegreatbob ( 693104 ) on Wednesday November 25, 2020 @07:08PM (#60766378) Journal
    The bracketed text was not written by myself - but I'll make an addition that it was the engine nacelle design/placement to blame for the aerodynamic/handling discrepancies that necessitated a fix, not the engines directly. As it will probably come up, CoG changes are trivial to compensate for, and Center of Thrust didn't change enough to matter - low slung engines on a jet will cause it to pitch up when power is applied (these are not vastly more powerful), and this is handled by the related "Speed Trim System".

  • You're a fool if you fly in this aircraft (Score:5, Insightful)

    by Cryptimus ( 243846 ) on Wednesday November 25, 2020 @07:14PM (#60766392) Homepage

    The Atlantic article documented clearly how the 737 MAX was a product of an appalling management culture that ignored the safety concerns of engineers.

          To me, this implies it is incredibly likely that other fatal flaws exist - they just haven't been uncovered yet.

          You're a fool if you fly in this aircraft.

    • Re: (Score:3)

      by tlhIngan ( 30335 )

      The Atlantic article documented clearly how the 737 MAX was a product of an appalling management culture that ignored the safety concerns of engineers.

      To me, this implies it is incredibly likely that other fatal flaws exist - they just haven't been uncovered yet.

      You're a fool if you fly in this aircraft.

      Unfortunately, they're all like that. Airbus has some pretty fatal flaws in it as well. As did many other aircraft - pret

      • You mean McDonnell Douglas, not Lockheed, right?

      • Boeing had two types grounded this decade. Airbus had only one grounded (the Concorde) two decaes ago, and this wasn't even an actual Airbus.

        • Since Airbus launched its fly-by-wire aircraft in the A320, Boeing has had three major groundings (737 Classic, 787 and 737MAX) and Airbus has seen none - and yet people try to make out that Airbus is the unsafe manufacturer...

    • I'm not a fan of what Boeing has become, but the 737MAX was in service for nearly 2 years before the grounding. If there were other flaws we'd have likely seen them by now. The MCAS issue was also not an engineering failure, by a systems one - nothing malfunctioned except the designer's understanding of how pilots would react to the system.

      Again doesn't excuse the rubbish management that caused this problem and then tried to fob it off after the first crash, but the plane itself is unlikely to be inherently

    • The Atlantic article documented clearly how the 737 MAX was a product of an appalling management culture that ignored the safety concerns of engineers.

      To me, this implies it is incredibly likely that other fatal flaws exist - they just haven't been uncovered yet.

      You're a fool if you fly in this aircraft.

      Yep, fly other 737s: https://www.seattletimes.com/b... [seattletimes.com].

      To me this just shows this isn't simply caused by the management culture, unless that same culture existed more than a decade ago. On the other hand, AGAIN Boeing, seriously? Didn't the 2009 incident teach you NOT to rely on a single instrument for inputs to automated flight controls? I'd probably laugh if it was in Dilbert, rather than downing two aircraft and killing all onboard.

    • Given the heavy scrutiny these airplanes have just received, I would guess they are actually reasonably safe now. It's other more recent Boeing planes like the 787 that I'd be more worried about.

      • Re: (Score:3)

        by ytene ( 4376651 )
        Actually, I think the evidence might show you're completely wrong there.

        Let me try to explain...

        New Aircraft Certification Requirements

        Because the 787 was an entirely new aircraft, Boeing had no choice but to complete ALL the required certification for it. They had no choice but to develop a from-scratch training plan for pilots. Any airline that wanted to add the 787 to their fleet had to pay for their pilots to undergo *full* conversion training. This meant that, from an operational and aircraft h

  • Lucky for Boening, it seems that Biden won.

    Nonetheless, expect some pushback from the CAAC

  • ...in other news, third world countries continue to use 'underqualified' pilots to fly their complicated aircraft, with up to a 1/3 with fake pilot certifications and credentials. Portland Mud airlines spokesperson said "the MAX continues to be a great plane to pilot if you're a complete newb to flying!"

  • You meant "737 Max" at the very least.

    DO YOUR JOB.

  • A little insight (Score:4, Interesting)

    by dschnur ( 61074 ) on Wednesday November 25, 2020 @08:06PM (#60766502)
    My brother is a 737 captain for a major US airline and had some interesting input: The Air Line Pilots Association, Int’l (ALPA) is the union that represents pilots for several major airlines. Unlike other trade unions, its number one priority is flight safety. They are often the first to point out airlines which are unsafe along with airplanes and even pilots. If they have a member who is unsafe to fly, they will "suggest" that pilot find a new job.

    Taking the above into account, if they approve of their members flying that plane, then I'd feel safe on it flying on it too. After all, their members are the ones who will be spending the most time aboard that aircraft type.
  • “the aircraft is stable and has no tendency to pitch-up even without the MCAS.”

    How have they managed that, considering that with the engines mounted forward and higher up, the airframe generates lift around the nacelles, especially under high thrust conditions, such as at take-off.

    ‘MCAS "is necessary to meet the safety regulation and obtain the necessary safety margins. However, when it is lost (failed and inoperative), an averagely skilled and trained crew is still able to safely fl
    • Because the significance of the changes has been grossly overstated (which is reasonable in absence of precise data on the airplane's aerodynamics). The truth lies somewhere in the middle, I suspect. They weigh less than 1000 lbs more, the amount of thrust they produce isn't that much greater (1-2000 lbs approx), they're not massively further forward, and they're not all that much higher (the fan is only a bit over 8 inches larger in diameter). Any lift effects the the nacelle can produce are muted by how c

  • They say without the MCAS the plane would not pass certification, but it is still "safe" without MCAS. I really don't understand, I thought the certification criteria is about what is "safe" vs "not safe". I mean, either change the certification criteria, to what is actually safe, or not certify a plane that may fly at times with the system that is required to pass certification off.

    • Pitch controls get too light on approach to stall; this does not imply, by itself, that the aircraft is prone to stalling. Various evidence, such as the extreme changes to MCAS movement allowances during development, seemed to suggest a stall-prone aircraft with a possible tendency to enter a self-reinforcing pitch up condition, but nothing ever materialized to confirm this (though I still can't definitively deny either of these possibilities, for lack of information).

      Per FAA requirements (I imagine EASA's
  • Didn't the FAA do this less than a week ago, and we all got out our pitchforks and torches? You know the guys, compulsively vowing not to be cowed by the US government until the EU says it's ok?

    Guess what? They're AS safe or as unsafe as they were a week ago . . .

    • Guess what? They're AS safe or as unsafe as they were a week ago . . .

      This is not the purpose of obtaining a second opinion - going to a second doctor won't inherently change anything about an illness (which has already been proven to exist), but can provide additional insights, or help to clarify a prognosis. The idea is to come up with a well-rounded treatment plan, aiming for the best chance of a positive outcome.

      The FAA granted Boeing significant latitude to damn near certify its own plane, resulting in a series of egregious violations of public trust. EASA, at the time

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