


European Regulators Prepare For MAX To Return To Service In 2021 (theregister.com) 40
thegreatbob writes: Looks like the main additions over the FAA's requirements are some additional pilot training requirements. The actual EASA statement can be found here. Confirms what the available information had been pointing to: the plane flies tolerably without its Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS), but does not meet certification criteria. [The MCAS was a software system installed on the Max by Boeing to compensate for the Max having larger engines than its predecessors in the 737 family of airliners. Those larger engines changed the way the aeroplane responded to its controls, requiring a software system to keep it within certifiable limits.] The EU Aviation Safety Agency made the announcement after confirming the airliner will return to European skies in January 2021.
Patrick Ky, chief of EASA, said in a statement: "EASA's review of the 737 MAX began with the MCAS but went far beyond. We took a decision early on to review the entire flight control system and gradually broadened our assessment to include all aspects of design which could influence how the flight controls operated. This led, for example, to a deeper study of the wiring installation, which resulted in a change that is now also mandated in the Proposed Airworthiness Directive."
Ky added: "We also pushed the aircraft to its limits during flight tests, assessed the behavior of the aircraft in failure scenarios, and could confirm that the aircraft is stable and has no tendency to pitch-up even without the MCAS." A spokesperson for EASA clarified that the Max's MCAS "is necessary to meet the safety regulation and obtain the necessary safety margins. However, when it is lost (failed and inoperative), an averagely skilled and trained crew is still able to safely fly and land the airplane."
Patrick Ky, chief of EASA, said in a statement: "EASA's review of the 737 MAX began with the MCAS but went far beyond. We took a decision early on to review the entire flight control system and gradually broadened our assessment to include all aspects of design which could influence how the flight controls operated. This led, for example, to a deeper study of the wiring installation, which resulted in a change that is now also mandated in the Proposed Airworthiness Directive."
Ky added: "We also pushed the aircraft to its limits during flight tests, assessed the behavior of the aircraft in failure scenarios, and could confirm that the aircraft is stable and has no tendency to pitch-up even without the MCAS." A spokesperson for EASA clarified that the Max's MCAS "is necessary to meet the safety regulation and obtain the necessary safety margins. However, when it is lost (failed and inoperative), an averagely skilled and trained crew is still able to safely fly and land the airplane."
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You're a fool if you fly in this aircraft (Score:5, Insightful)
The Atlantic article documented clearly how the 737 MAX was a product of an appalling management culture that ignored the safety concerns of engineers.
To me, this implies it is incredibly likely that other fatal flaws exist - they just haven't been uncovered yet.
You're a fool if you fly in this aircraft.
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You’re welcome to risk it, but if it’s Boeing, I ain’t going.
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Re:You're a fool if you fly in this aircraft (Score:5, Informative)
Just to put all the facts on the table, the A310 hasnt been sold by Airbus in 25 years, and the youngest A310 is 22 years old.
Its also the last of Airbuses non-fly by wire aircraft.
And here it is being used to try to make the MAX and Boeing look good.
The MAX has been in service for 3.5 years, and has been grounded for 1.8 of those years - before the grounding, Boeing had managed to deliver 387.
This means that the MAX managed to outdo the A310s 37-year operational record in just 1 year and 10 months of operations and only 50% more aircraft delivered.
Thats why Boeing is having a PR issue safety wise today and Airbus isnt.
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Agreed
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You're a fool if you fly in this aircraft.
By this time next year there will be hundreds of these aircraft operating the usual routes moving millions of people without issue.
There will always be a few cranks warning people about 737 MAXs. You won't be one of them. You'll just shut up about it. And that will be nice.
The fact that you posted this AC so nobody can rub that prediction in your face when you are proven wrong indicates that even you don't really believe that.
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Dunno about you, but my employer asked the travel agency that is buying the company tickets to not use Boeing aircraft after the second crash. Guess what, the travel agency complied and complies, even more today when the number of tickets we buy is sharply down and the choices are fewer.
Amazingly, the average we pay has not changed very much. That is, there is enough safe, non-Boeing alternatives and therefore, no reason to get killed in a Boeing.
If it's Boeing, I ain't going.
Simple.
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asked the travel agency that is buying the company tickets to not use Boeing aircraft
I'd like to adopt this policy for our company as well. What's the name of your travel agency?
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And you're an imbecile who has no idea what you're talking about.
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Unfortunately, they're all like that. Airbus has some pretty fatal flaws in it as well. As did many other aircraft - pret
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Boeing had two types grounded this decade. Airbus had only one grounded (the Concorde) two decaes ago, and this wasn't even an actual Airbus.
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Since Airbus launched its fly-by-wire aircraft in the A320, Boeing has had three major groundings (737 Classic, 787 and 737MAX) and Airbus has seen none - and yet people try to make out that Airbus is the unsafe manufacturer...
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Yes, the Boeing FUD always has been strong.
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I'm not a fan of what Boeing has become, but the 737MAX was in service for nearly 2 years before the grounding. If there were other flaws we'd have likely seen them by now. The MCAS issue was also not an engineering failure, by a systems one - nothing malfunctioned except the designer's understanding of how pilots would react to the system.
Again doesn't excuse the rubbish management that caused this problem and then tried to fob it off after the first crash, but the plane itself is unlikely to be inherently
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The Atlantic article documented clearly how the 737 MAX was a product of an appalling management culture that ignored the safety concerns of engineers.
To me, this implies it is incredibly likely that other fatal flaws exist - they just haven't been uncovered yet.
You're a fool if you fly in this aircraft.
Yep, fly other 737s: https://www.seattletimes.com/b... [seattletimes.com].
To me this just shows this isn't simply caused by the management culture, unless that same culture existed more than a decade ago. On the other hand, AGAIN Boeing, seriously? Didn't the 2009 incident teach you NOT to rely on a single instrument for inputs to automated flight controls? I'd probably laugh if it was in Dilbert, rather than downing two aircraft and killing all onboard.
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Given the heavy scrutiny these airplanes have just received, I would guess they are actually reasonably safe now. It's other more recent Boeing planes like the 787 that I'd be more worried about.
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Let me try to explain...
New Aircraft Certification Requirements
Because the 787 was an entirely new aircraft, Boeing had no choice but to complete ALL the required certification for it. They had no choice but to develop a from-scratch training plan for pilots. Any airline that wanted to add the 787 to their fleet had to pay for their pilots to undergo *full* conversion training. This meant that, from an operational and aircraft h
now we are only misisng the chinese regulators (Score:2)
Lucky for Boening, it seems that Biden won.
Nonetheless, expect some pushback from the CAAC
in other news... (Score:1)
"MAX" ?! (Score:2)
You meant "737 Max" at the very least.
DO YOUR JOB.
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The headline should summarise the story , not require reading the story or searching to work out ts meaning.
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A little insight (Score:4, Interesting)
Taking the above into account, if they approve of their members flying that plane, then I'd feel safe on it flying on it too. After all, their members are the ones who will be spending the most time aboard that aircraft type.
MCAS: the longitudinal stability enhancement (Score:1)
How have they managed that, considering that with the engines mounted forward and higher up, the airframe generates lift around the nacelles, especially under high thrust conditions, such as at take-off.
‘MCAS "is necessary to meet the safety regulation and obtain the necessary safety margins. However, when it is lost (failed and inoperative), an averagely skilled and trained crew is still able to safely fl
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They'll get all of two weeks of reduced business and that will be it.
I really don't understand. (Score:2)
They say without the MCAS the plane would not pass certification, but it is still "safe" without MCAS. I really don't understand, I thought the certification criteria is about what is "safe" vs "not safe". I mean, either change the certification criteria, to what is actually safe, or not certify a plane that may fly at times with the system that is required to pass certification off.
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Per FAA requirements (I imagine EASA's
Americans (Score:1)
Guess what? They're AS safe or as unsafe as they were a week ago . . .
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Guess what? They're AS safe or as unsafe as they were a week ago . . .
This is not the purpose of obtaining a second opinion - going to a second doctor won't inherently change anything about an illness (which has already been proven to exist), but can provide additional insights, or help to clarify a prognosis. The idea is to come up with a well-rounded treatment plan, aiming for the best chance of a positive outcome.
The FAA granted Boeing significant latitude to damn near certify its own plane, resulting in a series of egregious violations of public trust. EASA, at the time